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Abstract 
The transfer of the Straits Set tler!'lents from the India Office 
to the Colonial Office in 1867 was the outcome of a persistent campaign 
begun in 1857 by the mercantile communities of the Straits Settlements, 
particularly that of Sinoapore. The transfer was delayed largely 
ii 
because of objections from the Treasury that the Straits Settlements were 
not self-supporting. Iotperial consent came only after the Straits 
SettlementM proved that they could be self-supporting and the strategic 
importance of Singapore was more fully appreciated. The aims of the 
campaign for transfer were two~old: (1) to bring about a new constitution 
that would provide for an Executive Council and a Legislative Council 
with unofficial representation and (2) to elevate the status of the 
Straits Government by providing the governor with wide powers to conduct 
foreign relations, particularly with the ~~lay states. The campaign 
achieved only n partial success in 1867 for its second aim did not 
materialize immediately. The Dritieh government was reluctant to get 
involved in Malay affairs. After 1867 demands for British intervention 
grew rapidly; they were favoured by colonial entreprenuers and officials 
but r~jected by the British government. Lord Kimberley, who conducted 
colonial affairs within the framework of Gladstone 1 s policy, but with 
considerable initiative, rejected in 1871 recommendations that political 
officers be appointed to the Nalay stateso However, he favoured . this policy 
in 1873 because he believed he could satisfy Gladstone's requirement: 
no British protection unless there was such a desire on the part of 
the native state involved. In t87J Kimberley fulfilled that condition: 
Tenku Kudin of Selangor expressed his desire for British protection. 
iii 
And Governor Clarke swiftly put this forward policy into effect in early 
1874. The establishment of the Straits Settlements as a Crown colony, 
followed by intervention in Malaya, came about largely as the result of 
colonial influences; international rivalry remained a background factor. 
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THE ~lAKING OF BRITAIN'S l-.'E\i HALAYAN 
POLICY, 1857-1874: THE INTERPLAY 
OF I~WERIAL AND COLONIAL INTERESTS 
vii 
Introduction 
In 1867 the British government transferred the Straits Settlements 
from the India Office to the direct administration of the Colonial 
Office as a Crown Colony. Seven years afterwards British influence was 
extended ir. the ~mlayan Peninsula with the appointment of British 
political officers to the native states of Perak, Selangor and Sungei 
Ujong. These two measures extended Imperial control and responsibility 
in the area, contrary to the general trend of Liberal colonial policy. 
The transfer was not only a redistribution of administrative responsibilities 
between the India Office and the Colonial Office but also involved 
Britain's general colonial policy, signifying a change in that policy 
towards the Straits Settlements. A number of substantial changes in 
the government of the Straits Settlements took place, with the introduction 
of Executive and Legislative Councils with unofficial representation 
in the latter body. The position of the Straits Settlements in the 
Empire was generally reappraised, with the result that their importance 
was enhanced. The appointment of political officers called Residents to 
the Malay states put an end to the traditional policy of non-intervention 
and inaugurated the Residential system under which the Residents became 
the de facto rulers of the Malay states. 
The agitation for the transfer originated in Singapore in 1857 
but did not achieve its aims until almost ten years later. The delay 
was primarily due to insistent objections from the Treasury that the 
Straits Settlements were not self-supporting financially. During the 
agitation for the transfer the desire to see British influence extended 
viii 
over the Malayan Peninsula was frequently expressed by the local community. 
Ho\1ever, the Imperial government resisted such demands because they 
were incompatible '"i th its policy of non-intervention in Halay 
politics. Nonetheless, the transfer did materialize, although rather 
belatedly, and the appointment of British officers to the l>talay states 
was finally approved by the Imperial government. These two significant 
developments were linked closely. But they were approved only after the 
requirements of the Imperial government were satisfied: in the first 
case, the Straits Settlements proved that they could be self-supporting; 
in the second case, there was an expressed desire on the part of a 
l-!alay ruler for Bri ti15h protection. 
E. A. Benians points out in his introductory Chapter to Volume III 
of The Cambridge History of the British Empire that: 11 In British colonial 
policy three influences were always making themselves felt - Britain'l5 
own needs and sense of her own interests, the needs and opinions of her 
Colonies, and the changing face of the world.111 Here Benians is writing 
about British colonial policy after the 1870s when international politics 
became intricately entangled with the affairs of the Empire. Nonetheless, 
his general remark about the interplay of these three different forces 
is equally applicable to our subject. The three forces were operative in 
the making of Britain's new Malayan policy, although not all were of 
equal weight. International rivalry for colonies was secondary to the 
more important considerations of Imperial and colonial needs. It is 
1 The Cambridpe History of the British Empire 1 Vol. III ( 1959), J. 
ix 
the purpose of this study to investigate, in the light of Benians's 
remark, the various influences on the formulation of the two significant 
decisions taken in regard to l-lalaya. We shall look at the development 
of the policies from their emergence through their vicissitudes to their 
eventual adoption by the British government. Concentrating on the 
actions of the Imperial government, we shall deal with the varying 
attitude~ of the Colonial Office, the India Office and the Treasury 
towards the demands from the Straits Settlements. In other word~, we 
shall examine, mainly, London's response to the persistent demand for 
increasing imperial control ~•d ass~7.ption of responsibility in ~~laya. 
The thesis consists of six chapter~. The introductory chapter 
briefly outlines the trend of Britain's colonial policy, bringing out 
in this general context the various elements that contributed to the 
outbreak of the campaign for the transfer of the Straits Settlements 
to the Colonial Office. The second chapter deals with the origin and 
development of the agitation for the transfer and the initial response 
of the I~~erial department~ immediately concerned, the India Office ~~d 
the Colonial Office. The people involved and their organizations a~ 
well as the channels through which the colonial demands reached London 
are also examined. The subject of Chapter three is the objections from 
the Treasury to the proposed scheme and the reasons behind them. The 
Treasury's objection~ are related to the general colonial policy of 
the day. Chapter four concentrates on the resulting compromise between 
the interests of London and Singapore and the final approval of the 
proposal by the Imperial government. We discuss in Chapter five the 
X 
governmental chm1gcs that accompanied the transfer, . the gradual emergence 
of a new policy in the Straits Settlements with respect to the Halay 
states, and its incompatibility with the General Imperial policy of the 
Gladstone administration. The issue centres largely on the nature and 
extent of the Straits Governor 9 3 powers in foreign affairs. Chapter six 
discus~es the rea5on~ behind Lord Kimberley's decision to adopt a more 
active policy in the Malay states. While C.N.Parkinson1 stresses the 
effects of Britainvs domestic politics on the eve of the t874 general 
election and C.D.Cc,~nn2 emphasi7.es the forces of international rivalry, 
we suggest that Kimberley decided to change the traditional policy of 
llhands-o:ff11 because he believed he could satisfy Glad!>tone's general 
requirements in this reg<trd: no Dritish intervention unless there was 
such a desire on the part of the native state involved. 
1 C.N.Parkinson, ~ritish Intervention in I>1alaya,t801=1Z. 
(Singapore: University ofl\lalaya Press, 1l)60). 
2 C.D.Cowan, Nineteenth Ccntm·y Hal;..ya(London:Oxford University 
Press, 1961). 
Chapter I: The Bri tj sh Empi rc ;md the Straits 
Settlements in the Nid-Ninetcenth 
Century 
, I 
2 
The main trend of British colonial policy in the 1850s was 
towards self-government for the colonies of white settlement, a policy 
that had made great advances during Lord John Russell's ministry (1846-52). 
In British North America the principle of self-government was conceded 
in 1846, applied in 1848 and tested in 1849.1 In 1848 Lord Elgin, the 
Governor-General, invited the victorious Liberal Party in United 
Canada to form a goventment; the same policy of responsible government 
was also applied to the Atlantic Provinces. Nova Scotia had a party 
government in 1848, and New Brunswick, although did not have a party 
government until 1854, had a coalition goverrunent in 1848. Prince EGward 
Island and Newfoundland obtained responsible goverr~ent in 1851 and 1855 
•·e,p~cti v~l y. 2 
The principle of self-goverrunent was also applied in the 
Aust~alian colonies and New Zealand. In 1853, the Duke of Newcastle,J 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, definitely conceded the 
principle of self-government to the Australian colonies. The keynote of 
British policy here can be found in Newcastle's own words. "It appears 
1 A. L. Burt, The British Empire and Commonwealth (Boston: D. C. Heath, 
1956)' 267. 
2 Burt, British Emnire, 255-267; H. E. Egerton, A Short History of 
British Colonial Policy, 1606-1909 (London: Nethuen, 1950; revised by 
A. P. Newton), 261-267; K. N. Bell and w. P. Norrell, Select Documents on 
British Colonial Policy, t8)o-t86o (Oxford: 'l'.he Clarendon Press, 1928), t-6. 
J Clinton, Henry Pelham Fiennes Pelham, 5th Duke of Newcastle (1811-64), 
was educated at Eton and Oxford; in December 1852 became Aberdeen's 
Secretary of State for the Colonies; in June t854, the Secretary for War 
when the War Office became a separate aepartment; C~lonial Secretary again 
in Palmerston's ministry from 1859 until his death in 1864 . Dictionary of 
National Biography (hereafter cited as ~), IV, 554-555 • 
J 
to me therefore," he wrote to the Governor of Ne~ South Wales, Sir 
Charles Augustus FitzRoy, "that, lthile public expectation is as yet but 
little excited on the subject of responsible government, it is very 
desirable that we should prepare ourselves to regard its introduction as 
a change which cannot be long delayed and for which the way should be 
gmoothed as far as possible. 111 In 1855 the Imperial Government finally 
approved new constitutions giving self-government to .the Australian 
colonies, and New Zealand was granted a responsible government in 1856.2 
By 1856 responsible government had become an accepted principle in the 
settlement colonies, a year before the outbreak of the agitation in 
Singapore for the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the Indian 
Government to the direct administration of the Imperial Government. 3 
The grant of responsible government to the settlement colonies 
synchronized with the triumph of Free Trade. The Corn Laws were repealed 
in 18~ and the Navigation Acts done away with in 181t9. The connection 
between these two great developments in the colonial system can be easily 
establiahed. When the Imperial Government abandoned the monopoly of colonial 
trade it was no longer necessary to control the administration of the 
colonies. Earl Grey, the Colonial Secretary who was responsible for the 
introduction of responsible government, defended his policy in terms of 
1 The Duke of Newc~stle to Sir Charles Augustus FitzRoy, 4 August 1853, 
in Bell and Horrell, Select Documents, 161-163; also Egerton, British 
Colonial Policy, 276. 
2 Egerton, British Colonial Policy, 271-278; B21l and Horrell, Select 
Docum~nts, tl~B-155, 166-171; E. L. ~ioodward, The Age of Refonn (Oxford: 
the Clarendon Press, 1962, 2nd. ed.), 377-378. 
J Bell and Morrell, Select Documents, 6. 
Free Trade. He maintained that the Empire should be preserved, but not in 
the same old way. The Imperial Government should not interfere in the 
internal affairs of the colonies because the end of the old conunerical 
system had removed the necessity for control of the trade and tariff policies 
of the colonies. 1 
However, the policy towards British India, under which the Straits 
Settlements were placed, was altogether different from that applied to the 
settlement colonies. Although a Legislative Council was provided for India 
in 1853, it had no elective members and was intended only to assist the 
Governor-General. The period under discussion coincided with the governor-
generalship of Lord Dalhousie (1848-56), who was appointed by the same 
Russell ministry. It was Dalhousie's administration that witnessed a great 
expansion of British rule in the continent of India. 2 The }.tanchester 
School, although generally deploring the expansionist policy of Dalhousie, 
advocated governmental intervention in India, such aa the promotion of 
cotton production and railway construction.J 
1 Earl Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord John Rus!!!ell 1 s Administration 
(London, 185J), vol. I, 11-18; R. L. Schuyler, The Fall of the Old Colonial 
System: . A Study in Dritish Free Trade, 1770-1870 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 19L1-5) ~ 146-149.. Uurt, howew~r, holds that the evolution to self-
government was due more to the impact on the colonial administration of the 
American Revolution and the consequent advance of democratic ideas in North 
America. See Burt, British Empin~, 243-251. 
2 E. L. Woodward, Age of Reform, 4o8-412. 
3 J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade", Economic 
History Review, 2nd. ser., vol. VI,1 (195J), 1-15; R. J. Hoore, "Imperialism 
and 'Free Trade' Policy in India, 185.3-411 , Economic History Review, vol. XVII 
( 1964-5), 135-145; P. llarnetty, "The Imperialism of Free Tra<ie: Lancashire 
and the Indian Cotton Duties, 1859-186211 , ~~~.:_:Jnic History Review, 
vol. XVIII ( 1965), 333-49 and "Tile L!!p eri<l.li .::.! o i Free '.l'radc : LancaBhire, 
India, and the Cotton Supply !.(uestion, t86t-65", The Journal of British 
Studies, vol o VI ( 1966) , 70-96. For a contrary vie~-~point, see 0 o NacDonagh, 
"The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade", Economic History Revie,.,, volo XIV 
(1961-62), ~89-501o 
r> 
•4-0' ' 
·20' 
.c_ __ 
}.talaya in 1875 
<IU • J.Q~ ~o · 
E LA NT 
~fALAY PEI'ITNSULA 
I 
Sl~A'.#-in:J Settl.erneni.a of' Si.nJ"pqre,, 
.Pinn.ng, ProvirU",('· lt't>.lles1~ aiUL 
.Mala,c~ .. 
JJourularit:-4 or .NaJ.W~ State..• 
net 117w-wrv. 
1.jo. 2o· 
' . . 
. I • ~<> • ~-·· - zp' 
1 3 ~o· 
·'· 
• f• 
'¥ 
co' 1.04-
.'""' 
'- -.. 
:- : 
' 
._ 
.. 
~ 
7' 
- ~o·-
Jd . 
e· l 
10'· 
ao' 
s·~·t;;,vor Genera-l's Otn('A'; oo'. 
.Si.nt~rrpore, 
]•-' Ocf.ober 1875. _ .1 
4 {.. lfj~~-- ~___!_~~ 
5 
Reproduced f'rom R.H.Veitch (ed), Life of Sir ndrew Clarke 
(London, 1905) • · 
6 
The three British settlements in Malaya, Penang, Malacca and 
Singapore, were originally acquired by agents of the East India Company, and 
were initially placed under the control of the Indian Government 1 which was 
in turn governed from London by the Company's Court of Directors and by the 
Board of Control until the abolition of the East India Company in 1858 and 
the creation of a new department, the India Office. The first settlement, 
Penang (officially called Prince of Wales Island), occupied by Francis Light 
in 1786, was made a Residency under the control of the Governor of Bengal 
until 1805 when its status was raised to a Presi<1ency, the Fourth or Eastern 
Presidency, on an equal footing with the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and 
Bombay, which were subject to the gene r a l coutrol o f the Governor-Genera l 
of India. This cl1ange in status was brought about because it was anticipated 
that Penang would become a great trading centre and naval station to compete 
with the Dutch, an anticipation \vhich did not materialize. 
Singapore was occupied in 1819 by Sir Stamford Raffles on behalf of 
the East India Company. In 1823 it carne under the direct control of the 
Gove rnor-General of India. John Cra,·;furd , who played a conspicuous role in 
the agitation for the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the Indian 
to the Imperial Government t,.;enty five years l ater , \ 'laS appointed Resident 
of Singapore (in the capacity of governor,1823-26). 1 
1 John Crawfurd(178J-t868), Orientalist, studied medicine at Edinburgh 
from 1799 to 1803 ''hen he \·lent to India and served with the army in the 
north-\-Jcst. provinces for fi vc years and then transferred to Penang; took 
part in the J ava expedition of Lord Minto in 1811; in 1821 envoy to the 
courts of Siam and Cochin-China; the Res ident of Singapore fr~n 1823 to 
182.6 when h e:! \ 'laS commiss ioner to Pcgu, Durma and J\va; after his return to 
England , devoted himsel f to the study of Indo-China. ~,v,6o-6t. 
He t·ras the parlinmentary agent nnci publi<..:i ty manager in London of the 
Calcutta merchants at a salary of£ 1 , 500 , <!.nd pl a yed a consider.:~ble part 
in the attack on the East India Company 1 s tradino privil c 9es n For this 
see H.Grecnberg , Bri ti s ll Tra<l~ t~.~~i.:_l.:_r;__~r~.:E.~~q __ C?E .• chi !}: t_,,]f-loq_-t8L:2 
(Cc.:J:lbridue :Univers i ty Press , 1951), 1BJ-181J" 
7 
,, 
By the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 Britain's possession of 
Singapore was confinned and the Dutch colony in the •mlayan Peninsula, 
Malacca, was made over to the British in exchange for Bencoolen in 
Sumatra. Two years lnter, Singapore and ~~lacca were incorporated with 
Penang into a single Presidency, officially called the Incorporated 
Settlements of Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca, and came to 
be known collectively as the Straits Settlements. But under Governor-
General Lord Bentinck the Fourth Presidency was abolished in 1829 on 
grounds ot economy and the Straits Settlements were downgraded to the 
\ 
status of a Residency under the control of the Governor of Bengal. No 
further change was made until 1851 when Lord Dalhousie transferred the 
s ·t.raits Settlen•ent~ irom the Bengal Government and placed them under his 
direct administration. 
Whether under the Governor of Bengal or the Governor-General, 
the· domestic and foreign . affairs of the Straits Settlements were subject 
to the approval of the Indian authorities, which were called in the 
Straits the Supreme Government. The administration of the Straits 
Settlements itself was placed in the hands of a governor (stationed at Penang) 
and his two aides called Resident Councillors, (one at Singapore, the other 
at Malacca) who acted as lieutenant-governors. After 18)2 the site of 
8 
government moved from Penang to Singapore where the governor was stationed. 
Authority was concentrated in the hands of the governor, for there was 
no executive or legislative council. 1 This political arrangement was 
soon found to be inadequate and outmoded as circumstances changed. 
The Straits Settlemer1ts were closely connected with Britain's 
trade in the East. Penang and Singapore were acquired by the East India 
Comapny for both strategic and commercial reasons. The long struggle 
between England and France for supremacy in India, and the Company's 
expanding China trftde, proved the value of such a station as Penang, 
which could serve as a base for naval operations in the Bay of Bengal 
and as port-of-call between India and China.2 When Raffles hoisted the 
British flag over Singapore in 1819, he hoped to make Singapore a great 
emporium in the East in order to break the Dutch monopoly of trade in 
the f.falay Archipelago, as the flourishing "country trade" so required. 
In addition, British shipping en route to China would be safeguarded.3. 
1 L. A. Hills, British 1-talaya, 1824-67 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1966; first published in 1924), 81-97• 
2 D. ~. E. Hall, A History of South East Asia (London: f.lcMillan, 
1955), 421-429; Greenberg, British Trade and the Coening of China, 
8-10. 
3 Mills, British ~!alava, 53•55; F. Swettenham, British Halaya: 
An Account of the Orit:tin and Pronress of British Influence in Nala a 
London, 1907; rev. ed. 1948 , 65. 
The growth of trade in Singapore as well as in Penang and 
Malacca was remarkable. In 1819 Singapore was only a small fishing village 
of about 150 inhabitants. It soon became the key to eastern trade because 
it was a free port and commanded a central position in the Malay Archipelago, 
being situated at the southern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. Native 
traders flocked into Singapore from the Malayan Peninsula, Siam, Cochin• 
China, the Philippines, Borneo, the Celebes, Java, Sumatra and Burma. 
By 1825 the value of Singapore's imports and exports reached£ 2,610,440, 
and the trade of the three settlements amounted to l. 4,043 ,48o. By 1850 
the trade of Singapore was valued at £5,637,287, and the total of the 
three settlements at f: 7 ,i21,J93 .• 1 The trade of Singapore more than doubled 
in twenty five years, while the total of the three places together nearly 
doubled. 
In the 1850s there was ·a ttemendous increase of trade in Singapore 
and the other two settlements. By 1859 the import and export trade of 
Singapore amounted to £10,371,3009 showing a rate of increase close 
1 Table of the Imeort and E~ort Trade of the Straits Settlements 
Year Penang Singapore Malacca Total 
1825 J:. 1,114,614 £ 2,610,440 f. )18,426 £ 4,043,480 
1830 708,559 3,948,784 141,205 4.!. 798 '548 
1840 1,475,759 5,851,924 no data 7,327,68) 
1850 1,644,931 5,637,287 439,175 7,721,393 
1859 3,530,000 10,371,300 920,000 14,821,300 
1864 4,496,205 13,252,175 821,698 18,570,080 
This table is taken from MillS, British Malaya, 196. 
9 
\ 
to 1oo% in a decade, and the total trade of the three settlements reached 
t14,821,JOO, showing a similar rate of increaseo1 The figures also 
reveal the relative importance of each settlement, with Singapore at the 
top, possessing about 70% of the total trade. 
The importance of the Straits Settlements in the British Empire 
was obvious. But the value of Singapore to British commerce was even 
greater because of its dominance of the southern entrance to the Straits 
of Malacca. Singapore carried on a rapidly increasing trade with the 
Malay Archipelago, and, at the same time, was a centre for transship-
ment of goods from England to the East. The usefulness of Singapore as 
an entrepot in Britain's trade with the East has been vividly described 
by John Cameron, a contemporary writer, who was a master mariner 
commanding ships trading in Australia before becoming editor of the 
Singapore Straits Times in 1861.2 He describes, in 1865, . the way 
Singapore was used· fortransshipment as follows: 
1 
It is not at all unusual in England to send goods to Singapore 
which are ultimately intended either for China or Java, 
because doing so gives the choice of two or three markets. If 
on arriving there (Singapore) the goods are low in China, but 
high in Java, they are of course sent on to the latter port, 
and vice versa; or, if both in China and Java they are unsaleable, 
there is still the chance of Siam, Saigon, and Borneo. 3 
See the table in P•9 note i above. 
10 
2 For John Cameron's career and background, see C.B.Buckley, An Anecdotal 
History of Old Ti mes in Singapore, 1819-1867(Kuala Lumpur: University of 
Malaya, 1965; first published in 1902),715o 
3 John Cameron, Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan lndia(London: 1865; . 
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965 reprint), 177• 
As to what extent Singapore absorbed Lancashire cotton manufactures 
in the 1850s either for sale there or for transhipment to other ports, no 
accurate statistics seem to be available.~ However, Jotm Cameron's trade 
figures for Singapore in a later period are useful for indicating the 
magnitude of British exports to Singapore. The total imports of Singapore 
for the year ending April t86J were valued at;t.6,46t,720, of which 
£ 1,500,758 were imports from Britain, about one fourth of the total; and 
about one half of these British imports were cotton manufactureso 2 Consi-
dering the tremendous increase in the trade of Singapore and the Straits 
Settlements as a whole in the 1850s, the amount of Lancashi.re manufactures 
sent to Singapore in the same period must have been considerable. 
The advantages of Singapore as an excellent distribution centre 
were also made use of by India. One half of the opium and more than three 
fourths of the rice, the two main items of export from India to Singapore, 
were consumed in China, and a large portion went to Java. Although there 
was little difficulty in procuring freight from India to China, and the 
cost of direct shipments was always considerably less, 11 still, to take 
1 A.Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade( Manchester: 
University Press, 19)4),volo I, 244-245 Appendix B contains a table showing 
the exports of Manchester manufactures for the year 185J• As the Straits 
Settlements were then included under the heading 11 lndia" 'no separate 
11 
figures are given for the exports to these settlementso The total Manchester 
exports were J:. J2, 712,902, and those to India, Java, the Philippines, China 
and Hong Kong were as follows: 
India•••••o•••o•• £ 5,680,069 
Javao••••••••o•o• 448,265 
Philippines•••o•• )44,155 
China.•o••••••••• 1,129,799 
Hong Kong•••••••o 278,634 
2 . 
Cameron, Malayan India, 181-182. 
\ 
the chances of the several markets, obtained through Singapore, is . found 
,J 
the most profitable 1 course." 
12 
The position of the Straits Settlements, and Singapore in particular, 
in imperial commerce tended to become more and more linked with Britain 
and China. Soon after Raffles 1s occupation of .singapore, James Matheson, 
the foremost 11 free merchant" in the East, had perceptively forseen its 
commercial potential.2 Michael Greenberg's study of the China trade to 
1842 has shown how free merchants, by the device of transhipment of goods 
through Singapore, were able to encroach upon the East India Company's 
monopoly of the China trade. It was actually through Singapore that 
increasing . quantities of Manchester manufactures were sent to China when 
the East India Company still enjoyed the monopoly. By 1833, Lancashire 
cottcn manufactures had become the major branch of the China trade~3 Thi~ 
in turn strengthened the position of the provincial merchants led by those 
of Manchester and Liverpool, and encouraged them to fight for the end of 
the Company's monopoly, which came in 1833o4 
The interdependence between Singapore and India, on the other hand, 
was lessening in terms of trade, despite the fact that the Straits 
Settlements were under the control of Indiao For the year ending April 1863 
1 Cameron, Malayan India, 177• 
2 James Matheson to Robert Taylor, 24 May 1819, quoted in Greenberg, 
British Trade and the Opening of China, 97• 
J Ibid., 101-102 for how the free merchants used Singapore to carry on 
trade~ween England and China. . 
4 See Red~ord, Manchester Merchants, 108-125 for the struggle of the 
provincia l merchants agai.nst the monopoly of the East Itidia Company, 
particularly 115-118 for the early 1830s; also, JoFairbank, Trade and 
Diplomacy on the China Coast~ Cambridge: Harvard University Press,195J),374. 
\ 
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the imports from India ( including Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay) amounted 
,I 
to ~ 757,678, opium being the chief item, while imports from Britain and 
1 China combined amounted to i 2,4o),68o. The exports of the same period 
show the same tendency. Exports to India were £ 990,583, while exports to 
2 Britain and China together reached £ 1, 901, J54o This led to a divergence 
of interests between the Straits Settlements and India. The East India 
Company had in 18JJ wound up its trading business and in the same year the 
China trade was thrown open to independent merchantso The benefits derived 
from the Straits Settlements, which were an essential link in the China 
trade,were also enjoyed by the free merchantso Probably for this reason, 
the Indian Government attempted several times to tax the tradeand shipping 
of the Straits Settlements in order to balance the perennial annual deficit 
in its budget. But these measures enraged the commercial class in Singapore 
vho were convinced that the commerce of Singapore depended on its free 
port status. Dissatisfaction towards the Indian Government gradually grew 
among the merchants. 
On the other hand, the affinity of interests between the merchants 
of the Straits Settlements and England unavoidably brought the~ together 
to safeguard or promote their interests by exerting combined efforts on 
the home authorities concerned. This tendency had already been quite 
discernible in the 18JOs. For example in 1836 the Indian Government 
proposed to levy a tonnage duty on the trade of the Straits Settlements, 
in order to meet the cost of suppressing piracy in the eastern seas.3 
1 Cameron , Malayan India, 181. 
2 lbido t 187 • 
J Buckley, Anecdotal History, 301~302. 
' 
-----~-~ ---·----~ 
\ 
.•. ; 
The Singapore mercantile community opposed this measure by petitioning 
Parliament. The petition stated that the foundation of Singapore's 
commercial prosperity was free trade, and that the proposed duty would 
not only deflecta .considerable portion of native trade to the nearby 
rival Dutch port of Rhio, but would also destroy:tlle transshipment 
business.1 The petition was forwarded to the members for Manchester and 
Glasgow to be presented to Parliament.2 The East India and China Association, 
the commercial rival of the East India Company,also took the matter up on 
behalf of Singapore.3 The proposed tonnage duty came to nothing after the 
Board of Control ordered the lndian Government to abandon it. In this case 
the Singapore merchants seemed to have overestimated the probable effect of 
the proposed duty because the rate was not high (~ %) and the Dutch port 
could in no way compete with Singapore. But they seemed to have believed 
that the home authorities would be more attentive and responsive to their 
demands and wishes. What is significant for our purpose here is the direct 
and close connection between British and Singapore mercantile interests, 
a connection which was to become more pronounced in the next thirty years 
or so and produce far-reaching repercussions for the future of the Straits 
Settlements. 
The central position of Singapore in the Malay Archipelago not only 
rendered it the hub of commerce in the eastern seas and port-of-call between 
East and West, but also a significant strategic point in the East. 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 303-304. 
2 ~-, 302. 
3 j~., 305. For the attack of the East Inrlia and China Association upon 
the monopoly of the East India Company, see Redford, Manchester Nerchants, 
11.5-118. 
Singapore's strategic value was proven in the Opium War(18J9-42}. 
It was both the rendezvous and the point of supply for the Chinese 
expedition. According to John Cameron, Singapore was the gathering point 
for warships and transports and point of supply throughout the \o/ar. 1 In 
the second Anglo-Chinese War(1856-6o} Singapore served the same purpose. 2 
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This strategic importance did not escape the observation of the mercantile 
comnn41.1.i ty there. For instance, a writer in the Singapore Free Press, in 
181.~;8, proposed that Singapore should be made the vrincipal naval station 
of the eastern seas.3 The same demand was also repeated during the agitation 
for the transfer. 4 
By the 1850s Britain had long established its position as the 
supreme power in the Malayan Peninsula. The Dutch were excluded from the 
area by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, which settled the conflicting 
claims of Britain and Holland over Singapore; and by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty 
of 1826, Siamese expansion in the no1·th of the peninsula had been checlted. 
1 Cameron, Malayan India, 21-22; see also Buckley, Anecdotal Histol~, 
J4J-J44. 
2 Buckley, Anecdotal Hist~~' 68). 
J Letter to the Singapore Jrree Press , quoted in .!.!?12.·, 4-89-1±90. 
4 Hansard, Jrd series, vol.CLII(1859), 160J-4; A.Guthrie and Others 
to the Colonial Office, 20 April 1861, in Correspondence Relating to 
the Transfer of the Straits Se ttlements to tha Colonial Office, 
Parliamentn£Y Paper~ (hereafter cited as PoP.), 1862, XL(259), 651. 
:..__.. ___ :_ __ :.:._---·-·- -·-
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A number of other treaties had secured for the Straits Settlements alliances 
of friendship and free trade with Perak, Selangor, Sungei Ujong and other 
small Malay states as well. 1 The Malay states were beyond the direct control 
of the Straits Settlements, but were under strong British influence. 
For example, in 1855 Governor W. J. Butterworth arranged a treaty between 
Sultan Ali of Johore and the Temenggong Ibrahim to settle their claims to 
·the control of Johore. By this treaty the real power of government in 
Johore was transferred from Sultan Ali to the Temenggong who was a British 
protege (the Temenggong was a hLgh official under the sultan).2 
The growth of Britisl1 influence in the Malayan Peninsula was the 
result of the activities of the Straits Settlements rather than that of 
Indian Govenunent which had the control of the ·foreign relations of the 
Straits. The Supreme Government adopted generally a policy of non-
intervention in the ~~lay states. This was partly because the Indian 
Government did not want to irritate Siam whose friendship was important 
during the two Anglo-Burmese wars of 1824-25 and 1852, and partly because 
1 N. Tarling, British Policy in the ~~lay Peninsula and Archipelago 
1824-1871 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1969), chapters 1 and 2 
also his article, "Intervention and Non-intervention in ~lalaya", !.!:!!. 
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXI, 4 (1962), 523-7; R. Emerson, ~~laysia: 
A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (Kuala Lumpur: University of %-1alaya 
Press, 1964 reprint; first publi$hed in 1937), 69-Bo; for a comprehensive 
report on the various treaties with the ~~lay states, from 1786 to 1855, 
see Colonel o. Cavenagh (Straits Governor, 1859-67) "Report on the Treaties 
and Engagements with the ~1alay States of the ~~layan Peninsula anterior to 
1860", in w. G. ~mxwell and w. s. Gibson (eds.), Treaties and Enqagements 
affecting the Malay States and Borneo (London, 1924), 1-7; D. G. E. Hall, 
History of South East Asia, 444. 
2 Swettenham, British Halaya, 86-101; Hills, British Nalaya, 181-188. 
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the Straits Settlements's interests in the ~ialayan Peninsula were 
seen as less important in India. However, the Indian Government in 1862 
approved reluctantly Governor O.Cavenagh 1 s decision to bombard Trengganu 
on the east coast of the Peninsula because the Governor believed that 
Siam was involved in an intrigue to gain control over Trengganu and 
1 
Pahang. This incident brought about a debate in Parliament on 10 July 1863 
and Cavenagh was charged with being high-handed in his proceedings. 2 
Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, agreed that Cavenagh's 
actions were "at least, precipitate,u but no further action was taken 
by the India Office.J 
Changing circumstances in the Halayan Peninsula \'1ere making 
the non-intervention policy undesirable in the vie\'1 of the Straits 
merchants. First of all, the agricultural activities of the Singapore 
Chinese in Johore had increased the interest of the merchants in the 
area. Gambier and pepper plantations, started by the Chinese l'1ho 
began to settle in Johore bet\ieen 1835 and t8l±O, had by the 1860s 
l! developed considerably. The Straits merchants profited from these 
enterprises because the products were sent to Singapore for export to 
1 Mills, British r.ta laya, t68-172; Cavana gh to the Se cretary to the 
Government of India, 26 July 1862, Secretary of the Government of India 
(Colonel H.Durand) to Cavenanh, JO August"1"862, in Papers conne cted 
with the Attacl<: upon Td.ngpanu(Tre~nanu), P.P. 1863, XLIII(541), 318. 
See also 'f .G .Knox, Hemoranda on the State of Affairs in the MalaY,2!! 
Peninsula, in P.P. 1863, XLIII(54t), J69-J70 and 377-378. 
---
2 Hansard, vol. CLXXII(1863), 10 July 1863, 586-593. 
3 Sir Charles 'Hood to the Governor-General of India , 25 July 1863, 
in P.P. 1863, XLIII, 359. 
4 S'\'re ttenham, British Nalaya , 86 and 1 ·12. 
\ 
.. , 
Britain and Europe. In 1863 gambier and pepper were the largest export 
items to Britain. 1 With the increase of the Chinese population, Johore 
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also furnished a promising opportunity for trade. Secondly, it was long 
known in the Straits Settlements that the Malayan Peninsula was rich in 
natural resources (tin, iron and coal). Tin-min~ng on the west coast 
( Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong) was attracting attention in the 
2 Straits Settlements, to which the tin produce was exportedo In addition, 
the soil was fertile and well adapted for plantation of sugar and rice.J 
Internal disorders in the Malay states from the 184os onwards 
prevented smooth expansion of trade in the area. Struggles between rival 
4 factions for power and succession were frequent. The internal strife, 
which became more serious and complicated in the 1860s, also involved 
the Straits Settlements from where arms and ammunitions were imported.5 
Because of the disturbe<l concii tions, · new:tp!f1.1Jt=i"& in :;ingapc:-~ ""~--'" +" --~-· --
urge the Indian Government to adopt' a more active policy. For example, 
in 1844 one newspaper advocated that, in order to develop trade with the 
I Malayan Peninsula, the Malay states should be annexed or controlled by · 
1 Cameron, ~~layan India, 187. 
2 Mill.s, British Malaya). 20Q-201; C.D.Cowan, Nineteenth Century 
Malaya: The Oriqins of British Political Control (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 68-69. 
3 Mills, British Malaya, 201. 
4 
.!.2.!!!·' 175 .. 179· 
5 Swettenham, British Malaya, 113. 
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giving "advice" to their sultans.1 One article appearing in the 
Singapore Free Press in 1853 noticed that "the non-interference system, 
however, has been the favourite one of late years", and regretted· that 
no attempt had ever been made to exercise a "moral influence" on the 
2 
rulers of the Nalay states. 'l'he hostility of the mercantile community 
towards the non-intervention policy was aptly expressed in the Free Press 
in 1654: 
After Raffles and Crawfurd, we had a succession of officials 
who were either imbued with the prejudices and feelings of 
the higher authorities or were of too little weight at head-
quarters to induce any great degree of attention to their 
representations. They knew that the Supreme Government did not 
wish to have any trouble regarding the politics of a quarter so 
distant from the seat of Government, and they very dutifully 
sl~ped their line of conduct accordingly. Hence, a cour~e of 
utter neglect towards the native states in our vicinity. 
And when the Singapore merchants looked around they became concerned 
because other European powers were busy expanding their influence in the 
surrounding regions. 
While the British merchants were deploring the non-intervention 
policy of the Indian Government, their European rivals were energetically 
pushing forward. The outbreak of the Anglo-Chinese War (1839-42) had 
drawn attention to eastern affairs, and the activities of James Brooke 
1 Mills, British Malaya, 175; Buckley, Anecdotal History, 421-422. 
2 Quoted in Buckley, Anecdctal History, 575. 
3 Quoted in~., 584. 
in Borneo caused anxiety and fear in the Dutch, who were stirred to 
adopt a more aggressive policy. 1 In the 1850s the Dutch consolidated 
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their rule in Borneo and Java, and increased their control over Sumatra, 
situated on the other side of the Straits of Malacca.2 Having expelled 
from Sumatra in 1857 a Singapore merchant, Adam Wilson, who assisted the 
sultan of Siak in an internal quarrel, the Dutch made a treaty with the 
sultan in the following year, thereby securing control of Siak and its 
dependencies.) The Straits Governor did not come to Wilson's assistance.4 
In face of the powerful competition offered by Singapore as a 
free port, the Dutch copied this liberal trade policy. By 1864 there 
were six Dutch free ports scattered over the Dutch colonies, one of 
which v~s Rt Rhio: Abnut onP. dl'ly's .11udl to thP. "nuth of Sin~~pore.5 
These Dutch free ports, however, could not rival Singapore, although 
they doubtless derlected a good deal of trade away from it. Singapore's 
dominance was secured by its geographical position and by the fact that 
Britain was far ahead of Holland in industrial production. 
1 Hall, History of South East Asia, 456-460; Emerson, ~~laysia, 110. 
2 Hall, History of South East Asia, 49)-494. 
3 Ibid., 495· Adam Wilson was the chief clerk in ~~rtin Dyce & Co., 
and 1~ became secretary to the Singapore Exchange and was also a 
broker and auctioner. Buckley, Anecdotal Historv, 66J-664. 
4 Buckley, Anecdotal Hi~tory, 664. 
5 .!lli•, JOJ; Cameron, J.falayan India, 175• 
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The French were making great efforts to establish themselves in 
Indo-China. In the 1840s they had on several occasions intervened in Indo-
China on behalf of the missionaries. 1 They also unsuccessfully attempted to 
establish a station in the Sulu islands, south of the Philippines. 2 During 
the early years of the reign of Emperor Tu-Duc (r.1848-8J) of Annam, 
persecution of foreign missionaries was resumed.J The French, under the 
Emperor Napoleon III, was looking for a pretext to annex the territory of 
Annam, and were quick to exploit the issue. In 1857 the French and the 
Spaniards despatched a joint expeditionary force to Indo-China. The Spaniards 
joined in the expedition because a Spanish bishop at Tongking was put to 
death in 1857. Saigon was captured in February 1859 and by 1867 the whole 
4 
of Indo-China was under French control. 
The Spaniards came into direct confrontation \'lith the British over 
the control of the Sulu islands. In 1851 the Spaniards destroyed the· 
capital of Sulu, thus preventing the ratification of a treaty James Brooke, 
as British Commissioner and Consul General in Brunei, signed with the 
sultan in 1849, which gave the British most-favoured-nation treatment in 
the Sulu islands. To compete \'lith the British in Borneo, the Spaniards 
established a station on Palawan close to the coast of Borneo.5 The activities 
of the Dutch, the French and the Spaniards all explain the rising demand 
in Singapore for more Imperial naval protection. 
·. 
1 Hall, History of South East Asia, 557-558. 
2 John Cady, Roots of French Coloniali s m in Eastern Asia ( Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1954), 57-60. 
3 Hall, History ~uth Eas t Asi~, 559. 
/1: Ibid., 559-560; T.E .. Innis, French Policy and Develo,:p_~ent in Indochina 
(Chicago: University Press, 19J6), J6-J8. 
5 · th c t " 1 y 23 211: 1h7-1'*8·, Buckley, Co\•ran, Nl.netccn · en · \11')' •·•a a a, - , 
Anecdotal His tory!.. 767. 
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It is not easy to determine to what extent British trade was 
affected by this increasing expansion of the Dutch, the French and the 
Spaniards. British merchants in the Straits Settlements had been carrying 
on trade with Borneo, Sumatra, the Philippines and Cochin-china, and it 
would seem clear that a portion of trade had been taken away from Singapore 
by the measures of the other European powers. We can only surmise that 
a vast area for the future expansion of British trade had been cut off. 
That the Dutch policy had more effect on the trade of the 
Straits Settlements is obvious. The Dutch were not only more powerful in 
that area than the other European powers but were also long established. 
The complaints of the Straits merchants concentrat~d on the Dutch activi• 
ties. In 18~7 the merchants in Singapore, in their petition to Parliament, 
charged that the ·nutch were throwing hindrances in the way of British 
trade with the Dutch possessions, thus infringing upon the provisions of the 
Treaty of 182~ which guaranteed equal treatment of each other.1 The Dutch 
exclusive treaties with the native rulers did affect imports from Sumatra 
to Penang in t86~6J; and the Dutch free ports had, as John Cameron 
observes, " certainly deflected a good deal of that, which, in their absence, 
would doubtless have reached 11 Singapore, although it 11 had not robbed the 
Straits of much of its old trade. 112 Trade with Cochin-china was also affected 
by the French occupation of the area.3 
However, what really concerned the Singapore mercantile community 
were the various attempts by the Indi~ Government to tax the trade or the 
shipping of the Straits Settlements. Protests against those measures led 
finally to the agitation for Crown colony statuso 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, ~66-~7. 
~Cameron, Malayan India, 175,195-196. 
J Ibid., 18~. 
:2) 
·I 
The early 1850s saw relations between Singapore and India strained 
by opposition in Singapore to several measures the Indian Government 
introduced. The Singapore merchants deprecated the idea of a stamp tax, 
which was proposed in 1851 in order to raise a local revenue and probably 
also to integrate the Straits Settlements ntore closely into the fiscal 
system of India. A public meeting, held on 22 September 1851, opposed the 
proposal on the grounds that the stamp tax would be "burdensome and 
vexatious" to the commerce of Singapore where the trade, unlike that 
in England and India, was carried on by a system of credit. What seems 
more revealing to us here is the resolution that stressed the importance 
of Singapore in intperial trade as another reason why the tax should not 
be introduced. "Singapore was establish«!d and is kept up": the rP.t~~o1utinn 
declared, "!or the chief purpose of affording an outlet to the manufactures 
and productions of Great Britain and India, and is now yearly acquiring . 
increased value to these countries as a naval and steam station.111 
This was the recurring argument of the Singapore merchants in their 
opposition to all attempts at taxation. The proposed tax was thus 
thwarted for several years. 
We have already mentioned the Indian Government's unsuccessful 
attempt in 18)6 to introduce a tonnage duty on the trade of the Straits 
Settlements.2 The same question flared up again in 1852 and was still 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 549. 
2 See above 1)•14. 
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opposed by the Singapore merchants on the same grounds. But this time the 
Indian Government only partially gave way: the duty was not charged on 
native shipping, probably to prevent turning the native traders away to 
the Dutch free portso1 The Singapore merchants, however, were not satisfied 
with the concession and expressed their· .dissatisfaction at a public 
meeting on 18 December 1856, which was 11 very . numerously attended by the 
European and Chinese merchants.'' It was charged in strong language that 
" the imposition of tonnage or port dues on shipping is an unwarranted 
attack upon the freedom of this port, ••• (and is) in direct violation of 
the principles upon which this Settlement was established, and calculated 
to endanger the very existence of the trade. 11 2 Antagonistic public 
sentiment was further reflected in the Singapore Free Press. It contrasted 
the different attitudes of the home and Indian authorities towards the 
interests of Singapore. On the one hand the home authorities were 
sympathetic: 
Statesmen of all parties in E~gland have ever recognised the 
importance of maintaining in all its integrity the system 
(of a free port) on which Singapore is conducted, and which 
has been productive of such beneficial results to the trade 
of England as well as to that'•of India. 
On the ather hand, the Indian Government's attitude was unattentive: 
Our immediate rulers in India, however, have never been able 
to regard the Settlement of Singapore through any other medium 
(than) a revenual one; and, whenever, therefore, there has been 
an excess of expenditure over receipts, whether -arising from 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 565-566. 
2 
..!.!?!2·, 6)8. 
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ordinary sources of disbursement or from measures required 
for the protection of trade, they have frowned upon the 
unfortunate place, and the only sole remedy propounded---
the r.nly suggestion they have had to make on the subject---
is thb imposition of duties on tl1e trade. 1 
The question of tonnage duty \'/as taken up in London. In February 
1857, a memorial signed by individuals and several London firms connected 
with the Straits was sent to the President of the Board of Control. Among 
them were retired Straits officials like John Crawfurd, Thomas Church 
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and Samuel Garling; merchants such as Ed\'lard Boustead, Alexander and James 
Guthrie; and business finns like the Borneo Co. Limited, Matheson & Co., 
2 the Oriental Bank Corpor~tion, and the Peninsular and Oriental Company. 
But it was Act XVII relating to currency, passed by the Indian 
Legislative Council in 1855, that most infuriated the mercantile community. 
The Act provided that Indian copper money (anna and pice) was henceforth 
not only legal tender for fractions of the rupee currency, but also legal 
tender for fractions of the dollar, and that henceforth only pice, not 
cents,were to be minted by the East India Company.3 From the Indian point 
of view, it was natural to introduce a uniform currency throughout the 
territories under the Indian Government; and it was probably because of 
this reasoning that they failed to appreciate the peculiar circumstances 
of the Straits Settlements and the feelings of the people. 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal Hi.:=;tory, 6)<). 
2 · ~.' 611.6-6'*7· 
J Mills, British Malaya, 277-278; Buckley, Anccrlotal Hi:=;tory, 596; 
see Sir Hercules RlJhinson•~ Rr!1ort (the Robinson J3...?port), 25 January 1864, 
in Further Corrt>spom~R~tinf) to th0. Tran~fer of the Straits 
Settlements ;P:P. Hl66, Lll (J672), 705-706. 
Early in 1852 the intention of the Indian Government to substitute 
the Indian rupee currency for the dollar one in the Straits Settlements 
was known in Singapore, and opposition was aired.1 However, a bill to this 
ef~ect was introduced in 185~ into the Legislative Council of Indiaq A 
public meeting, held on 1) October 185~, strongly objected to the bill, 
because the " inexpedient and impolitic" ' lndian currency would be "injurious" 
to the trade of the Straits Settlements. The meeting then resolved to 
petition Parliament.2 Meanwhile, the Old Singaporeans in London, led by 
11 the old veteran Goventor" John Crawfurd, waited upon the Board of Control , 
to express their opposition to the bill on behalf of Singapore.3 
The concern of the mercantile community was a genuine one. By custom 
and common consent, the Spanish dollar with its fractions, cents, had 
long been the common circulating medium in commercial transactions through• 
out the Malay Archipelago, and it was certainly convenient to leave the 
system unchanged as long as this system of currency did not impede the 
smooth transaction of trade with the native traders. The bill, if put 
into effect, would certainly cause confusion, partly because tha rupee 
and its fractions, anna and pice, had never been used in the Straits 
Settlements, notwithstanding the Indian Acts of 1835 and 18~~ by which 
the rupee and its fractions were made legal tender throughout the 
territories of the East India Company; and partly because the dollar 
was a decimal system while the rupee was a 11 barbarous system" as it 
was contemptuously described ( 1 rupee=16 anna; 1 anna=12 pice). 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 566. 
2 Ibid., 597• 
J Ibid., 598. 
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Notwithstanding the protests from the Singapore community and 
the pressure exerted by their supporters in London, the Indian Legislative 
Council passed the bill on 27 ~~y 1855. As soon as Act XVII was published 
in Singapore the merchants were outraged. On 11 August 1855 a public 
meeting was held, attended by nearly every European inhabitant • The 
meeting strongly opposed the Act, charged the Indian Government with 
neglecting their wishes, and passed an important resolution: . 
That by the passing of the Act XVII of 1855 this meeting is 
forced into painful conviction that the Legislative Council 
of India, in treating with utter disregard the remonstrances 
of the inhabitants, have shown that they are neither to be 
moved by any prospect of doing good, nor restrained by the 
certainty of doing evil to the Straits Settlements, and that 
it is therefore the bounden duty of this community to use 
every exertion and to resort to every means within its reach 
to obtain relief from the mischievous measures already enacted, 
and to escape from the infliction of others of the same nature 
more comprehensive and still more hurtful. 1 
The feeling of the meeting, judged by the emotional languag~ of the 
resolution, was completely hostile. 
The Singapore petition to Parliament arrived in London early in 
1856. The Earl of Albemarle, who was the spokesman for the Straits 
2 Settlements in the House of Lords, presented the petition. He strongly 
attacked the Act without reservation, and urged the Imperial Government 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History,62J-624; Mills, British Malaya, 279-280o 
2 Kepple, George Thomas, sixth Earl of Albemarle (1799-1891), was 
once a private secretary to Prime Minister Lord John Russell in 1846; 
brother of Admiral Kepple who was despatched to the Straits to suppress 
piracy and thus popular in Singapore.~' XI, 4)-44. Albemarle moved in 
the Lords in 1853 for the corresponcence relating to the capture of a 
Chinese junk at Trengganu. Buckley, Anecdotal Historx, 575 and 635• 
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to repeal it. In his reply, Lord Granville, then President of the 
Council in Palmerston 1s cabinet, could only raise doubts as to the legality 
of the dollar money, and give assurance that the Government wouid see that 
1 
no harm was done. The Act had to a great extent discredited the Indian 
Government in the eyes of the Straits merchants, although the use of the 
dollar currency was subsequently restored by order from the Imperial 
Government. 
The Straits mercantile community was increasingly alienated from 
the Indian Government by the latter's unpopular measures; and the failure 
of the Indian Government to take a more attentive attitude to the needs 
of the community had certainly not checked the process. The continued 
subordination of the Straits Settlements to the Indian Government was 
proving more and more unsatisfactory under changed circumstances o It ,.,.as 
therefore natural that the Singapore merchants would seize the opportunity 
brought about by the great convulsion created by the Indian Nutiny to 
demand that the Straits Settlements be removed from the authority of the 
Indian Government. 
1 Hansard, CXLI(1856), 21 April 1856, 1248-1251. 
·. 
. . -. . .... .. ... -· ····- ·- -- . - - - ----· i =========-:-__.__c· · -~---~---··--'-"-·~-~' - ~-,~~---~~...,-~ ".;i.: 
Chapter II: The Beginning of the Agi tat.ion for Transfer 
and Its Initial Success, 1857-1859 
The feeling of dislike and dissatisfaction in the $traits 
mercantile community towards the Indian Government and the East India 
Company had long existed, ·but it was the meeting of 11 August 1855 to 
oppose Act XVII that saw the first indication of a campaign to seek a 
change in the relationship bet\>~een Singapore and India. 
As we have seen earlier, the meeting resolved that it was the 
duty of the community "to use every exertion and to resort to every 
means within its reach to obtain relief from the mischievous measures 
already enacted, and to escape from the infliction of others of the 
same natut:e, more comprehensive and still more hurtful.111 However, 
although the tone of the resolution was uncompromising, the actions 
actually taken were no more than strong protests, and exertion of 
pressure on the Imperial Government by the Old Singaporeans in London. 
Yet, the implications of this resolution could not be overlooked. 
C.B.Bucltley, editor of the Singapore Free Press from t884 to 1887, is 
perceptive \'lhen he suggests, in his An Anecdotal History of Old Times 
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in Singapore(1902), that this meeting was the beginning of the agitation 
for the transfer. 2 The idea of making the Straits Settlements, or Singapore 
1 See Chapter I p.27 above. 
2 Buckley, Anecdotal HistorY,, 623; Mi'lls, British Malaya, 271~:.. 
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alone, a Crown colony was apparently emerging amid an atmosphere of 
protest. A public meeting held in July 1856 adopted a resolution to 
draw up a petition to Parliament to request that Singapore should be made 
a Crown colony, but the resolution was dropped subsequently for reasons 
unknown. 1 The question was mooted again in another public meeting held 
in January 1857 to discuss the Chinese riots, but came to nothing. 2 
However, between the latter part of 1855 and early 1857 the idea of 
separating the Straits Settlements from the Indian Government slo,.-ly took 
shape in the mind of the Singapore mercantile community. In private 
conversation and in the press, the desire for the transfer was a frequent 
subject. However, the decisive moment to demand that Parliament place 
the Straits Settlements under the Crown came during the great convulsion 
engendered by the Indian Nutiny. 
The year 1857 was a decisive year in the history of British India, 
and the same can be said of that of the Straits Settlements. The Indian 
sepoys revolted in early 1857, and the news of the occurence reached 
Singapore on J 1 March 1857. J Soo~ after the outbrealt of the revolt the 
Europeans in Calcutta agitated against the East India Company, demanding 
that the Imperial Government assume direct control of India.
4 
This was 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 6)6; Hills, British Halaya, 280. 
2 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 6)6; ~tills, British Malaya, 280-281. The 
Chinese riots were caused by a misunderstanding of the Chinese over a new 
municipal act which gave the police magistrates pOl.-er to inflict for 
certain minor offences fines not exceeding 500 rupees. See Cameron, 
Malayan India, 268-270. 
3 Buckley, Ane cdota l History, 651· 
4 ~-, 755· 
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certainly the most opportune moment for the Straits merchantso Whether 
it was a planned or spontaneous move, the Singapore merchants launched 
an agitation to support the Calcutta movement, and at the same time put 
forth their unequivocal demand that the Straits Settlements should be 
separated from India and placed under the Imperial Government. On 15 
September 1857 the European inhabitants in Singapore held a public meeting 
to consider whether it was advisable to join in the movement against the 
East India Company. It was unanimously agreed that it would be greatly 
advantageous to remove the control of India from the East India Company 
and place it under the Imperial Government. One resolution, proposed by 
R.CoWoods and seconded by C.Spottiswoode, was passed 11to record its hearty 
concurrence in the prayer of the Calcutta Petition," and to petition 
Parliament 11to place the whole of British India under the sole governm~nt 
. 1 
of the Imperial Government." The future of the Straits Settlements also 
became the subject of discussion, and the decisive move was made. The 
meeting adopted a resolution proposed by J.J.Greenshields and seconded 
by J.Harvey: 
That the petition to Parliament set forth the grievances under 
which the Straits Settlements have laboured during the Government 
of the East India Company, and pray to be placed directly under 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 755; Mills, British Malaya, 281. 
Robert Carr Woods, went to Singapore from Bombay in 18~5 to practice 
law and became editor of the Straits Times. Buckley, Anecdotal History, 
4J8 and passim. 
Charles Spottiswoode, a merchant, was a partner in John Purvis & Co., 
later in Spottiswoode & Connolly; took part in the protest against 
tonnage duty. Ibid., 2JJ and passim. 
.. 
the Crown, with a separate Government and not as present 
under a delegated authority in India. 1 
As usual, a committee was formed to draw up the petition. It included 
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three lawyers (A. Logan, R. c. Woods and A. M. Aitkin), and two merchants 
(R. Bain and Joaquim d 1Almeida).2 
The petition which resulted from this public meeting was presented 
to Parliament in ~~rch 1858. It was essentially a catego~ical indictment 
of the Government of India. It charged that the Indian Government was 
completely ignorant of the peculiar circumstances of the Straits 
Settlements, and "almost invariably treated them from an exclusively 
Indian point of view", and that it had shown "a systematic disregardu 
towards the needs and wishes of their inhabitants, however earnestly 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 755· 
John James Greenshields, was a partner in Guthrie & Co.; actively 
involved in opposition to introduction of rupee currency, Indian 
convicts, income tax, stamp tax and in the agitation for the transfer. 
Ibid., 499 and pa~sina. 
- John Harvey { 1fi29-79), was a partner in l-fcEwen & Co.; later managing 
director of the Borneo Company; played an active part in opposing the 
rupee currency and the tonnage duty. ~., 671 and passim. 
2 Abraham Logen (1816-7.)), began law practice in Singapore in 1842, 
and later became one of the leading lawyers there; editor and proprietor 
of the Singapore Free Press; secretary of the Chamber of Commerce in 1856; 
a frequent member of the various committees appointed at public meetings 
to draw up petitions to India and London. Ibid., 379 and passim. 
A. 1-1. Aitkin was one of the law agents--;;r-the Court in Singapore; 
appointed Registrar of the Court in 1356-57; called to Bar in 1864. 
Ibid., 637-JD and passim. 
- Robert Bain, a partner in the leading finn of A. L. Johnston & Co. 
in 1848; in Boustead & Co. from 1853 to 1855; and in Maclaine, Fraser & Co. 
in 1859· Ibid., 208 and passim. 
Joaquim d'Almeida, son of the well-known Spanish merchant Joze d 1Almeida, 
was a partner in Joze d'Almeida & Co.; took part in the agitation against 
the rupee currency and the tonnage duty. Ibid., 186 and passim. 
and perseveringly presented. 1 This petition is significant for an 
understanding of the nature and extent of the discontents among the 
mercantile community, and therefore deserves a closer look. 
The Petition considered that the Straits Settlements were governed 
under a political system detrimental to their interests. The Settlements 
were not represented in the Indian Legislative Council "by any person 
having a competent knowledge of their requirements". When the Council 
dealt with matters connected with the Straits Settlements, "the members 
confessed their complete ignorance of Straits affairs", yet no steps had 
ever been taken to make up this deficiency. The result of this ignorance 
was that the Council passed acts "most detrimental" to the interests of 
the Settlements, in spite of thei~ protests. Within the Straits 
administration itself, there was no executive council to "advise or assist•• 
the governor whose reports and suggestions largely guided the Indian 
Government in dealing with the affairs of the Settlements. It frequently 
happened that the governor 11 from caprice, temper or defective judgement", 
was opposed to the wishes of the whole couununity. And when there was a 
conflict of opinions between the governor and the community, the former's 
views were almost invariably adopted by the Indian Governmant. 2 
To substantiate its accusations, the Petition contained grievances 
on almost every aspect of the Straits administration, ranging from the 
danger to free trade to the inadequacy of the judicial establishments. 
The various complaints, after a close examination, fall into two categories, 
one connected with trade and the other with internal security. 
1 Petition from the European Inhabit~nt~ of SinQapore, Presnnted to the 
House of Conunons in 1858 (hereaf ter ci t.ed as _::>ingapore Petition of 1858), 
in P.P. 1862, XL, (259), 585-588; also printed in Bucldey, Anecdotal 
History, 755-758. 
2 Singapore Petition of 1Q~, 585. ~ 
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The Petition accused the Indian Government of having failed to 
promote the trade of Singapore. It pointed out that Singapore was 
established as an outlet for British commerce, and that the preservation 
of its integrity as a free port had always been recognized by statesmen 
"as essential to its prosperity and the full development of the objects 
comtemplated in its formation. 11 Its status as a free port had turned 
Singapore from "a haunt of savage Malay pirates" into a place having 
"a trade of the annual value of ten millions pounds sterling, steadily 
increasing from year to year." However, the East India Company and the 
Indian Government had "never cordially recognized or appreciated" the 
advantage which the free port of Singapore had afforded to the commerce 
of Britain and India as well.The Indian Government,11 influenced solely 
hy t.he deflire to protect their revenue," proposed to impose, at one time 
import and export duties, and at another time tonnage dues, measures 
which if carried out would have had the effect of "ruining or seriously 
injuring" the trade of Singapore. The attempted introduction of the 
Company's rupee into the Straits Settlements to replace the dollar currency 
was another serious blunder, because the use of the latter had almost 
exclusively prevailed in the Straits and the former could not be integ~·atc ci 
with it.These measures had been protested by the Straits inhabitants, 
but their protests fell on deaf ears, and the Petition did not fail to 
point out that "the evil was only averted or redress procured by appealing 
to the Imperial Government or Parliament11 • 1 
1 The Singapore Petition,585-6. 
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Moreover, 11 no systematic measures" of protection against piracy 
had been adopted by the East India Company. The result of this neglect 
was that for long periods the neighbouring seas had been left wholly 
unprotected or very lightly guarded and had at such times swarmed with 
1• r t t th II t • • II f th f S ' i p a es, o e grea 1nJury o e trade o 1ngapore. 
The failure of the Indian Government to encourage a more ·active 
policy with regard to the Malay states was another major source of grievance: 
The Supreme Government of India has uniformly discouraged 
the local Government of Singapore from interfering with 
matters beyond the limits of the island. The cultivation 
of friendly relations with Native States and chiefs has 
been neglected, and the Government (of Singapore} does 
not possess that influence in the ·Indian Archipelago 
which the interests of British commerce require, and 
\V"hich might have been acquired and maintained by a ve2y 
slight exertion on the part of the Indian Government. 
We may note here that Singapore's desire to embark upon a more vigorous 
policy with regard to the ~falay states was to produce significant 
consequences in subsequent years, as shall be seen later. 
The other category of grievances of the Straits Settlements ,.,.as 
connected with the question of safety and security. The Petition pointed 
out that the judicial establishments were inadequate because of the 
rapid increase in the wealth and population of Singapore. In Singapore 
there was only one judge; and the amount of judicial business had increased 
so much that it was impossible for the one judge to dispose of it even 
though he sat 11almost uninterruptedly in Court, from day to day, 
throughout the whole year." 3 
1 The Singapore Petition, 586. 
2 ~-, 586. 
3 ~~-, 586-587. 
J7 
The inadequacy in the gdministration of justice had been aggravated 
by the presence of a large Chinese population and convicts from Irtdia. 
The Chinese, who constituted the great bulk of the population, belonged 
"chiefly to the lowest class;" they were "ignorant and turbulent," and with 
their secret societies, they were found 11to interfere seriously with 
public order and the proper administration of justice." To control such a 
population, the Petitioners believed, required 11a firm and consistent 
though conciliatory course of action" which was lacking on the part of the 
Government. It was pointed out that the European inhabitants had previously 
urged upon the Government the imperative necessity of action to remedy the 
undesirable state of matters and had suggested means to improve the 
situation, but "such remonstrances and suggestions have been· generally 
received with indifference." 1 
But the more difficult problem was that of the convicts, a problem 
that loomed large in later years. The petitioners were "seriously appre-
hensive11 that the Government intended ·to make Singapore a penal station 
on a large scale, and to send to it the 11worst and most dangerous" of the 
criminals confined in the Indian jails. The management of the convicts was 
of the ''lnost defective and loose nature," and there was no adequate 
provision for the protection of the lives and property of the inhabitants. 
The petition strongly felt that a settlement established and kept up as an 
emporium of trade should not be converted into a penal station, and 
desired to be freed from what it called the contamination of the convict 
2 body. 
1 Sinqapore Petition, 587. 
2 Ibid., 587. 
-~ 
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Thus the Petition clearly showed that the Straits mercantile 
community was absolutely convinced that they could see no benefit 
whatsoever in continuing the existing system. But ho\~ to escape from 
this very undesirable state of affairs? The answer to this question was 
clearcut: the Petition specifically requested that 
the Straits Settlements may be constituted a separate 
Government, directly under the Cro~rn, 1and not as at present, under a delegated authority in India. 
The agitation so started was to createprofound reactions both in 
Singapore and London. Support and s~~athy for the cause of the Petitioners 
was not difficult to get in London, where the Conservative government of-
Lord Derby (February 1858 to June 1859) was soon confronted with the 
request for Crown colony status. The Petition was presented to the 
House of Commons in ~~rch 1858 by Viscount Bury, the eldest son of 
the Earl of Albemarle, and touched off a debate on 13 April 1858.2 
Bury, who was greatly interested in colonial affairs, forcefully 
pleaded the cause of the Straits mercantile community. Having 
1 Sinnapore Petition, 588. 
2 Hansard, vol. CXLIX (1858), 13 April 1858, 986-996; also Buckley, 
Anecdotnl Historv, 758-763; Mills, British Hnlnva 1 281. 
William Coutts ( 18J2-94), 7th Earl of Albemarle and Kepple, best 
known as Viscount Bury, educated at Eton; in 1850.51 was private secretary 
to Lord John Hu!!lsellt 1852 went to India as aide-de-camp to Lord Frederick 
Fitzclarence, commander-in-chief at Bombay; in 1854 went to Canada ae 
superintendent of Indian affaire for Canada; elected to Parliament in 
1857 in the Liberal interest, and appointed Palmerston's treasurer of the 
household from 1859 to 1865; after 1874 he became a Con!!lervative, and 
served as U.nder..S ecretary at War under Beacon!!lfield from 1878 to 188o,. 
and under Salisbury from 1885 to 1886. ~, XXII, 931-2. He was the first 
president of the Royal Colonial ln!!ltitute when it was formed in 1868. 
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reiterated some of the arguments and charges contained in the Petition, 
he emphasized the point that the question was an Im}lerial rather.; than 
Indian one. He urged the British Goverrunent to put the Straits Settlements 
under the Crown as territories of "great national importance." Commercially, 
the Straits Settlements '"ere "the highway ••• of the commerce of the east 
and the west," as well as "the most natural-depots for the trade of the 
south and the east. 11 On the other hand, the Straits Settlements 11had 
properly no connection with India." They ceased to be of any importance 
to India since the East India Company lost its monopoly in the China trade, 
and appeared to be regarded by the Indian Government as "useful for a 
convict station," "the receptacle of the scum of the Indian population." 
The Straits Settlements were "compelled to pay the whole expense" of the 
convict charges. All these circumstances proved, Bury argued, that the 
interests of the Straits Settlements were very much more Imperial than Jndjan, 
and that they would be much better governed if they were brouaht immediately 
under the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Another 
important consideration in favour of the transfer involved the question 
of strategy. Singapore required protection against the aggressive policy 
of the Dutch, who prevented the native states from trading with Singapore 
and diverted their trade into Dutch ports. He ended his speech by moving 
for the correspondence on the subject. 1 
The proposed transfer received no direct objection from H.J.Baillie, 
Secretary to the Board of Control. 2 Baillie admitted that the Government 
1
·Ha.nsard, 986-990. 
2 It J B "11 · ( 180'· ? ) w,~s one of the J. oint secretaries to ~nry ?mes . a1 1e ~. , ~ 
t he ] ; ( ' i tl"c! of Control; Cons~rvative ~1oP.for Invern<>ss since t8ltO; 
voted aaainst the Chinese 'far; in favour of mode rate parliamentary refom. 
Dod':::; Pa rliamentary Campania~( 1858), p.140. 
~ 
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had not given sufficient attantion to the problems of the Straits 
SE'!ttlements. However, he did not thinlt that their complaints against the 
Indian Government were al~ogether justifiable, for the attempts of the 
Indian Government to impose duties on trade had been frustrated and the 
dollar currency had been restored after the Settlements appealed to the 
home . government. The only legitimate complaint, Baillie said, was that 
Singapore had been made a penal station, a complaint "well entitled to 
consideration." But the convicts were not all useless; they had been 
employed at public works. And now, Baillie added, with a touch of ridicule, 
11as often happened with the colonies, when they rose to wealth and power, 
they desired to get rid of those very means by the help of which they 
had risen." 
Baillie raised the question of the military expenses that would 
have to be borne by . the Imperial Government if the Straits Settlements 
became a Crown colony, a question that lias to become most important 
in the agitation and a stumbling block to the transfer. Baillie declared 
that the military defence of the·colony involved a question of the 
utmost importance for the consideration of the Government, because, if 
Singapore \oJere to become a Cro\'m colony, England would be responsible 
for its defence spending, estimated at not less than 1 JOO,OOO annually. 
He added that it \'las an amount of expenditure '~hich could not be 
thrO\m upon the resources of the colony \'lhosc revenue l>Tas barely 
sufficient to defray its ordinary civil expenditure. 2 \Vhether 
1 This figure was grossly overestimated; see bclm-1 p.66 and the table 
on p.7J• 
2 Hansar d, 990-992. 
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Baillie was stating a definite policy of the Doard of Control is not 
clear. The concern over the probable additional burden on the Imperial 
budget was a real one, as shall be seen in the development of the agitation. 
The proposed transfer had a strong supporter in Edward Horsman, 
M.P. for Stroud (1853-68), who had had some connections in the Straits 
S ttl t d t b l •t• • 1 e emen s, an was no an o scure po 1 1c1an. Like Bury before him, 
Horsman stressed the point that Singapore was closely connected with the 
imperial interest. The question under debate was, he believed, "rather one 
of public policy" than one of complaint against the East India Company. 
He said the real question for consideration was '~what had Singapore to do 
with India?" He reinforced the argument that Singapore should be separated 
from lnd~.a by referring to the relation between Ceylon and India. Ceylon 
was only 85 miles from India, but it was a colony independent of India; 
yet Singapore, nearer to China than India and having more trade with 
England and China than India, was dependent upon India. He thought that 
Singapore, with its thousands of Chinese population and "well called the 
Liverpool of the East", ought to seize every opportunity of fostering its 
2 trade. 
On the other harid, the position of the East India Company 
vas defended by R. D. •~ngles, who was a director of the East India 
1 Edward Horsman (1807-76), educated at Rugby and Cambridge; an advocate 
of the Scottish Bar; M.P. for Cockermou~h (1836-52), for Stroud (1853•58) 
and for Li.skeard (1869-76); a junior Lord of the Treasury in Melbourne's 
administration in 1840-41; Palmerston 1s chief secretary for Ireland an4 
a member of the Privy Council in 1855-57• ~' IX, 1281-2. At one time 
he had a large plantation in Province \lellesley, Buckley, Anecdotal 
History, 761; the first pres ident of the Straits Settlements Association 
when it was fonned in 1868. 
2 Hansard, 992-J. ~ --- -- .. - --..:. ... _____ ._ ., ___ .... ':..__. _. ___.. ___ :._ _ .____ :~ ---· _:. _____ ,_,_ ......... ...,..
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1 Company. He warned that the military expenditure of the settlement 
.I 
would become a burden on the British Government if the proposed transfer 
was agreed to. But he hinted that the East India Company would not be 
unwilling to part with its control over the Straits Settlements if the 
Governor-General o~ India, whose opinion must be consulted, saw no objection 
2 to the change. And Bury's motion for the correspondence between the 
departments concerned with the subject was carried. 
The character of the whole question of the propo$ed transfer was 
quite clear from the debate. The Straits merchants, supported by their 
friends in London, pushed forward the demand for the transfer on the 
ground that the Straits Settlements, p~orly administered under the Indian 
Government, were more closely connected with Britain's general Imperial 
interests, and would be better governed as a Crown colony. On the other 
hand~ the Board of Control and the East India Company, although unable 
to refute directly the arguments put forth by the exponents of the transfer, 
as ~he defences of Baillie and Mangles reveal, stressed the Imperial 
Government's policy of economy. The next stage in the development of the 
agitation CO\.~ld be expected to centre around this question. 
The Petition of 1858 was no doubt an effective and powerful attack 
on the East India Company and the Indian Government in so far as it exposed 
their ignorance of and indifference to the interests ·and circumstances 
of the Straits Settlements. t-leanwhile, the agitation gained strength 
from the Old Singaporeans who were busily preparing memoranda to support 
1 Ross Donnelly Jolangles ( 1801-?), J.J.P. for Guildford since 1841; 
formerly in the Bengal civil service; a director of the East India Company 
and n director of the New Zealand Company. Dod's Pa rliamentary Companion 
( 1858), P• 244. 
2 Hansard, 994-6;. 
the proposed transfer. The Old Singaporeans included retired Singapore 
merchants, such as Edward Boustead and Alexander and James Guthrie, and 
1 
ex-officials such as John Crawfurd. Loosely organized, they had joined 
together on various occasions to express their views on matters connected 
vith the Straits Settlements, especially when the trade of the settlements 
was affected either by piracy, foreign rivalry or measures contemplated 
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by the Indian Government. The latest example was the deputation which 
waited upon the Board of Control in 1857. 2 Host of them still had commercial 
connections with the Straits Settlements, whose interests they championed 
enthusiastically. The most prominent of the group was probably John 
Crawfurd, a former Resident of Singapore, an Oriental.ist and a '\'rell-kno\m 
champion of free trade. 
John Crawfurd was probably the first Old Sin;Japorean in London 
to take up the cause of the transfer. In a memorandum to Lord Stanley, the 
Prime Minister's son, \otho had held the office of the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies (February to June 1858) and \'las now the President of the 
Board of Control, Crawfurd strongly urged the necessity of the proposed 
1 Ed\'lard Boustead (?-1888), one of the earliest merchants in Singapore; 
founded Boustead & Co.; returned to England in 1850; edited the Singapore 
Chronicle for some years and later in 1835 started the Straits Times; a 
founding merober of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce in 1837. 
Buckley, Anecdotal History, 207-8 and passim. 
Alexander Guthrie (?-1865), went to Singapore in 1820; formed Guthrie 
& Co.; a founding member of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce. Ibido 1 
65 and passim. 
James Guthrie ( 1814.-1900), nephmof of Alexander Guthrie; ,.,ent to 
Singapore in 1829; a partner in Guthrie & Co. and later its head; active 
in Singapore politics, such as in the agitation against the Indian rupee. 
~., 66 and passim. 
2 See above p.25. 
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transfer. He argued that the Straits Settlements \iere "colonies" in the 
strict sense of the word. Socially, they had "little ·connexion with the 
British possessions on the (Indian) continen~,- 11 for the bulk of the 
inhabitants were Chinese and Malays. Economically, their11most important 
commercial relations" were not with India but \•d th England. 'l'he Indian 
trade amounted to one-fourth of the total trade of the Settlements, and 
the chief part of it consisted of the single item o:f opium. 11The main 
portion of the trade is with England, the capital English, and the 
principal merchants British and Chinese."2 
Crawfurd, because of his long assoc~ation with the Straits Settle-
ments, was certainly in a position to grasp the reasons behind the campaign. 
As he pointed out to Lord Stanley, there '"ere two principal ones. 
First, the Settlements's interests were better understood in England 
than in India; and secondly, the administration of the Crown colonies to 
the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope was conducted in "a more liberal, 
popular and constitutional spirit!' than that which was characteristic of 
the East India Company. 3 This realization was reflected in the Petition 
of 1858 which pointed out that the Imperial Government had intervened 
favourably in matters connected with the Straits Settlements. It was 
1 Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826-93), educated at 
Rugby and Cambridge; appointed Colonial Secretary \ihe n the ministry 
of his father, the 14th Earl, was formed in February 1858; transferred 
to the Board of Control in June that year when the Earl of Ellenborough 
retired.~' XVIII, 948-51. 
2 John Crawfurd: Notes on the Proposal of Annexinp the Settlements in 
the Straits of Malacca to the Colonial Administrntio~ the ~~ 
(hereafter cite d as Cr~w~' ~ Notesl 22 July 1858, in P.P. 1862, XL, 588; 
Mills, British Halax_a, 281. 
J Cra,>~furd 9 s Notes , 588. 
~ 
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therefore not unexpected that the Straits community should look forward 
to be placed under the Imperial Government. 
Apparently aware of the misgivings the Imperial Government had over 
the financial capability of the Straits Settlements and the probable burden 
on the Imperial Exchequer, Crawfurd proceeded to show that if certain 
changes were carried out, the transfer would not cost the Imperial 
Government any additional expenses. To charge the maintenance of the 
Indian convicts on the local revenue was, in his view, "contrary to justice 
and principle, 11 and should be stopped; the military garrison, consisting 
of Madras troops, was large and expensive, and should be reduced to a small 
European artillery unit and a local infantry corps. The suppression of 
piracy could be more efficiently carried out by the Imperial navy than by 
the local marine. If these changes '~ere carried out, Crawfurd argued, 
there would be no extra cost imposed on the Imperial Exchequer, and that 
1 there would be a considerable surplus in the local budget. 
However, the agitation for the transfer seemed to have no 
immediate results. The India Bill lias passed on 2 August 1858, ,.,hereby 
the Crol'rn assumed the direct control of British India. A ne,.,. department, 
the India Office, was created, and Lord Stanley became the first Secretary 
of State for India. No change was effected with regard to the Straits 
Settletnents, although Bury in the debate in the House o f Commons had 
requested that the Straits Settleme nts be exclude d from the India Bill 
in order to give immediate effect to the transfer. This had to al·Jai t the 
response of the India Office , and the India Bill wa s pass ed before the 
propos al could be a cted upon. 
1 Cral'lf urd' s Not es , 589-590. 
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In the meantime, support for the proposed transfer grew, and the 
debate in the House of Commons in 1858 was "replayed" in the House of 
Lords in the following year. A petition from "the Bankers, Merchants 
and Residents at Singapore" which requested that Parliament consent 
to the proposed transfer, was presented to the Lords on 10 March 1859 
by Lord Stanley of Alderley, who was to be appointed Palmerston's 
Postmaster General in 1860.1 In presenting the petition, Stanley of Alderley 
stre~sed the growing importance of the trade between Singapore and Britain, 
the effects of the energetic efforts of the Dutch, the French and the 
Spaniards in expanding their influence, and the potential of Singapore 
as "a great naval arsenal". And most important of all, he said, a 
British governor with "competent authority" should be stationed at Singapore 
to watch the activities of foreign nations and to protect British 
2 interests in the area. In his reply, the Earl of Carnarvon, Conservative 
Under-secretary for the Colonies, was sympathetic, but non-committal.) 
He thought that the proposed transfer was "a very new fact in the history 
of the Colonial Office" and "a very great contrast" to the feelings ,.,i th 
which the Colonial Office lmd been usually regarded. However, he agreed 
that the Straits Settlements were of great importance commercially, and 
1 EdWard John, second Baron Stanley of Alderley (1802-69), was educated 
at Eton and Oxford; held various offices in P.'hig administrations, such as 
under-secretary for Foreign Affairs (1846-52), ~' XVIII, 951-2. 
2 Hansard, )rd. ser. Vol. CLII (1859), 10 ~~rch 1859, 1602-5. 
3 .!.!?.!.2.•, 1605-6. Herbe.rt, Henry Howard Holyneux, 4th Earl of Carnarvon, 
(18)1-90) 1 was Under-Secretary fort~ Colonies from February 1858 to June 
1859 in Derby's administration; became Colonial Secretary in June 1866 
in Derby's second ministry, but resigned in !-larch 1867 over Disracli's 
scheme for parliamentary refonn. ~' IX, 646-52. 
stated that the Government was anxious to fulfill the wishes of the 
petitioners but was held up by the consideration that the Imperial Government _ 
would suffer additional expenditures. He disclosed that the Government 
had tal<en the first step of obtaining the opinion of the Governor-General 
of India. 
In fact, the initial response of the India Office to the proposed 
transfer was favourable. The first necessary step, which Carnarvon 
mentioned in the House of Lords, was taken by Lord Stanley, the Secretary 
of State for India, who \fae convinced that the proposed scheme was desirable. 
After consultation with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir 
1 Edward Bulwer-Lytton, he sent a despatch on 1 March 1859 to the Governor-
General of India, Lord Canning. Stanley stated tl~t there was no reason to 
continue the existing arrangement by which the Straits Settlements were 
controlled by India. This arrangement was convenient and proper when there 
was "a very intimate connexion" between India and China. But this connexion 
had gradually diminished since the extinction of the East India Company's 
trading privileges, while the Straits Settlements had become "more closely 
connected with China, and in particular with the British settlement at 
Hong KonQ", a connexion he said was likely to become more intimate under 
the operation of the treaty then being negotiated with China. He believed 
these changed circumstances made it desirable to separate the Straits 
Settlements from the Indian ad~inistration and provide them with a separate 
government or connect them with Hong Kong. However, pending any step taken 
to that effect, Stanley wished to know the opinion of Canning whether . 
"any good and sufficient reasons" existed for continuing the system, or 
1 Bulwer-Lytton, Edward George Earle, (1803-73), was Derby's Colonial 
Secretary from June 1858 to June 1859· ~ 
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whether it '~ould be advantageous to the public interest and to the Straits 
Settlements themselves to transfer them to the Colonial Office. Canning 
lias also requested to ascertain whether the proposal '~ould be generally 
acceptable to inhabitants of the Straits Settlements, European as well as 
Nativeo 1 
Lord Stanley was certainly quite to the point in emphasizing the 
intimate connection between the Straits Settlements and the British interests 
in China. But he was only getting at part of the question involved in the 
agitation. He had to a large extent ignored the distinct interests of the 
Straits Settlements, interests that were growing and had to be taken into 
account in forming a new policy toward them. The significance of Stanley's 
despatch lay in the fact that it brought about a serious consideration of 
the proposed transfer by the Imperial Government. Without this important 
initiative on the part of the India Office, it is doubtful whether the 
Colonial Office would have volunteered to take control of the Straits Settle-
ments. Stanley's favourable decision was based on reasons which were almost 
identical with those put forth by the exponents of the transfer. This would 
suggest that there was strong influence on Stanley by the agitators and 
their supporters, who included the_Old Singaporeans, the leading merchants 
in Singapore, and the friends of Singapore in Parliament, and atl of whom 
together can be conveniently called 11 the Transfer Group". 
Towards the end of 1859 the Indian Government had made its decision 
on the subject of the transfer. Canning believed that there was no good 
1 Lord Stanley to the Governor-Gen~_r:~.l of Ind~a ir:t Council, 1 Harch 
1859,--in P.P. t862,XL, 591; S(~C also ~!:ill~, ~~L~':;:_.l.i!,~' 2<31-282. 
and sufficient reason to continue the existing ~ystem of government 
over the Straits Settlements, and was highly in favour of the proposed 
transfer, an opinion concurred in by the Council of India. 1 
One reason which might be put forth in favour of the status quo 
was the desirability of consolidating the whole of the British possessions 
in the East under one chief resident authority. But Canning thought that 
this object was no longer practical for various reasons. The rapid 
progress in communication by electric telegraphy between those possessions 
and England, the broad line of separation between the peoples of India 
and the Straits Settlements·, and the lack of community of interests 
indicated that there was no real necessity to secure such an arrangement. 
The opinion that the Straits Settlements should be subject to the nearest 
centre of British authority prevailed in the past but this was not a 
consideration to which "much weight" should be attaclled now because 
electric telegraphy would soon link the Straits Settlements directly 
2 
with England. 
On the other hand, Canning considered that strong reasons existed 
in favour of transferring -the Straits Settlements from the Indian Government 
to the Colonial Office. In the first place, he repeated the often made 
observation that the geographical separation of the two excluded the 
Straits Settlements from the sphere of Indian interests.For instance, Indian 
civil and military officers sent to the Straits f ound themselves completely 
1 Minutes by the Govf'rnor-General of India, 7 November t85Q (hereafter 
Canninn's Minutes), in ~.P.t862,XL, 594-597• 
' 
. 
. 
. 
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separated from the services to which they belonged, and the Governor-
General found it inconvenient to visit the places often. Thus, to maintain 
the existing arrangement, Canning held, was M~o maintain a system of 
double government very cumbrous and circuitous, and totally without 
1 compensating advantages." 
Secondly, the Governor-General considered, from the administrative 
point of view, the civil administration of the Straits Settlements 
"a positive evil 11 which ought to be remedied in any case. The evil was 
aptly described and explained in Canning's own words: 
Indian officers have no opportunities of acquiring experience 
of the habits or the language of either Malay or Chinese, and 
accordingly, when officers are sent to the·Straits, they have 
everything to learn. The Government of India is unable to keep 
a close watch upon their efficiency; the field is so narrow as 
to afford little or no room to the governor of the Settlements 
for exercising a power of selection in recommending to a 
vacant office; and there is consequently so comple~e an absence 
of stimulus to exertion, · that it may well be doubted whether 
Indian civil officers sent to the Straits ever became thoroughly 
well qualified for, · or heartily interested in the duties they 
have to discharge •••• In truth, it has come to this that no 
officer of the Indian civil service will willingly go to the 
Straits for a permanency, except in the position of governor. 
To be transferred there at the beginnin.g of his career, on 
the understanding that he shall remain attached to the Straits 
throughout the whole or even the g•reater portion of it, w~uld 
involve so large a sacrifice of prospects on the part of a 
young Indian civil servant that he cannot reasonably be expected 
to make it. 2 
Another factor to which Canning attached great weight involved 
the defence of the Straits Settlements. Canning considered it necessary 
that Singapore should always be garrisoned, and this duty could be 
carried out by India in ordinary times without difficulty. But Canning 
1 . Canning's Minutes,594-5. 
2 
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rightly pointed out that the Straits Settlements, if threatened with 
external danger, must be protected mainly by warships which India could 
not supplyo 11The defence, therefore, of the Straits Settlements, in case 
of a rupture with any maritime power, must be provided by the naval 
strength of Great Britain." 1 
On the question whether the proposed transfer would be acceptable 
generally to the inhabitants of the Straits Settlements, Canning and 
·2 E.A.Blundell; the Straits Governor, held contradictory views. Blundell, 
when consulted on the subject by the Indian Governm~nt, expressed the 
opinion that had the measure been proposed two years earlier, "it would 
probably meet with the enthusiastic approval of the European community 
of Singapore, but the feeling in favour of it had probably subsided 
very considerably." With regard to the native people9 Blurldell thought 
that it would "probably cause distrust and alann" among them, because 
the change .11would not be comprehended" and would be "impossible to 
thoroughly explain to them." He warned the Indian Government that, 
if the transfer be carried into effect, it must be prepared to give up 
the transportation of convicts to the Straits, especially to$ingapore, 
because the feeling against it, already strong, would be increased after 
the transfer. It was a mistake, Blundell thought, to say that the 
convicts were a burden on the local revenue; on the contrary, without 
1 Canning's Hinutes, 595• 
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2 Edmand Augustus Blundell, Governor of the Straits Settlements, 1855-59; 
joined the Penang civil service in 1821; Resident Councillor at ~~lace~ 
and Penang before appointed Governor. Buckley,Anecdotal History, 619 and 
passim. 
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convict labour, much of the public works could not have been carried out.1 
But Blundell's opinions were lightly dismissed by Canningo First, 
it was not apparent to the Governor-General why the native people should 
be ala:nned and suspicious of "a change which would not cause any alteration 
,) 
of things in the Settlements; even if Blundell's opinions "be well founded", 
Canning argued, nothing beyond a little temporary inconvenience need be 
apprehended. Secondly, Canning had no doubt that the transfer would be 
highly acceptable to the European residents," for they had at all times 
evinced a marked impatience of the control of the Indian Government, and 
would assuredly wish to be free from it.11 And, thirdly, Canning believed 
that there would be no difficulty in arranging for the transportation of 
convicts, for a new penal settlement had recently been established at 
the Andamans. He saw no obstacle in arranging tor continued transportation 
to the Straits, on the understanding that the Straits Government would 
get the profit from the convict labour while the Indian Government would pay 
. . 2 the net expense of the1r ma1ntenance. 
Canning concluded,in definite te:nns, that 11no good and sufficient 
reasons now exist for continuing the Straits Settlements on their present 
footing;" that "very strong reasons exist for withdrawing them from the 
control of the Indian Government and transfering them to the Colonial 
Office;" and that "there are no objections to the transfer which should 
cause Her Majesty's Government to hesitate in adopting a measure 
1 E.A.Blundell to the Government of India, 13 June 1859, in P.P.1862, 
XL, 597-8; see also his letter to the Government of India on 9 February 
1859, in P.P.1862,XL, 615o 
2 Cannin~'s Minutes, 595-6. 
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,, 
calculated to be advantageous to the settlements themselves". 1 
Subsequent events were to prove that Canning rightly judged the 
situatioll in the StrAits Settlements. The European community not only 
welcomed the proposed transfer, they, in f~ct, insisted that it should 
be effected at once, as we shall discuss in the following chapters. 
What seems surprising was the Governor-General's complete approval of the 
proposal and his ready admission that the outmoded arrangement was a .· 
"positive evil", because it does not appear that the Indian Government 
had made any attempt to improve it. The sudden recognition of this 
defective system on the part of the Indian Government ,.,ould indicate that 
it wished to relieve itself of the unrewarding burden. Canning's opinions 
carry the agitation forward. 
The advocates of transfer had won an initial victory. They had 
won the support of an influential group in Parliament, as well as the 
India Office and the Indian Government, the t,.,o authorities most closely 
connected with the question; both had expressed in very favourable tenns 
their willingnees to bring the measure into effE'ct. The negotiations 
that were to follow might have been expected to be smooth. But they 
turned out to be complicated and difficult; they became deadlocked because 
the proposed scheme was not compatible with the Imperial policy of economy. 
1 Canninn's Hinutes, 596. 
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When the India Office received the approving reply from the Indian 
Government on the proposed transfer, Lord Stanley '"as no longer the 
Secretary of State for India. Had he stayed in office he "'ould certainly 
have accepted it, considering his strong support of the proposal when 
he was in office. The Derby ministry had resigned in June 1859, and 
Palmerston formed a new government. The change in government, however, 
did not affect the basic position of the India Office on the subject; 
Sir Charles Hood, the new Secretary of State for India, entirely concurred 
in Canning's opinion that the Straits Settlements should be transferred 
to the control of the Colonial Office. 1 1ie do not know whetb.~r \vood 
attached any special importance to the seve1·al reasons advanced by 
Canning in favour of the transfer because the former did not elaborate 
on the position he took. Herman Herivale, the Permanent Under-Secretary 
in the India Office, ~tated later in 1861 that it appeared to \vood that 
the Straits Settlements were more connected vith Imperial than with 
2 
Indian interests, an•J that it would be expedient to effect the transfer. 
Upon the receipt of the reply from the Indian Government, the 
1 Sir Charles \.food ( 1800-85), educated at Eton and Oxford, had a 
long administrative career before h.is appointment as the Secretary of 
State for India (1859-66). He was responsible for the reorganisation of 
the government and finances of India after the abolition of the East 
India Company. ~' XXI, 824-5. 
2 Herman Herivale (1806-74), succeeded Sir James Stephen as Permanent 
Under-Secretary in the Colonial OfficP. in 1848, and held the position 
until 1859 when he was transferred to the same position in the India 
Office which he held until his death.~' III, 280-1. 
India Office began in early February, 1860, serious discussions with the 
Colonial Office on the necessary arrangements to carry out the pr~posed 
transfer of administrative responsibility. 1 The principles laid do'~ 
by Wood on which the transfer should be based were those contained in 
Stanley 1 s despatch of 1 l-larch 1859: ( 1) that all the revenues of the 
Straits Settlements should accompany the transfer to the Colonial Office; 
and that (2) India should be relieved of all the existing expenditures, 
whether civil, military or miscellaneous. The only exception to this rule 
would be the "net expense" of the maintenance of the Indian convicts, 
that is, the expenses after deduction of profits derived from their 
labour, ~his expenditure was considered by Stanley to be fairly chargeable 
to the Indian Government. Wood adopted these principles,and, in addition, 
wished to discuss with the Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, 
the terms on which the Indian troops of the local army should be furnished 
after the transfer, if such troops were needed.2 The negotiation between 
the India Office and the Colonial Office thus centred around the financial 
condition of the Straits Settlements in general and the relative liability 
of the two departments with respect to the convict expenditures. Before 
we start to discuss the development of the negotiations, it is necessary 
to look at the question of the convicts so as to understand why it came 
at the top of the agenda and why the negotiations did not proceed as 
smoothly as expected. 
First sent to Singapore in 1821, the Indian convicts soon became 
1 Sir Charles Wood to the Duke of Newcastl~, 7 February 1860, in P.P. 
1862,-XL, 607o 
2 ~., and Lord Stanley to Lord Canning, 1 March 1859, in P.P. 1862 
XL, 591o 
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the main source of labour eupply for public works because of the scarcity of 
labour at the settlement. Their number constantly increased: by 1858 there 
were 4172 convicts in the Settlements, 2329 of whom were in Singapore. Their 
custody and maintenance were costly to the Settlements's revenue, as the 
following table shows: 
Convict Expenditures,1846-59 
1846-56 
1856-57 
1857-58 
1858-59 
£ 77,882 
11,560 
12,588 
23,587 
1 
The presence of so large a body of convicts had long been a source 
of irritation to the mercantile community, not only because they thought 
that the convicts were a eonstant drain on the local budget but also 
because they felt the convicts posed a threat to the safety of life and 
property. For instance, in 1848, on the arrival of convicts from Hong 
Korig, the Singapore Free Press protested that Singapore had been converted 
into a pe~al station.2 In 1857 the mercantile community was outraged when 
it was reported that the Indian Government intended to send to Singapore 
a number of the most dangerous convicts from India. A memorial was sent 
to the Governor-General of India protesting against any addition of convicts 
and demanding that transportation to Singapore be stopped.3 This protest 
was of no avail. In May 1858, 190 convicts arrived in Singapore from India. 
The outraged community held a meeting on 19 May 1858 to voice its opposition. 
The meeting resolved to draw up a petition to the Imperial Government and 
decided to urge upon the Straits Governor that the convicts should be 
removed from Singaporeo A committee was appointed to carry out the resolutions, 
1 See inclosure no.1 in E.A.Blundell to the Government of India, 13 June 
1859, P.P.1862,XL, 598; also 600~ 604, 605, bOb. 
2 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 475• J ~.,657· 
-~ 
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'dth A.Logan, H.IIO\I':trd, N.F.Dcwidson, R.C.Hoods, J.J.Grecn~hielcl~~ and 
1 John Purvis as members. In Sept0mber thnt year London merchants connected 
with the Straits Settlements also sent a memorial to th8 Board of Control 
to protest auainst turninn Singapore into a convict station.2 It was also 
one of the grievances contained in the Petition of 1R589 as we have seen 
earlier. This averse fccJ ing of the Europeans against the convicts ,vas 
quite understandable in vicH of the fact that the total European population 
of Singapore in 1860 '"as 24:l.t5, <=m only slightly greater number than that 
of the convicts.3 It ,.;as small ,.-onder that the question of the convicts 
became the first issue to be dealt with in the negotiations. 
The scttlemc•nt of the prohlem of th•~ convicts involved two questions. 
The fi:t·st ,.:as ,.,-hcthcr Sinaapo1·c, or the Straits Scttlcm0nts, should 
continue to receive convicts from India. This question wns easily sett.l~d 
as al 1 the pn1·ties, the Straits ll!erchants, the Old Sin~Japoreans, the India 
Office and the Colonial Office, agreed thnt transportation to the Straits 
should be stopp~cJ. The second on0 ,.,as which depru·tmcnt, the India Office 
1 For bioaraJ>hical notes 0n Lou an, Hoods and Grcensh i e lds, sec above 
PP• )2-JJ. llo•."ard ' ''<lS a r.!erch::mt. 
J.1ichic Fo1·bes Davidson , .,.as n leading merchant in Singapore; partner 
in AoL.John::.: ton ~' Co.; a member of the Grand Jury; took part in the 
oppostion to the introduction of Indian currency in tR5!r. See Buckley, 
Anecdotal lli ::;tory, 23ft anrl passim. 
--Jol~-;·· Pm·vi~~·f;~s a sen). or rcsiclcnt merchant in Sinanpore; started 
John Purvi s & Co. in 1822 ~nd ,,·as n,wmt for Jtclncs Nathcson; nctccl as 
chairma n of vnrious public rncetinus over a p (~riod of yc.:lrs, such us 
that in 1851 \·rhich opposr.:!d the st<"\mp dutyc Sec .!]_>_i_<l•, 23 2. , 507 and passim. 
2 Ihirl .. ) 668. 
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or the Colonial Office, should pay the convicts' upkeep in the event of 
a transfer of administration. This was seemingly not a difficult question 
to solve because the agreed principle stipulated that the Indian Govern-
ment should pay the 11net expense" on this account. But it was in fact a 
controversial one for the two departments could no+. agree on what the 
net expenses should be. The India Office assumed that the profits derived 
from the convicts• labour was equal to the cost of maintenance; in other 
words, the convict establishments would pose no great financial burden. 
The Colonial Office, however, did not share this view. It doubted whether 
the India Office's assumption was true, and expressed the view that the 
convicts could only be employed at public works when there was such a 
necessity, but could not be employed with a view to paying off the cost 
of their maintenance. Here was a controversial issue that had to be ironed 
out by the two departments. 
While there was no immediate reply from Newcastle to Wood's letter 
of 7 February t860, there was no lack of pressure for an immediate transfer. 
Samuel Gregson, M.P. for Lancaster, raised the question in the House of 
Commons on 9 March 1860, asking when the proposed transfer could be 
completed. The Secretary of State for India replied that he was in favour 
of the proposal, and that he had contacted the Colonial Office, but added 
h . 1 that no answer had come to 1m. 
When the Colonial Secretary replied in late June 1860, more than 
four months had elapsed. The reason for this delay was because the info~ 
ation supplied by the India Office was insufficient and the Colonial 
1 Hansa~d, J r d sero; volo CLVII (t860), 9 March 1860, 216•7o 
. ~ 
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Office had been expecting further details, as Newcastle explain~d to 
llood. In his reply Newcastle immediately drew Wood's attention to the 
deficit in the Straits budget from the statements provided by the India 
Office. For the year 1858-59 there was an excess of expenditure over 
revenue to the amount of £.50 1 797: 
Straits Budget, 1858-59 
Revenue 
General 
Deficit 
* 1J2,JJ7 
50,797 
1:.. 183 t 1)4 
Expenditure 
General 
!Ulitary 
Convict 
1:. 82,491 
77,056 
2),587 
J:.t8J t 134 
Newcastle held that it was not desirable that the Straits Settlements 
be ~~ddled with the reception of the Indian convicts any longer. · 
Unless their maintenance was wholly provided for, he anticipated "much 
difficulty and probable controversy", from any attempt to allocate the 
charges. He expressed the view that benefits to the Straits froro the 
convict labour could only be derived when it was neces8ary to start 
public works, and when free labour was more costly than that of the 
60 
convict labour, neither of these two contingencies, he thought, was likely 
1 to continue for long. 
This rather delayed response of the Coloniai Office to the India 
1 Newcastle to Wood, 22 June 1860, in P.P. 1862, XL, 611-12; 
Wood to Newcastle, 7 July 1860, P.P. 1862, XL, 612. 
Office was probably connected with the campaign of the Transfer Group. 
The date of Newcastle's reply was 22 June 1860. About a week earlier, on 
16 June 1860, a deputation composed of persons who had connections in the 
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Straits Settlements and who were in favour of the transfer, had an interview 
with the Colonial Secretary. The deputation was led by Samuel Gregson 
and Walter Buchanan, and included the Old Singaporeans John Crawfurd, 
Alexander and James Guthrie and others. 1 \'Te do not know what exactly 
transpired in the interview. However, considering the strong support they 
gave to the proposed transfer, it was probable that they urged upon 
Newcastle that the move was necessary and that the Colonial Office should 
not hesitate to take over the government of the Straits Settlements. It 
had already become an usual method of the interest group to send a deputation 
to have an interview with the heads of the departments concerned, as 
we have seen on several occasions earlier. Gregson, t-1.P. for Lancaster, 
was chairman of the East India and China Association, l>'hich had been a 
2 leading opponent of the East India Company. Buchanan ltas H.P. for Glasgou. 
Both of them \>'ere strong supporters of the agitation from the beginning 
to the end. 
The complicated question of how to calculate the expenditures of 
the Straits Settlements became the focal point of the negotiations. Should 
the expenses for the convicts and rnilita~ defence be fully charged to the 
Straits revenue? This ,.,.as the difficult and controversial question 
throughout the '"hole negotiation. 
1 Buckley, Anecdota l His torY..' 768. 
2 Redford, Hancheste~s_~, 115-118. 
The India Office stated that the Straits revenues for the years 
1854-59 were more than adequate to cover the ordinary civil expenditures. 
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It was pointed.out, in Wood's letter to Newcastle on 7 July 1860, that the 
Straits Settlements had an aggregate surplus of t 146,088 for those years, 
as the following table shows: 
The Budgets of the Straits Settlements, 1854-601 
Revenues Expenditure Balance 
1854-55 £ 87,817 t 79,169 ~ 8,648 
1855-56 111,799 76,)47 J5,J47 
1856-57 104,430 79,736 24,694 
185'7-58 130,000 74,052 55,948 
1858-59 132,003 105,964 26,0)4 
1859-60 
(estimated)125,960 1)0,653 4,693 (deficit) 
aggregate surplus £146,o88 
The above accounts did no"t include the military expenditures which wen: 
given under the head of general military charges of India in the Indian 
accounts, but included convict expenditures. 
The India Office had in the meantime taken some steps to deal 
with the convicts. Before the transfer was proposed the Indian Government 
1 Wood to Newcastle, 7 July 1860, P.P.1862,XL,612-613. 
The figures in the table are taken from a statement· on revenue and 
expenditure for 1854-60, an appendix to Wood 1 s letter to Newcastle. The 
accounts were kept in rupees, and were converted into pound sterling at 
the rate of 1 rupee= 2 s. Note the discrepency in the figures for 1858-59 
on P•60 above. The figures in the table here did not include the military 
expenses which were ~77,056 (this sum including the expenses for the 
construction of barracks); the actualrevenues and expenses for the year 
had been slightly adjusted by the India Office. 
.~ 
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had considered the expediency of using any longer commercial settlements 
like Singapore and Penang as penal stations. It recognised that in the 
event of the transfer there would be additional reasons of great weight 
for stopping the transportation of Indian convicts to the Straits Settle-
ments. To solve this question a new penal station had been established in 
1858 at Port Blair, in the Andamans. But the Indian Government at the time 
hesitated to give the assurance that there would be no further transportation 
to the Straits, because the new station was only a recent experiment 
and its usefulness had still to be seen. 1 But in 1860 by an Act of the 
Indian Legislative Council, the transportation of Indian and Hong Kong 
convicts to the Straits had been prohibited. The question of further 
transportation was thus settled and the Straits merchants satisfied. But 
the question of the existing convict establishments remained unsettled. 
This question could be reduced to a simple point: what would be 
a realistic evaluation of the labour of the convicts employed at the 
public works? We l~ve seen that one of the principles on which the transfer 
was to be based was that the Indian Government should defray the net 
expenditures after the profit derived from the convict labour was 
deducted. Until the transfer was demanded, the Indian Gnvernment did 
not bother to consider the question of convict labour. But now the 
India Office claimed that the profit derived from convict labour was 
equal to the cost of their maintenance, therefore India would 
not be liable for ftny costs. . This assumption was made on 
1 Wood to Newcastle, JO July 1860, P.P. 1862, XL, 613-614. 
the authority of the Straits Governor, A.E.Dlundell .• In his administrative 
report for 1858-59 he stated that the value of convict labour was about 
equal to the expenses of maintenance, the fonner being£ 28,598. This 
amount was higher than the actual expenses of£ 23,587, and was much higher 
than the estimated value for the previous two years which were only£ 527 
and£ 351 respectively. 1 Blundell proposed that the transportation of 
convicts to Singapore cease because he thought that the progress of 
Singapore had now made the practice unacceptable. But he dismissed the 
assumption often made that the convict body was a financial burden, pointing 
out that public works such as roads, bridges, canals, sea-walls, jetties, 
piers, churches, batteries and fortifications, had been built by convict 
labour. ~le would be glad to see the end of the transportation, but warned 
,., 
that there would be an increased demand on the revenue consequently.{j By 
accepting this view, the India Office tended to value convict labour more 
highly than was acceptable to the Colonial Office. 
There was no immediate reply from the Colonial Office to the 
position taken by the India Office. Probably the Colonial Office was 
trying to work out a formula ,.,.hich would be acceptable to both departments, 
and by which the whole question of the proposed transfer could be satis-
factorily settled. It took the Colonial Office six months's time to ,.,.ork 
out a fonnula which in substance was a compromise. With respect to the 
convict establishments, the Colonial Office was willing to allo,.,. them to 
1 Governor Blundell's Administrative Report,1858-59, in P.P. 1862, XL, 
61I*• 
2 Bl 1'1Hiell to th0. Governm!'!nt of India, 9 February 1859, in P .. P.1862,XL, 
615. 
remain in Singapore for the next three years. This conce8sion was 
ftCCompanied by the following "indispensable" conditions: 
(1) that the whole expense, direct or indirect, of the 
establislunents should be borne by the Indian Government; 
(2) that the employment of convicts should be subject to such 
laws as the colony might find it necessary to enact for its 
own protection; 
(3) that the colonial government should not be bound to en~loy 
the convicts unless it was in the interests of the colony 
to do so; 
(4) that the convict8 should not be set free in the colony; 
(5) that the colonial government was the "proper judge" whether 
the convict labour was of value to the public.t 
The purpose of those conditions was obviously to prevent the 
convicts from becoming a burden on the StJ·ai ts budget. If the employment 
and the rate of payment was to be determined by the Straits Government, 
then it could see to it that the convicts did not become an unnecessary 
financial drain. Presumably, the Colonial Office wanted to be able to 
fix the value of the convicts so that the Indian Government could not 
write off all or a large part of thE.' expenl5es by placing a high value 
on convict labour. The Indian GoverruJent, if the conditions were accepted, 
would be thrown into a disadvantageous position, as the p~rmanent Under-
secretary in the Colonial Office Sir Frederic Rogers admitted.2 That was 
obviously the intention of the Colonial Office, because it considered that 
the Indian Government, which enjoyed the advantages of the convict establish-
menta, should bear the inevitable disadvantages. 
1 Sir Frederic Rogers to Herman Herivale, 6 February 1861, P.P. 1862, 
XL, 615-6. 
2 Sir Frederic Rogers (1811-89), Baron Dlachford, educated at Eton and 
Oxford; succeeded Herman Nerivale as Permanent Under-Secretary for the 
Colonies in 1C.59 and held the position until 1871• ~' XVIII, 119-120. 
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On the other hand, the Colonial Office \'laS ,.,illing to make some 
concessions on the question of the Straits finances. It found the state~ 
ments on the Straits budaets for 185h-59, put before it by the India 
Office, could support 11 no trush:ortby estimate", and that by "a certnin 
amount of selection <~nd conjecture" they could be made to sho"' a possible 
surplus of f. 10,000 annually, or a possible deficit of .£ 70,000. According 
to Rogers's estimate, the British Trea sury wou~d have to cover a deficit 
of from ;f:JO,OOO to £. 50,000 annually, \•rhich \'lould largely he used to cover 
the military expenses estimated at £:8o,ooo for 1858-59· Thus it appeared 
to the Colonial Office that. the ·.:ransfer \·ioulrl bri ng 11 a very con!'::i.cl~rahle 
cxpen::;e" on th(\ Dr:i.t.j:=;h Trt!asury. Ho;.;ever, d e spite all this uncertainty 
and confusion, Ne"'castle Has prepal'ed to recommend that the expense be 
risked if the India.n Government \vould consent to the proposal regarding 
the settlement of the convict e s tablisht;!ents. If \•/ood should agree to 
this, then the concurrence of the Har Office and the Treasury might be 
sought. 1 It thus appenrc d in February 1861 that an agreement could be 
reached between the Coloninl Office and the India Office. 
The India Office accepted the propos itions of the Colonial Office 
in principle. It ,.,ould not give any assurance that the Straits Settlement s 
would not b e come n burde n on the Briti s h Exche que1· . Hood Has una ble to 
answer the question a b out the de t a il s of the budge t with any grea ter 
degree of precision than wa:::; afforde d by the statl~nwnts a lready sent to 
the Coloni rd . Off ice . Ho•.-rcve:r· , the Indi a Office 's reply pointed to the 
!':tea di ly . inc]:ca s ina rcvcnu~s in the p ast fm·r y e<' r s , ancl t ::> the f nct tha t 
-.. -----·-···· ------------· 
1 HoqP.rs i :n Hcri v;d e , (> Fr~hng,ry 18G1, i n P.P.tRG2, XL ,617o 
- :----·-- ------·-----. 
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expenditures, exclusive of military charges,were considerably below 
revenues and much of the military expense was temporary, like the 
expenditures on the barracks being constructed. 
Wood was prepared to accept, with some modifications, the formula 
of the Colonial Office on the convict establishments. He demanded that the 
Straits Settlements, after the transfer, should continue to employ the 
convicts for some time; that the rate of payment should be based on mutual 
agreement between the colonial and Indian Governmen~and be subject to 
revision from time to time; and that the penal establishments should 
remain for a longer period, to be removed three years after notice to 
that effect was received by the Indian Govenunent from the Colonial Office.1 
The India Office further demanded that the Indian Government should 
be rapaid by the British Government for the cost of barracks which were 
being constructed at Singapore. In 1858, after the outbreak of the Indian 
Mutiny, the Indian Government decided to construct barracks for the 
accommodation of European troops which would be permanently stationed there. 
The cost of construction was estimated at t 10,000. The Indian Government 
held that it was entitled to repayment because the construction had been 
sanctioned "in the full confidence that the expense would be repaid to 
2 the Indian Government." This fresh demand jeopardized the chances of an 
early agreement with the Colonial Office which definitely declined to 
accept .the demando 
The Colonial Office accepted the counter-proposals of the India 
1 De Grey and Ripon {Under..,S.ecretary in the India Office} to Ro~ers, 
22 March 1861, in P.P. 1862, XL, 617-9o 
2 ~•t 617o 
. · . . ~ 
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Office with some minor changes and the question of the penal establishments 
1 
was thus closed. Complete agreement might have been reached then had the 
India Office claimed for the repayment of the cost of the barracks; this 
claim further complicated ·the whole issue of the transfer. 
The construction of the barracks had been discussed by the India 
and the Colonial Offices soon after the transfer was proposed, but no 
decision was made as to which government should pay the expenses. In 1859 
the India Office asked the Colonial Office whether the cost would be 
2 defrayed by the Imperial Exchequer. The Colonial Office then could not 
give "any very confident opinion" because the transfer had not yet been 
finally decided, and it did not know the particulars of the Straits 
finances; but it added that, in the event of the transfer, if the local 
revenue was not sufficient to cover the ordinary expenditure, then it was 
possible that "application would require to be made to Parliament for any 
military barracks which ,.,.ere found to be indispensable" and that the 
War Office 11would have to prepare plans and submit the vote to the 
House of Commons.") This reply was taken by the India Office to mean 
that the Colonial Office would agree to repay the cost of the barracks. 
It was obviously mistaken here for the Colonial Office did not accept 
the claim on various grounds. 
First of all, the Colonial Office argued, in asking Parliament to 
sanction the transfer lihich Newcastle had agreed to, the Colonial 
Secretary \V'OUld be obliged to propose that "a large and indefinite annual 
1 Rogers to De Grey and Ripon, 24 April 1861, in P.P. 1862 , XL, 619. 
2 G .. Clerl<. (Under-Secreta ry for India ) to T.F.ElJ.iot (Assistant Under-
Secret a ry f or the Colonies ), 28 October 1859, in P.P.1862, XL~ 606. 
J T.F.El l iot to. G.C~, 18 November 1859 , in~~' XL, 606-607. 
. . . . 
•o 0 -----···--·-- ·P' ~---
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payment" should become a charge on the British revenue. He could not 
further propose that the British Exchequer should reimburse the In.dian 
Government for expenses incurred which the Imperial Government had neither 
authorised nor controlled. What concerned Newcastle was that the claim 
involved a principle whose application, if admitted, was difficult to 
restrict. Secondly, the demand was 11peculiarly unexpected" because the 
Colonial Office had already expressed the view that such an outlay ought 
only to be made on the authority of the Secretary of State for ~ar and with 
the sanction of Parliament. Therefore, the Colonial Secretary considered 
that he "could not recommend to Parliament the reimbursement of expenses 
incurred not only without its consent but against the views of the 
1 department which would have to propose the vote. 11 
The strong language of the Colonial Office was somewhat unexpected, 
considering its expressed readiness to recommend that the British 
Government cover deficits in the Straits budget. The India Office was 
equally unhappy about the refusal. Wood was sorry to find that Newcastle 
"hesitates to admit the justice of the claim for repayment." The I~dia 
Office argued that it was entitled to repayment because the construction 
of the barracks was then considered indispensable,politically and militarily, 
with respect to the war with China and other considerations connected 
with the state of affairs in the eastern seas, which were more important 
to the British Empire than to the Indian territories. The Imperial 
Government would be the sole party to reap the advantages of these works. 
Had it not been expected that the Imperial Exchequer would reimburse the 
1 Roqers to De Grey and Ripon, 24 April 1861, in PoP.1862,XL, 619-620. 
' · . )I 
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cost, the Indian Government would not have sanctioned the construction. 
However, the India Office would leave the question for further settlement 
between the two departments and was willing to agree that immediate steps 
be taken by Newcastle to carry out the transfer in order to prevent 
"considerable public inconvenience."1 
When the Colonial Office and the India Office were on the verge ~f 
reaching some agreement, in April 1861, over the question of the transfer, 
the influence of the Transfer Group was brought to bear on the Colonial 
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Office. The Straits n1erchants and the Old Singaporeans in London flooded the 
Colonial Office with lengthy memoranda and notes in support of the 
2 
transfer. The common theme of these memoranda was that the transfer 
should be effected immediately and the new form of government provided 
for the colony. The merchants seeme d to be \'iell-informed about the 
progress and obstacles of the negotiations because the information and 
vie,.,.s contained in the memoranda \'t'ere specifically directed to them. 
It is of course not easy to determine to what extent the memoranda 
influenced the opinions of the departments concerned. But it was beyond 
1 De Grey and Ripon to Rogers, 9 May 1861, in P.P.1862, XL, 620. 
2 See Singapore Chamber of Commerce: Hemorandum on the Revenue and 
Expenditure of the Straits Settlements, April 1861; John Cra\'/:furd: 
Suggestions for the Future Administra tion of the British Colonies in the 
Straits of Halacca, 1861; Cra\ffurd: J.lcmorandum on the Finnnces o f the 
Straits Settlements, April 1861; A.Guthric and Others to the Colonial Office: 
The British Possess ions in the Straits of Halacca, 20 April 1861, in 
P.P.1862, XL, 621-651. The las t one was signe d by 12 other Singapore 
merchants: Ed\~ard Bous tead, L.Frascr, James Fra ser, James Guthrie, 
John Harvey, J.M.Little, H.T.Ha r s ha ll, H.J.Ma rtin, W.W.Ke r, William Napier, 
W.W.Shaw a nd H.H.Simons. 
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doubt that their ~uggestions and arguments carried considerable weight, 
as we shall see later. 
Thus, in Hay t86t, after more than a year of bargaining, the India 
Office and the Colonial Office had reached an agreement over the proposed 
transfer. The Colonial Office agreed to propose the transfer to Parliament, 
anticipating a considerable expenditure on the part of the Imperial 
Exchequer; while the India Office gave way over the question of the convict 
establishments. Both expressed their willingness to bring the scheme into 
effect in order to satisfy the wishes of the Straits mercantile community. 
These negotiations in their length illustrated the complexity of 
negotiations on a question where more than one governmental department 
had responsibility. The negotiations were further protracted because the 
War Office and the Treasury also were involved in colonial matters. 
It was thought appropriate now to invite the concurrence of the 
latter departments on the question. The Colonial Office did not seem to 
have anticipated any unfavourable reaction from either of these departments. 
·. 
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The Colonii'\1 Office communicated on )1 Hay 1861 \dth the \-lar 
Office to seck the latter's opinion on the proposed military reorgani-
zation "'hich would have to be made in the event of the transfer. This 
move \'las necessary because of the reorganiz<'tion of the \var Office 
itself after the Crimean Har .. Throughout the first half of the nine-
tecnth century a single minister W<S at the head of the ''f<n~ and Colonial 
departments. 'l'he Crimean \var put i'\11 end to this i'\rrangement i'\nd the \var 
Office became a separate depnrtmcnt, but the Secretary of State :for \iar 
was still obliged to defend in Parli<~mcnt e:: .. :pendi ture incurred for the 
defence cf the colonies~ 1 
Before we deal ldth the response of the \lar Office on tho proposed 
militnry nlTCin!Jemcnts, it is necessary to look bnck at the various schemes 
that had already be!'n proposed, and the discussion that had passed bcb.,.cen 
the India Office nnd the Colonial Office over the subject. 
The question of nm" military arranuements for the _Stnd ts 
Settlements "'as not only an important issue itself, but also very closely 
tied up with the fin<.mccs of the Scttlcmcni:so Therefore :i.t naturally came 
under close se1·utiny from th~ pnrties concerned. It '"as one of the questions 
constnntly raisccl in the various racmoranda put forth hy the Transfer 
Group, \l'ho '"ished to rcoJ"U<mh':c the military defences ,.,i th a vie'" to 
economy and efficiency. It. therefore involved the nature and sb~e of 
the nnrrison and its cost. 
·----·-···---··---·-·--· -·-·-
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The expenses for the Straits garrison were indeed a great 
financial burden to the Straits Settlements, as the follol{ing table shows: 
The Straits Military Expenses, 1846-61 1 
1846-56 -£: 358,412 
1856-57 
1857-58 
1858-59 
1859-60 
1860-61 
59,047 
81,025 
77,055 
50,537 
54,966 
The garrison was 1728 men strong in 1859, 1868 men in 1860 and 1865 men in 
1861. The force was considered too· large and expensive by the ~traits 
community. When the Imperial Government had misgivings over the financial 
strength of the Straits Settlements, the Transfer Group then proposed to 
reduce the size of the force in order to effect a considerable saving. 
We have already mentioned in Chapter II that Jolm Crawfurd had in 
his memorandum of 1859 suggested that the military defences should be 
reorganized by reducing the existing troops and raising a local corps: 
t\iO regiments of native troops, each 1000 men strong, with three or four 
European commissioned officers, for service ··in the Straits as well as the 
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British settlements of Labuan (near Borneo) and Hong Kong. These changes if 
effected, Crm-1furd estimated, would bring the cost do\m to £22,000 from 
the £ 42,112 spent in 1855-56. In addition to this local force, there would 
be a detachment of Royal artillery, the cost to be paid by the Imperial 
Government. Crmifurd also suggested that the Imperial navy should replace 
. . 2 
the Straits marines for the suppress1on of pl.racy. 
1 ~olonel Cavena~h to the Government of India~military department), 
26 December 1859, i~ P.P.1862, XL, 608-610. F-;;-;-the military expenses and 
forces at the Straits, see statements by G.E.Barrodaile (Secretary to the 
Straits Government), 13 June 1859, in E._.P.t862, XL, 602; also Goo, 6oft, 605 
and 606; De Grey and Ripon to Rogers, 22 Narch 1861, 618. 
2 Cra\·rfurd' s Notes, 589-590 • 
f: : 
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The garrison was then composed mainly of Madras troops. In 1860 
the garrison consisted of 102 European artillery men and 1766 Madras 
sepoys. This garrison was considered to be inefficient, an opinion 
commonly held in the Straits Settlements. Even Governor Cavenagh himself 
strongly objected to the employment of the sepoys in the Straits, because 
the sepoys, unused to the climate and separated from their families, 
became what the Governor called "proverbially sick." 1 
In the military scheme proposed by Governor Cavenagh, a ne'i corps 
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was considered preferable to the Hadras troops of the regular Indian army. 
This would be composed of six companies, each 100 men strong, to be 
recruited from 11men of all classes and from all parts of India," and if 
possible, containing a small portion of Nalays and Bugis of the Straits. 
This change in the composition of the garrison would bring about greater 
efficiency and less expenditure, while the force would be more useful 
militarily because it would provide effective protection against an 
external enemy and internal revolt and render assistance to the 
neighbouring British dependencie~.2 
Cavenaghts new military scheme was well received by the India and 
Colonial Offices. It would have been surprising if it had been otherwise, 
because not only the proposal itself '~·as sound, but also because it \lias 
made by a soldier \'lho had a great deal of experience with Indian troops. 
He had been actively engaged in the Punjab War and also in the suppression 
of the Indian Mutiny. Uood called the proposal 11a very good one," and 
suggested that the new scheme could be more readily carried 
1 Cavena gh to the Secretary of the Government of India, 26 December 1859, 
in P.P.t86~, XL, 608 and 609. 
2 ~ .. , 610. 
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out before the transfer. 1 From the Indian point of view, the replacement 
of the Hadras troops would "conduce to the contentment and efficiency of 
2 the Madras native anny.n Newcastle agreed with Wood that it was a good 
proposal, and suggested that Cavenagh be authorized to raise one of the 
local native corps. The Colonial Secretary thought that a corps composed 
entirely of the natives of the ~mlayan Peninsula and the neighbouring 
islands would be preferable to one composed mainly of Indians .. Expressing 
the view that any new demand on the British army for the defence of the 
Straits Settlements would be wholly objectionable, Newcastle was glad to see 
that Cavenagh contemplated the probability of detaching the local troops, if 
needed, for the defence of the neighbouring British colonies. 11Their 
liability to be moved in case of emergency," Newcastle commended, "will 
materially increase the value of the corps to the government." 3 
The Transfer Group was also concerned with the future military 
defen~e··of the Straits, and continued to· submit their plans to the Colonial 
Office. In 1861 John Crawfurd presented a modified plan. He proposed that 
the existing garrison should be replaced by 200 Royal marines and 500' 
Malay troops,which would cost£ )1,442, far below the expense of 1860, 
£54,966.4 In the memorandum of 1861, Guthrie and others were also in 
favour of .raising a local corps which could be recruited on the spot and 
1 See Colonel W.E.Baker(military secretary) to Rogers, 16 June 1860, in 
P.P.1862, XL, 608. 
2 Wood to the Government of India, 9 August 1860, in P .. P.1862,XL,6to-6t1. 
3 See Rogers to Baker, 10 July 1860, in P.P.1862,XL,610. 
4 J.Crawfurd:Suggestion for the Future Administration, in P.P.t862,XL,6JO. 
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would be composed of Eurasians, Malays, Bugis and Javanese. They also 
supported Cra,~furd's idea of stationing 200 European troops there; if the 
European troops were not available, their places could be filled by 200 
marinestrained to the use of artillery. 1 It was estimated that this change 
would reduce the cost to£ ~~,250. 2 
The India Office, however, would not commit itself to any of these 
proposals; and on 22 March 1861 it referred the question of the defence 
of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial OfficeoJ Probably the India 
Office considered the question belonged properly to the Colonial Office 
in the event of the transfer, since the garrison in the various proposals 
did not involve the Indian troopso The Colonial Office in turn transmitted 
to the War Office in May 1861 the various proposals on the Straits defences, 
and requested its views on the subject, while abstaining from committing 
itself to any particular schemeo 
The War Office, however, felt it was not in a position to make a · 
definite decision on a general military scheme. Sidney Herbert, the 
Secretary of State for War, held that it was impossible to form any 
"positive judgement" on the number and composition of the future garrison 
and the proportion of European troops to native troops. He considered, 
however, that a regiment of the line, one battery of Royal artillery, and 
one or two native corps would be amply sufficient for the defence, and that 
1 Guthrie and others, P.P. 1862, XL, 648. 
2 
.!.2.!!!•, appendix, 651. 
J D d R" t R 22 March 1861, P.P. 1862, XL, 617. e grey an 1pon o ogers, 
it was clear that the force must be composed in a considerable degree 
of native troops. The possibility of employing the marines in the .iway 
suggested by Crawfurd was ruled out because the Admiralty had from time 
to time objected to the use of marines in such a manner. With respect 
to the claim of the Indian Government for repayment on account of the 
barracks, Herbert agreed with Newcastle that ·the Imperial Government 
could not reasonably accept the demand but for different reasons; the 
Indian Government would be relieved by the proposed transfer of an 
expenditure of from l 30,000 to £ 50,000 annually, and the presence of 
so large a body of convicts from India would require a larger garrison 
than would otherwise be needed • . Finally, the War Secretary considered 
it undesirable that a question involving so large a sum as£ 70,000 
should be left for future adjustment between the Colonial and the India 
Offices, and suggested that the attention of the Lords of the 'l'reasury 
should be at once directed to it by the Colonial Office. 1 
The Treasury was in fact brought into the negotiations at the 
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same time as the War Office and the inability of the War Office to reach 
a decision· on the defence of the Straits helped very much to increase the 
reluctance of the Treasury to approve of the proposed transfer. 
The Treasury rejected the proposed transfer as it then stood. 
George Hamilton, the Under-secretary, stated that the Lords of the Treasury 
found that the information was not sufficient to let them come to a 
satisfactory decision. He mentioned the fact that the War Office was unable 
to reach any definite conclusion with regard to the military arrangements. 
1 Edward Lunard (Under-secretary for War) to Rogers, 19 June 1861, 
P.P. 1862, XL, 65)-4. 
- -· 
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However, the Treasury would reconsider the proposal if it was provided 
with "more full and exact means of estimating any possible charge on the 
British Exchequer, as well as reasons for undertaking it.111 The Chancellor 
of Exchequer then was W.E.Gladstone. It is not clear how much he was 
involved in the negotiations because the printed correspondence, at least, 
does not bear any particular indication of his viet{S or decisions. 
In consequence of the Treasury's request, the Colonial Office wrote 
to the India Office on 16 September 1861, requesting that the latter should 
state to the Treasury the general reasons for the transfer, inform the 
War Office about the Straits defence needs so as to enable the \var Office 
to determine the costs involved, and provide a detailed statement of the 
Straits revenues and expenditures for the past few years. Newcastle insisted 
that unless the India Office abandoned definitely the claim for repayment 
of expenses incurred in public works before the transfer, there would be 
2 little use pursuing the subject any further. 
Before the India Office replied, the Colonial Office further 
transmitted a memorial addressed to Newcastle by the Singapore merchants.J 
Signed by \v.H.Read, J.J.Greenshields, \'lilliam Paterson and R.C.\voods, the 
1 Hamilton to Rogers, J1 July 1861, in P.P.1862, XL,657• 
2 Rogers to De Grey and Riponi 16 September t86t, in P.P.t862, XL, 655-656. 
3 Rogers to De Grey and Ri pon, 27 September t861, in P.P.t862, XL ~ 657. 
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memorial resulted from a public meeting held on 22 May 1861 in Singapore. 1 
The meeting voiced the view that the Straits revenue was more than 
adequate to meet local expenses, but that the cost of the expensive 
2 fortifications should not be put on them. The memorial, which contained 
and elaborated the resolutions of the meeting, pointed emphatically to the 
connection of Singapore with the imperial interests. Singapore was 
primarily establ~shed, it stated, with a view to creating a great commercial 
emporium, and fulcrum, whence the political influence of the British 
Government could be extended over the Malay Archipelago. Imperial interests, 
which prevailed from the very first,had gradually increased, and Singapore 
had become third in importance among the British possessions in the 
East. The memorial therefore held that the defence of Singapore was not 
merely of local but of "high imperial importance," and that it was unfair 
that .the charges should be defrayed by the local revenue alone. The local 
revenue, however, was not only sufficient to cover local expenses, but 
having a surplus of £ 50,000, was capable of providing for a local corps, 
the cost of which was estimated to be£ 35 ,ooo. 3 
1 W.H.Read was a very influential merchant in Singapore. A partner in 
A.L.Johnston & Co., he was sometime chairman of the Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce and became one of the unofficial members of the Legislative 
Council in 1867. In 1868 he was elected chairman of the Singapore branch 
of the Straits Settlements Association • He had strong influence with the 
native states and Siam. See Buckley, Anecdotal History, 367-368 and passim. 
William Paterson was a partner in P;terson,Simons & Co. in Singapore 
and later chairman of the Bank of India~Australia and China in London for 
twenty years; very actively involved in Singapore politics.~., 233-23~ 
and passim. 
2 
.!E.!!!·, 768-769. 
3 W.H.Read and Others to Newcastle, 30 June 1861, in PoP.t862,XL, 657-660. 
The memorial was a significant one because it came to the attention 
of the Colonial Office and the Treasury. It provided the financial · 
information and the general reasons in favour of the transfer that the 
Colonial Office and the India Office vere requested to provide for the 
Treasury. 
The India Office, in the meantime, seemed to have believed that the 
proposed transfer would not be effected soon, because it ordered the Indian 
Government to make preparation for the continuing administration of the 
Straits Settlements. Early in !-lay 1861 Wood instructe~ the Indian 
Government to discontinue work on the barracks and later in September 
after the Treasury's rejection, Wood sent furhter instructions to the 
Indian Government: all public works should be suspended and no further 
works of defence be constructed, in order to make the Straits Settlements 
no longer a financial burden on the Indian Government; and, if necessary, 
1 
ne\'1 sources of revenue should be developed. 
In October 1861 the India Office answered the Colonial Of fice's 
latest communication, but without advancing the negotiations further. 
This reply, however, throws some light on the origin of the agitation, 
and supports the vie\ot that it originated in Singapore. It stated that 
the demand for the trans fer "originated from the strong expres sion of 
the \dshes of the inhabitants to that cffect. 11 \·lith regard to the 
financial question, no fres h infonna tion ,.,.as provided; "Ti th regard 
b k 1• t to its claim for the repayment of expenses ·on the arrac s, 
insi~ted on its earlie r position that the bcnefi ts of those l\'Orks 
1 lvood to the Governor-Gene ral o f Indi a , 1ft Septembe r 1861, i n P.P. 1862 , 
XL, 655. 
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would be reaped solely by the Imperi~tl Government not by the Ind.ian 
1 Government. There was little change in the position of the India Office, 
nor did it provide any fresh information on the whole question. Thus 
the requirements laid down by the Treasury remained unfulfilled. 
The latest correspondence between the India Office and the Colonial 
Office, which included the memorial, was forwarded on 11 November 1861 
to the Treasury for its consideration. The Treasury rejected the proposed 
transfer for the second time, which action was not unexpected. Although 
the Lords of the Treasury had "every disposition to give due weight to 
the views and representations" contained in the memorial of the inhabitants 
of Singapore in support of the transfer, they were "unable to arrive at 
the opinion that there are reasons of state sufficient to induce Her 
Majesty 1 s Government to incur an addition to ih~ puulic ~p.::nui tu:;:e in 
order to give effect to· such transfer". They refused to commit themselves 
to an important measure because the information on the subject remained 
"in'complete11 and derived mainly fro111 "local parties", '"hose accuracy was 
questionable. But the refusal was not final and the door for consideration 
not closed completely; the Treasury expressed its readiness to reconsider 
the case if it was put before them with the "specific" information which it 
. t . d 2 
. was the task of the India and the Colonial Off1ces o prov1 e. 
The initiative obviously h~d to come either from the Colonial Office 
or the India Office, but both were not inclined to take any further step. 
The Colonial Secretary considered the Treasury's second refusal had put 
an end to the proposed transfer as far as he was concerned, because he 
1 He rivale to Ropers, 28 October 1861, P.P. 1862, XL, 66o-1. 
2 Peel to Rogers, 11 December 1861, P.P. 1862, XL, 661-2. 
'
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had no further information and held that it would rest with \Iood to 
decide whether any further step could be taken by him to obtain the 
required details.
1 
No such step was taken by the India Office, as it 
admitted later. 2 
The agitation for the transfer thus encounted a severe setback 
because of the Treasury's insistence on a policy of economy, and the 
inability of the Colonial Office and the India Office to prove that 
the Straits Settlements would be self-supporting. The Treasury's position 
reflected in fact the general colonial policy of the day. To explain 
why the Treasury was so insistent on the condition that the transfer 
should not bring any additional expenditure on the British Exchequer, 
we have to look at the reappraisal of colonial military defence and 
expenditure that coincided with the agitation for the transfer. 
From the preceding discussion it is obvious that the Straits 
revenue, although sufficient to meet the general civil expenditure, was 
not adequate to cover the military expenses. If the proposed transfer 
was carried out, the British Government would have to pay the deficit. 
The Treasury had every reason to reject such a proposal as it then 
stood, because the tradi tiona! colonial military policy, \-lhereby the 
Imperial Government had the greater share of the burden, had come 
under serious attack and \'las being changed. 
It has been mentioned earlier that after th-e Crimean Har the l-Iar 
Office was made a separate department, but the Secretary of State for 
War was still obliged to defend colonial military expenditure in Parliament. 
1 Rogers to Merivale, 19 December 1861, in P.P.t862, XL, 661. 
2 T.Baring (Under-Secretary) to Rogers, 28 July 1863, in Further 
Correspondence J:·~specting the Transfer of thf: ~ontrol. of ~he Str~i ts .... 
Settlements from the India Office to the Colon1al Offl.cc(l.n cont1nuac..l.on 
of No.259), P.P.t866, LII,695· 
. ... . .. ~ 
..,.,_,. 
It thus became necessary to define the respective liability of the War 
Office and the various colonial governments for military expenses.,; For this 
purpose an interdepartmental committee was formed in 1859 at the initiative 
of the War Office, comprising representatives from the War Office, the 
Colonial Office and the Treasury. The l-Iar Office then held the view that: 
England should assist in the defence o£ her colonies against 
aggression on the part of foreign civilized ~ations, and (in 
a less proportion) of formidable native tribes, but in no case, 
except where such Colonies are mere garrisons kept for Imperial 
purposes, should she assume the whole of such defence.o.(and) 
that military e~enditure for purpose of internal police, 
should be defrayed from local funds, there being no ground for 
drawing any distinction between a colony and an independent 
nation in this respecto 1 
One of the principal grounds on which the existing policy of colonial . 
defence was attacked by the report of the committee was that it imposed an 
enormous burden on the British people, not only in taxes but also by 
withdrawing a large part of their military forces from ,home. The report 
proposed to divide the colonies into two classes: 
(1) military posts, garrisoned by the Imperial Government for 
the imperial purposes rather for local defence; 
(2) all other dependencies where troops were stationed primarily 
for the protection of the inl~bitants. 
For the second class of colonies, it recommended that the defence system 
should be based on two simple principles:(1) colonial management, and 
(2) joint contribution at a uniform rate. It proposed that the Imperial 
Government should call upon each colony to decide on the nature of its 
own defence and should offer to bear a share of the entire cost (one half 
·'l 
was the proposed shareo)'~ The military questions involved in the proposed 
transfer obviously fell within the scope of this enquiry, and the Treas~ry's 
1 Quoted in Schuyler, Fall of the Old Colonial System, 222. 
2 ~·' 223-224. 
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reluctance to approval the transfer is understandableo 
.I 
In the meantime, demand for reform continued to grow in Parliamento 
On 5 March 1861 Arthur Mill's motion for the appointment of a select 
committee to enquire into colonial defence and to recommend changes was 
carried in the House of Commons. 1 The enquiry was completed in July 1861, 
and the Report divided the British dependencies into two classes: 
(1) those which may properly be called "colonies": to this class 
belonged the North American and South African Colonies, the 
West Indies,Ceylon, Mauritius, New Zealand, and the Australian 
Colonies (excluding Western Australia)o 
(2) "military garrisons, naval stations, convict depots, and 
dependencies maintained chiefly for objects of Imperial policy": 
to this class belonged Nalta, Gilbraltar, and the Ionian 
Islands, Hong Kong, Lat.uan, Bermuda, the Bahamas, St. Helena, 
and the Falkands, Western Australia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, 
and the Gold Coast. 
With respect to the settlement colonies, the Report recommended that, 
with some reservations, "the responsibility and cost of the military 
defence of such dependencies ought mainly to devolve upon themselves." 
With respect to the dependencies in the second class, "the responsibility 
and main cost of their defence properly devolve on the Imperial Government.112 
The Straits Settlements were not included in the latter classi-
fication because they were then part of the Indian territories, and the 
enquiry of the select committe did not extend to India (an indication that 
~ 
India was a distinct colonial entity.) To which class the Straits Settle-
ments would belong, if separated from India, had never been clearly defined 
1 Hansard, )rd. s e r.,vol. CLXI(1861), 5 March 1861, 1400-1421; also 
Schuyler, Fall of the Old Colonial System, 225-226. 
2 Report from the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, 
11 July 1861, in PoP.1861,XII I ,7ll; for the ·whole report see 69-90; also 
Schuyler, ! a ll of the Old Colonial System, 226. 
so far. They seemed to lie somewhere in between because they were colonies 
and military stations at the same time. The timing of the Report was 
significant here. It was completed in July 1861, at a time when the proposed 
transfer was being considered by the Treasury. To bring ~e transfer into 
effect requirerl parliamentary approval. If such a measure would place an 
added burden on the British Exchequer 1 as it then appeared, it ,.,.as certainly 
not expedient to request such approval. Hence the Treasury refused the 
proposal. Changing parliamentary sentiment on colonial defence apparently 
made the Treasury more reluctant. The House of Commons adopted in 1862 the 
principle that self-governing colonies should be responsible for selrdefence, 
i.e., self-governing colonies should have the main responsibility for 
internal order and assist in external protection. The recommendations 
of the P.epc:-t -:J£ !861 were e.dopted l:ly t.h~ !!OvernmP.nts of the 1860s and their 
implementation was to reach its climax in the Gladstone ministry of 1868-74.1 
The Straits mercantile community held that since Singapore was 
serving lmperial interests, it 8hould be protected by Imperial fo~ces 1 but 
they had offered a compromise: local revenue would pay for raising of a 
local corps for inten1al security. Of course, the Straits Settlements were 
never expected to be given self-governing status even in the event of the 
transfer taking place. But the Imperial policy of self-defence might be · 
binding here too. This was certainly a setback for the agitation for the 
transfer. But the movement did not die out, and soon was to resume. The 
outcome of this conflict would be either the at least partial exemption of 
the Straits Settlements from the new Imperial policy, or the assumption by 
the Settlements of full responsibility for their own defence. 
1 Schuyler, Fall of the Old Colonial System, 226-227. 
Chapter IV: The Triumph of the Agitation: The Straits 
Settlements Became A Cro\m Colony, 1863-1867 
~ ·~ 
The deadlock caused by the Treasury's refusal to approve the 
proposed transfer appeared to be more serious than it actually was. The 
conditibns of the Treasury were not all that difficult to meet if either 
the Colonial Office or the India Office would go to the trouble of collect-
ing the accurate and specific information required by the Treasury and 
prove that the Straits Settlements were self-supporting. Neither the 
Colonial Office nor the India Office took any step in this direction. On 
the other hand, there was no indication that the Treasury could be swayed 
to change its position. As far as the British Government was concerned, 
the issue of the proposed transfer was virtually closed. After four years 
of vigorous agitation , the proposed tran3!er seemed doomed to failure. 
But the Singapore merchants, greatly disappointed, no doubt, by the 
Treasury's refusal, had not been completely discouraged. They were soon 
to raise the question !or the second tim~ bringing strong pressure to bear 
on the Colonial Office to restime negotiations with the departments concerned. 
The immediate cause that precipitated the renewed agitation for 
the transfer was the In~ian Government's decision to bring into effect 
the provisions of the Stamp Act in the Straits Settlements. It has been 
mentioned earlier that the Secretary of State for India, Sir Charles Wood, 
instructed the Governor-General of India that the latter should balance 
the Straits budget, if necessary, by developing new sources of revenue. 
Consequently, the Indian Government sent to Singapore "imperative orders 
in very curt terms" to enforce the Stamp Act. 1 It was announced in May .1862 
1 Buckley,Anecdotal History, 694-695; see also aboveP•2J• 
• . 
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that, under instructions from the Supreme Government of India, the StampAct 
would become effective on or about 1 November 1862. The Indian Government 
had attempted unsuccessfully to introduce stamp duties earlier, but was 
prevented by the vigorous objections of the Straits inhabitants. Now the 
mercantile community was as annoyed as before. The Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce sent a memorial immediately to the Governor-General of India 
opposing the measure. The objections were that the measure would .affect 
the trade of Singapore, that taxation in the Straits Settlements was 
already higher than in India, and that the local income was sufficient 
for all civil expenditures. But the protest came to nothing. The Indian 
Government, determined to bring the duties into force, refused to accept 
those arguments. This refusal brought about more protests from the 
merchants. A public meeting held on 10 July 1862 expressed regret that 
the Chamber's memorial was ignored by the Indian authorities. A c~·~ittee 
of W.H.Read, W.Paterson, J.J.Greenshields, A.Logan, J.Davidson, 
W.Hactaggart and J.,d'Almeida was appointed to draw up n petition of protest 
to the British and Indian Governments. 1 The Old Singaporeans in London 
also took the matter up. A deputation led by John Crawfurd had an interview 
with Wood, urging him to reconsider the matter, but with no result. The 
Indian Government declined to postpone the enforcement of the provisions 
1 James Davidson was manager of the Cluutered Mercantile Bank of India, 
London and China until about 1864. Buckley, Anecdotal History, 711. 
William ~~ctaggart was a partner in the trading firm of Syme & Co., 
and latter in Mactaggart,Tidman & Co. in London; a member of the Singapore 
Grand Jury. Ibid., 233 and passim. 
For th~st of the committee, see notes in preceding chapters • . 
' .· 1 :t 
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pending appeals to the home authorities, and officers were appointed for 
.I 
the operation. It was not actually carried out, however, until 1 January 
186J because arrangements could not be completed in time. 1 
It vas this determination of the Indian Government to go ahead 
with the enforcement of the stamp duties that led to renewed efforts to 
press for the transfer first proposed five years ago. A week after the 
previous meeting another one was held on 17 July 1862 to discuss the 
question again. In the view of the mercantile community the Indian 
Government had been so identified with taxation that they felt it was 
absolutely necessary to remove the Straits Settlements from its administra-
tion. A resolution passed at the meeting declared that the transfer vas 
nan imperative necessity" beca\tse Briti~h interests, both commercial and 
political, would benefit. Another resolution stated that the attemrtt to 
impose "an objectionable tax" gave the inhabitants 11a just ground" to 
renew their appeal to have the Straits Settlements transferred from the 
India. Office to the Colonial Office. It was resolved that a petition 
should be sent to Parliament to demand an immediate transfer, and a 
committee of W.H.Read, A.Logan, J.d1Almeida, W.Paterson, W.Mactaggart 
and J.J.Greenshields was appointed to carry out the resolutions.2 A petition 
was presented to Parliament by Samuel Gregson but there vas no debate and 
no immediate response. 
In London, a deputation of the friends of Singapore had an interview 
with Wood again but it yielded no satisfactory result.3 Again, on 8 May 186J 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 695· 
2 ~- t 77o-771· 
3 
.!lli.. ' 771· 
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a strong deputation had an interview with the Colonial Secretary, 
Newcastle. It was led by the supp~rters in Parliament, Samuel Gregson and 
Walter Buchanan, an~ included John Crawfurd, the Guthries, E.Boustead, 
L.Fraser, G.G.Nicol and F.Richardson.1 Newcastle was urged to bring the 
proposed transfer into effect, and it was pointed out to him that the 
financial position of the Straits Settlements was improving. The Colonial 
Secretary was sympathetic to their presentation.2 
It was probably at this interview with Newcastle tl~t the memorial 
of 23 March 1863 was presented to him. The main points of the memorial 
were familiar: that the transfer must be carried out at once, and that the 
financial situation was improving. What was fresh .in it, and convincing 
perhaps, was that the memorialists could state definitely,for the firat 
time, that the Straits income for 1861-62 was not only capable of meeting 
expenditures, including military spending, but also showed a surplus 
ot !10,000. The figures were trustwortly because they were taken from the 
official report of the Governor-General of India. 3 The surplus was largely 
due to the income from the stamp duties, which, although so persistently 
objected to, turned out, ironically, to be a blessing in disguise for the 
agitation. 
1 Lewis Fraser was a partner in the trading firm of l-laclaine, Fraser & Co. I 
a founding member of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce; took part in 
opposition to the tonnage dues and the Indian currency. Buckley, 
Anecdotal Hi story, 314. . . . . 
George Garden Nicol was a partner 1n the trad1ng f1rm. of ~am1lton, 
Gray & Co. ; 1 i ved in London for many years when he was the Cha~rman of. 
the Chartered 1-lercantile Bank of India and China; one of the v1ce-pres1dents 
of the Straits Settlements Association. Ibid., 566-567. 
Francis Richardson was a partner in~ firm of McEwen & Co.( later 
the Borneo Company) •.!ill•, J80. 
2 ~·, 77'1; Mills, British Malaya, 284. 
3 f.lemorial from Herchants of the British Settlements to the Duke of 
Newcastle, 23 ~~rch 1863, in P.P.1866, LII, 691-692· 
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The memorial of 23 March was significant because it contai'hed 
specific and authentic information and because it was supported by 
influential interest groups. The list of the signatures was impressive. 
In addition to the familiar names of Crawfurd and Guthrie, it included 
representatives of several banking and shipping interests, like the 
Borneo Company, the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London, and China, 
the Oriental Bank Corporation, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Co., and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China.1 This was so 
far the largest deputation that had come forward to support the agitation. 
The memorial had offered satisfactory proof that the transfer would 
not become a financial burden on the Imperial Government. The Colonial 
Office certainly thought it was now able to resume negotiations with the 
India Office. I~ediately after the Transfer Group had the interview 
with Newcastle, the Colonial Office took the initiative to reopen its 
talks with the India Office. Newcastle told Wood that he was "quite 
willing to reopen the question," if Wood would agree to assure the 
Treasury that the total income of the Straits Settlements was in such 
"a promising· condition" as to justify the assumption that the transfer 
would not entail any expense upon the Imperial Exchequer. On the 
question of repayment for the barracks, the Colonial Office still denied 
the claim of the India Office. However, Newcastle was ready to give it 
1 The rest of the signatures were: John Fraser, Lewis Fraser, 
w. W. Ker, \f. Paterson, John Purvis, Edward Boustead, John Harvey, 
F. Richardson, G. G. Nicol, w. w. Shaw, J. Guthrie, Ashton & Co., and 
Smith, Wood & Co. 
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his "fullest consideration" when he received information from the India 
Office on the various points, and he would communicate with the Treasury 
to satisfy the wishes of the memorialists. 1 
The India Office was also ready for negotiations although it 
had so far taken no further steps to meet the requirements of the Treasury 
since the latter rejected the proposed transfer in December 1861. 
Replying to Newcastle's request for negotiations, Wood expressed his 
readiness to bring into effect the long contemplated transfer. He 
confirmed the authencity of the financial statement contained in the memorial 
of 23 March. But his position with regard to the various issues under 
discussion remained unchanged. There was, however, a new development 
in the claim of the India Office for repayment on account of the barracks. 
The construction of the barracks had been halted by order· of the 
India Office, and the Indian Government was willing to pay the expenses 
already incurred. For the completion of the barracks, an estimated 
sum of£ 15,000 was needed. But whether to complete the construction 
or not was a question that had to be determined by the Colonial Office 
in the event of the transfer. This new development certainly removed 
the dispute as to which department should be responsible for paying 
the expenses on this account. The question of convicts ceased to be 
controversial for no fresh convicts had been sent to the Straits, and the 
previously agreed uponmode of disposing of the existing convict 
establishments did not cause any further difficulty.2 
1 See T. F. Elliot to Hennan Meri vale, 22 1-lay 1863, P .P • 1866, 
LII, 692-4. 
2 See T. G. Baring (under-secretary for India) toT. F. Elliot, 
28 July 1863, P.P. 1866, LII, 694-6. 
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The transfer seemed to have a better chance of meeting the 
approval of the Treasury in }.fay 1863 because the question of which 
department had to pay the cost of the barracks was no longer an issue 
and the new information about the Straits financial situation pointed to 
a balanced budget. But tlle Colonial Office did not seem to entertain 
this optimistic view. Instead of seeking the TreasurJ's approval at 
the time, it decided to send a special fact-finding mission to the 
Straits Settlements to inquire into the whole question on the spot. 
This move was caused by the Colonial Office's desire not to put any 
additional charges on the Imperial Goverr~ent, as Chichester Fortescue, 
the under-secretary for the Colonies, indicated in the House of Commons. 1 
The idea to appoint the commission obviously came from Newcastle, 
who had previously proposed to make such an enquiry. This device was 
opportune. As Newcastle himself saw it, the commission was "the most 
satisfactory, as well as the most expedient way11 of reaching a conclusion 
on the various points concerning the military costs and finances of 
the Straits Settlements. He proposed that the commission should consist 
of an engineer officer from the War Office, an official resident in 
Singapore -to be selected by the India Office, and one from the Colonial 
Office. 
The commission was appointed in September 1863. The official 
appointed by Newcastle was Sir Hercules Robinson, who was the principal 
1 Hansard, )rd. ser., vol. CLXXI (186)), 11 June 1863, 705 • 
. . - ..... ·--~-~---------··-···-·-- - -- - - ---·· ·-··· ··· -- ······ ·-··· 
member of the commission; the War Office's appointee was a Colonel 
Freeth of the Royal Engineers; and Governor Cavenagh was selected by 
the India Office. 
The appointment of Sir Hercules Robinson was a convenient 
choice. Robinson, Governor of Hong Kong ( 1859-65), was then on leave 
in England and was about to return to Hong Kong. It was also a very 
appropriate appointment, not only because Newcastle had "every confidence" 
in his ability, but also because of his experience in the East. During 
his governorship of Hong Kong Great Britain was at war with China; he 
negotiated for the cession of Kowloon and made the arrangements for its 
annexation. For the next thirty years, Robinson was in the colonial 
service as governor of Ceylon (1865-72), New South Wales (1872-79), 
New Zealand (1879-80), and Cape Colony (1881-89). 1 
The terms of reference of the Robinson commission were 
specifically laid down by Newcastle in his letter of appointment 
on 9 September 186). The commission vas requested to inquire into and 
report: 
(1) "the state of the fortifications and barracks, and the 
amount of expenditure re·quisi te to complete these works, so 
tar as it may be needful or expedient to carry them to 
completion; 11 
1 
..E!!!• XXII, 1172-5. 
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and (2) "the number of men to be maintained for the protection 
1 of the Straits Settlements, and the nature of those troops". 
In addition, Robinson was required to furnish the Colonial Office 
with "a general report upon the affairs of the Straits Settlements 
with reference to the proposed transfer"• The Treasury also suggested 
that the primary object of the enquiry ought to be "to ascertain 
whether the Settlements, in the event of their transfer from the 
Indian to the Imperial Government, will be in a condition to defray 
their own expenses without any charge upon the Imperial revenues11 • 2 
It was obvious that the defences and finances of ·the Straits Settlements 
were the most important considerations. 
Robinson arrived at Singapore on 4 December 1863, while Colonel 
Freeth did not arrive there until 20 January 1864. In the meantime, 
Robinson began, with the assistance of Governor Cavenagh, collecting 
information for a general report on the affairs of the settlements. 
Robinson's arrival at Singapore naturally prompted activity on the 
part of the Transfer Group there. A public meeting was held to discuss 
ways and means to communicate with the commissioners. It appointed a 
committee to collect information regarding the finances, resources, 
and commerce of the settlements; and it resolved that, if expedient, the 
committee would communicate directly with the commissioners. We do not 
1 Newcastle to Robinson, 9 September 1863, in P.P. 1866, LII, 697; 
see also Buckley, Anecdotal History, 771-2· 
2 Rogers to Robinson, 5 October 1863, in P.P. t866, LII, 697• 
. . . ·-· · ... .. 
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know whether the interview took place or not, but a long report, dated 
9 January 1864, was published in Singapore, putting forth the complaints 
we have seen earlier and showing the promising financial condition of the 
aettlementa.1 
The general report of the commission was completed in January 
1864, less than two months after the commission started ita enquiry. 
The report was enclosed in Robinson's despatch to Newcastle of 25 January 
1864. The Robinson Report, as it can be properly called, was very much 
in favour of the proposed transfer. The commission confirmed the repeated 
assumption of the Transfer Group that the increasing income of the 
Straits Settlements was adequate for the local expenditures with a surplus 
for military expenses. The Report stated that for the financial year 
ending )0 April 186), the total revenues (including the Indian, 
Imperial and municipal incomes) were i 250 14)7, while the total expenditure 
(including the Indian, Imperial and municipal costa) were i. 2eo, 144, 
leaving a deficit of£29,707, as the following table shows: 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, .772-773o Among those who attended the 
meeting were: Joaquim d 1 Almeida, R. c. Woods, JG G. Davidson, 
.J. s. Atchison (lawyer), J. Berwick, J. c. Scryngeour (accountant and 
manager of the Oriental Bank), J. Cameron (proprietor and editor of the 
Straits Times) Thomas Dunman (Commissioner of Police), J. J. Winton 
' ( . (assistant, the Mercantile Dank), and John Purvis of John Purv1s 
and Son). 
Strait!! Settlem<~nts: Income and Expenditure 
for the fiscal year ending JO April 18631 
Income 
Total Strait!! 
Settlements ± 165,450 
Total Indian & 
Imperial 44,169 
J.lunicipal 1.10,817 
deficit 
250,437 
29,707 
t. 280,144 
Expenditure 
Total Strcd ts 
Settlements £119 1647 
Total Indian & 
Imperial 116,550 
J.funicipal 43,946 
280,144 
But the commissioners held that the total expenditure 
contained eeveral items "not fairly chargeable to the Straits 
Settlements, such as convicts and payment on account of Bublic Debtr.. 
I~ these items were ~xcluded, the deficit would be reduced to only 
£ 7, 293 1 as the following table shows: 
Straits Settlements: Adjttsted Burlpet 
Income Expenditure 
Total t 165,450 
deficit 7,293 
Total (civil) f 119 1 647 
J.lili tary 53,096 
97 
1 The Straite revenue!! included those derived froJn land, exci!!e dutie8 1 
income tax, stamps, administration of ju!!tice, marine, public works ~nd 
mi!!cellaneous; the Indian revenues: postal services, convict labour and 
others; the Imperial revenue was that from the naval coal depot. The 
Straits expenditures were those for the revenue departments, pensions, 
salaries and establishments, marine and others ; the Indian expenditures 
were for postal s ervices, convicts, Public Debt and military; and the 
Imperial expenditure was for the naval coal depot. 
- -- ----1!.·----- -~---- - -- --· :. __ 
This deficit would have disappeared if the stamp duties, which came into 
effect on 1 January 1863, had been collected for a full year, in~tead 
of four months, increaeing the revenue from the J:. 7, 965 collected to 
£26,000. The additional sum would have not only cancelled the deficit 
but would have produced a surplus of £10,000. Hence, the Report concluded 
poeitively that the revenue of the Straits Settlements for 1863 was "more 
than sufficient to meet all their civil and military expenses by upwards 
off 10,00011 • 
The Report wae also very optimietic about the prospecte for 
the Straits revenues for 186J-6~. According to the estimated budget 
of the Report, the total income would be £2~1,250, against a total 
expenditure of£ 239,210, including a military charge of {63,000. 
Therefore, Robinson had "no hesitation" in expressing his "conviction 
that the three settlements, if incorporated into one colony, will be in 
a position for the future to defray their own expensee, civil as well as 
1 
military, without any charge upon the Imperial revenues". 
The commission's recommendations on the military defence of 
the Straits Settlements were transmitted by the Colonial Office to the 
War Office in ~~y 1864. The enquiry found that the existing fortifications 
were sufficient for the defence of the Straits. It recommended that the 
future military garrison of the Straits Settlements should consist of 
three batteries of Royal artillery and one regiment of infantry, 
1 The Robinson Report, 25 January 1864, in P.P. 1866, LII, 697-709· 
See enclosures no. 1 & 2 for the financial conditions and prospects, 
710, 711. 
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to be recruited chiefly among the Indian natives. The expenses of 
this force should be defrayed by an annual contribution of£63,000 
from the Straits treasury.1 
The Robinson Report undoubtedly gave the views of the Transfer 
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Group an official authencity and consequently dispelled the Treasury's 
misgivings about the accuracy of the information in the petitions. 
The Report was well received by Edward Cardwell who had succeeded 
Newcastle after his retirement in April 186~.2 He described it as a 
"careful analysis of the resources" of the settlements. The optimistic 
and favourable views of the Report certainly strengthened the 
negotiating position of the Colonial Office. In submitting the Robinson 
R~port to the Treasury, on 26 May 186~, the Colonial Office could 
positively state that there was no reasonable prospect of the proposed 
colony becoming a burden on the Imperial Exchequer., and proposed that 
the Treasury consent to the immediate introduction of a bill to give 
effect to the transfer.3 The Colonial Office might well have expected 
to receive an favourable reply from the Treasury. 
1 Rogers to Captain D. Gal ton (under-secretary for War) , 26 May 186~, 
P.P. 1866, LII, 714-5• 
2 Edward Cardwell (1813-86), was Chief Secretary for Ireland in 
Palmerston's cabinet in 1859; transferred to the position of the 
Chansellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in 1861. As Colonial Secretary 
(1864-66) he implemented the policy of withdrawing imperial troops from 
the colonies, DNB, Vol. III, 952-4. 
-
3 Rogers to F. Peel (under-secretary to th~ Treasury), 26 May 1864; 
P.P. 1866, LII, 714. 
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However, the Treal5ury1s strict adherence to a policy of economy 
almost amounted to an obsession. Even the Robinson Report failed to meet 
its requirements. Although the Treasury agreed that the Report "appears 
to have been framed with care", yet it considered the estimated surplus 
"very inconsiderable". It required 11 1!!1ome assurance" that in case of need 
there were means by which the income could be increased, and future 
finances maintained in a position not less favourable than that 
1 
anticipated by the Report. The Treasury also raised the further 
issue of what was to be .called "Public Debt", and required its eatisfactory 
eettlement before it would sanction the introduction of the bill. 
This fresh obstacle arooe from the section of the Robinson 
Report which dealt with the position of th,. P•_!blic Debt in the Str~i t~ 
finances. The debt consisted of money which belonged to the euitore 
in the Court ot Judicature (referred to as the Suitor'e Fund) and the 
Police Fund. Under instructione from the Indian Government, this 
money had from time to time been invested in Indian securities at 4% 
interest. But the revenues from both funds, which had reached an accumulated 
amount of about £134,576 (Re. 1,345,768) had been paid to the Straits 
treasury · to cover expenditures on Indian items. The Report considered 
that since the cos1B had been incurred by the Indian Government, it should 
make good the amount of money so expended and that the Straits Settlements 
• 2 
could not be fairly asked to refund amounte due the su1tors. 
1 F. Peel to Rogers, 19 July 1864, P.P. 1866, LII, 715-6. 
2 The nobinson Renort, ih P.P. 1866, LII, 707. The total amount 
included the invested Rs. 989,607 and the uninvested Rs. 356,167. 
' 
. 
. . . 
The Treasury, however, did not spell out what settlement would 
be satisfactory to it. Presumably, a satisfactory settlement would 
be that the debt would not be repaid by the British Exchequer. In 
consequence of this new demand, the Colonial Office requested the 
India Office to replace the money. 1 The India Office could not give a 
positive reply pending the arrival of information on the subject from 
the Indian Government, but Wood, anxious to see the transfer proceed 
without delay, was willing to "engage to hold the Imperial Government 
harmless in respect of any claim upon the Public Debtn.2 The Transfer 
Group insisted too that the debt belonged to the Indian Government, 
and the Straits Settlements should not be asked to refund it.3 The 
Colonial Office was not satisfied with the reply of the India Office 
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for it held that the Straits Settlements had a claim to a portion of the 
profit from the Suitor and Police Funds which would accrue after the 
transfer. Its suggestion for settling the claim was that whatever sums 
had been already written off as unclaimed and had therefore fallen into 
the revenue, should belong to the Indian Government, but that any sums 
that might so fall in future should be considered as the separate revenue 
of.Singapore.4 The India Office, repeatedly expressing its desire that 
1 Rogers to Lord Dufferin, 26 May, 1864, P.P. 1866, LII, 714. 
2 Lord liodehouse to Rogers, 22 July 1864, P.P. 1866, LII, 717; 
Lord Dufferin to Hogers, 19 January 1865, P.P. 1866, LII, 720. 
3 J.lemorial from J-ierchants and Others to Rogers, 19 September t864, 
P.P. 1866, LII, 718-9. 
4 Rogers to Lord Dufferin, 28 February 1865, P.P. 1866, LII, 723. 
' ··~ 
the trans~er should not be delayed, accepted the Colonial Office's 
proposition. The Treasury finally agreed on JO March 1865 that the 
settlement was sati~factory.1 The issue of the Public Debt ~as thus 
closed. 
But there still remained the arrangements that had to be made 
for the ~uture defence o~ the Straits Settlements. Although this 
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question had in fact been under discussion as early as 1859, it was still 
far ~rom being settled when the negotiations resumed. The Imperial 
Government was conducting an overall review of colonial military defence 
e-~d expenditure, as we have discussed earlier. The Report of the 
Select CoMmittee o~ 1861, the culmination of the process of review, 
held that the erection of many fortifications in distant colonial 
possessions involved a useless expenditure and failed to provide 
2 
efficient protection for the places. This explained the insistence 
of the Colonial Office that it could not accept the claim of the Indian 
Government for repayment for the barracks. When the question of repayment 
ceased to be an issue, as pointed out earlier, the financial capability 
of the settlements in turn became the focus of attention, because the 
. 
Treasury would not agree that the surplus was sufficient to meet 
military expenditure. From the point of view o~ the Treasury, colonies 
should be required to absorb as much as possible the cost of their 
1 Lord Dufferin to Rogers, 11 March 1865, P.P. 1866, LII, 724; 
Rogera to G. A. Haoil ton, 24 l-Iarch 1865, P, P. 1866, LI I , 725; 
F. Peel to Rogers, JO Harch 1865, P.P. 1866, LII, 725•6. 
2 Rcnort from the Select Committee on Colonial }tilitary Expenditure, 
11 July 1861, P.P. 1D61, XIII, 75; see also above PP• 84-5 . 
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defence. In this case, it required the Straits Settlements to defray 
the cost entirely, \>hich ,.,.as an unfair requirement from the point of 
vie,.; of the Straits Settlements because they felt themselves to be 
important to the Imperial interests in the East. The question was 
thus essentially a conflict of opinions beb;een London and Si ngapore. 
· The facilities already availahle in the Straits Settlements 
for the garrison did not pose any problem, for the l-lar Office agreed 
with the H.obinson Commission that they ,.,ere sufficient. The Har Office 
also accepted the ·recommendations of the Repo1·t on the proposed composition 
of the military force, but stated that no Imperial troops were available 
at the time and that India could provide the proposed troops. The 
Straits garrison could be composed of a detachment from one of the 
European regiments stationed at Hong Kong and a portion of the Ceylon 
Rifles. For that purpose the Ceylon Rifles, then fourteen companies, 
should be increased and formed into thn~e small battalions, two of \·Thich 
to be stationed in Ceylon, and one in the Stra its. The arrangement 
would have, it ,.,.as stated, the result of obviating "the evil of a 
purely local corps", ann recruiting for the Ce ylon Rifles from among 
the natives of the Straits Settlements would be fad.litated .. 1 Canh-rell 
agreed to this alternative a r r nngcme nt propos ed by Lord Grey, the 
S .... of. State for \'Tar .. But :>incc h e ho.d fail e d to obta in th~ ecrc •. ary 
l T tho f.1.n? nccs of the Straits, Ca rdwell approva l of t1c reasury on ~ " 
I II 2 
cons ide r e d the Hhol e questi on as b e ing 1 in aheyanc:c • 
- - -- --- ·--·-------- ·---·-- -
1 G ltor1 to. Ho r.!_crs _ , 21 Jul y t8Gh, i n P.P. 1866,LH,7JG-7t7 .. ?. -
2 Hoqcl"S i:o Gol ton~ h Auuus t 186lr-, i n P.P.t8GG ,LII , 718 .. 
- -':- ----------- -
' 
--~ 
____ ....._,.. _ _______ --· ----- ----------- -- ·- ~-
. -·--- -- ... . ·-· ----------.---
The Transfer Group, in the meantime, having heard of the 
Treasury's refusal, kept sending me~orials to the Colonial Office 
to press for an early approval of the long awaited transfer. In a 
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letter of 19 September 1364 they put forth a very convincing argument 
against the expensive and large garrison th~t was proposed, which would 
cost£. 63 ,ooo. This garrison they considered "inordinate and uncalled 
for". The 24oo strong garrison at Ceylon whose population was eight-
fold that of the Straits Settlements, was only 600 men more than that of 
the Straits.1 
The controversy here apparently arose from a different appreciation 
of the political situation in the Malay Archipelago and the resulting 
defence needs. The Straits mercantile community did not foresee any 
threat fr~m the native people, and believed that any danger to British 
power there could only come from European countries. The proper 
garrison needed was a small local corps to keep law and order while 
protection against an external enemy should be the task of the Imperial 
navy. This view was clearly expressed in a ntemorial addressed to 
Rogers: 
••• Throughout the whole Indian (Malay) Archipelago, and 
in its neighbourhood, there is not the remotest risk of 
invasion or attack from a native power.... . Conspiracy 
~gainst the Government in a heterogeneous population 
consisting of many nationalities, differing in race, 
language, and manners, and consequently incapable of 
1 Herchants and Others to Rogers, 19 September 1864, P.P. 1866, · 
LII, 718-9. The letter was signed by Crawfurd, the Guthries, Boustead, 
w. w. Shaw, w. Nactaogart, w. Paterson, John Harvey, H. W. Beavee, 
J. J. Greenshielda and H. Little. 
combination, may be said to be next to impossible. If 
the inhabitants of the Straits Settlements cannot in the 
stri~t sense of the word be called loyal, the intelligent 
port1on of them are unquestionably attached to the ruling 
power by a thorough conviction of the advantage which 
they derive from its protection. 
The memorial continued: 
The only danger incident to the Settlements would be from 
an European enemy in time of war. An enemy's cruiser 
might bombard and Aestroy any one of the towns of the 
three Settlements, and most easily Singapore and Penang, 
the most valuable. From such a disaster our fleet must 
always be our chief protection for no amount of land 
force would be a security against such a catastrophe.1 
Therefore the proper garrison was not one that 11should aim at 
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protection against foreign aggression", but one that "will give confidence 
to its peaceable inhabitants, preserve internal order, and give security 
against lawlessness to property in goods, houses, and warehouses". 
The garrison should comprise, they proposed, 200 Royal marines, trained 
to the use of artillery, in place ofreg.Jlar artillery, the marines to 
be assisted by the European Volunteers in Singapore or .a native police 
force, instead of by the Indian native troops. If this arrangement 
was not acceptable, than the alternative would be to reduce the existing 
2 
sepoys from two regiments to one. 
This view about the defence of the Straits Settlements seemed 
to be commonly held in Singapore. John Cameron, editor of the Singapore 
Straits Times, was also in favour of a strong naval defence. According 
1 )ferchants and Others to RoQers, 1 February 1865, P.P. 1866, LII, 
722. It was signed by: John C~awfurd, A. Guthrie, E. Boustead, . · 
w. w. Shaw, J. Guthrie, 1-1. Little, J. Smith, w. H. Read, John Harvey, 
F. Richardson, G. Lipscombe, F. G. Pereira, a nd H. w. Beaves. 
2 Ibid •• 
to him, the best military and naval authorities in the Straits all 
agreed that the protection of Singapore and its shipping in case of a 
European war could be best secured by the presence of one or two heavily 
armed ships of the Navy. Cameron's opinion was contained in his book 
Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India, published in 1865. The 
purpose of the publication of_the book was to suppo1~ the agitation 
for the transfer. The importance of the Straits Settlements in the 
Empire was stressed, the defects in the existing government exposed 
and reasons for the transfer expounded. How effective its publication 
vas in helping the cause of the Transfer Group, it is not easy to determine. 
1 It certainly strenghtened the voices in favour of the transfer. 
The merchants naturally fnvo~naval protection because then they would 
not have to pay for such forces. 
The Colonial Office agreed in principle with the Singapore 
merchants that the proposed garrison was too large. It, however, did 
not accept their proposal in its totality. In his letter to the War 
Office on 28 February 1865, transmitting the merchants' memorial, 
Rogers stated that Cardwell objected to the replacement of artillery by 
marines because the Colonial Secretary considered the former a necessary 
part of the forces to be stationed in the Straits; besides, there was 
the repeated objection of the Admiralty to the employment of the marines 
in the way proposed by the memorial. Reminding the War Office of the 
1 John Cameron, Our Tropical Posses9ions in Malayan lndia,(published 
in 1865; Kual~ Lumpur 1965 reprint), P• 247. 
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Treasury's basic condition that the Straits Settlements should pay 
their own way, military as well as civil, the Colonial Office suggested 
some rerluction in the amount of the forces recornrnrmderl by the Robinson 
commission and by the liar Office. It \vas pointed out that since n large 
force \·las maintained 4\t llong Kong, not exclusively for the protection 
of thnt colony, hut to a great c:xtent for the protection of trade in 
China and Japan, then the cost of the detachment of European troops 
proposed to be stationed in the Straits might be considered as belonging 
to the British Government. As to the defence of the Straits, the force 
might be fixed at three batteries of Royal artillery and one battalion 
of the Ceylon RifJr.:::. Such a reduction would loHer the proposed colonial 
contribution from£6),000 to{:.h5,000 or£ 50,000, <1!1 amount lYhich ,.,.as 
considered to be \vi thin the m0ans of the Straits Settlements. 1 
This alternative arrangement proposed by CardHell, ,.,.ho \·:as 
later in 1868-71~: to undertake drastic reforms in the Driltish army, 
was obviously calculated to get round the obstacle arising from the 
Treasm-y' s conditio'!1. But it '"as also a more real5.stic appreciation 
of the value of SingApor e a~ n military station. From now on a new 
military scher.1e ,.1as to emerge gntducd.ly in ,.,hid·, t .he Strnits S0ttlcments 
were assigricd a greater role. 
The question of colonial contributions to tl1e cost of defence 
'ias another matter that h :-l.d to hr:- ?..rr<:!ngecl . The principle in this 
regard hnd been c!efini tcly Jaid c1o•m by the Sel cct Con:rai ttcc on Colonial 
--·-------------·-
1 Honer;, to .r .. Crofton (Unn01·-Sccret:1ry for . \·h!l ·), 28 Fcbrua1·y 1865, 
in P."P."'i8GG~L£1;'--7~;j-::j"2h. 
defence and expenditure of 1861, but the mode of how the contribution 
should be made was still a difficult matter to settle because it was 
not easy to fix an uniform rate. However, the War Office had finally 
worked out a fo1~la regarding the Straits Settlements. The defences 
to be maintained in the Straits would be determined by the "wants and 
means" of the inhabitants, since it was the sine guo non condition of 
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the consent of the Imperial Government to the transfer that there should 
be no additional burden on the Imperial Exchequer. The War Secretary 
explained that if the Straits Settlements were taken over by the Imperial 
Government, "it will not be with a view to hold them as imperial military 
stations, but in order to meet the often expressed wishes of the local 
communities".1 The implication here is obvious. If they were to be 
considered imperial stations per se, then the Imperial Government would 
have to defray the military charges (at least a larger portion of it), 
as the Report of the Sele.ct Committee recommended. The War Office was 
obviously trying to avoid expenditure commitments by refusing to view 
Singapore as an imperial station. 
The War Office's new formula was produced by a committee 
appointed specifically for the purpose of finding out the nature and 
size of ·the garrison that was needed in the Straits. The Committee 
found that it was impossible to lay down any inflexible rule as to 
the composition of distant garrisons supplied by imperial troops, the 
distribution of which throughout the world was determined by general 
considerations. The War Office thus decided that the simplest mode 
1 J. Crofton to Rogers, 11 May 1865, P.P. 1866, Lll, 726. 
by which the question of the colonial contribution could be settled 
was for the Colonial Office to state the sum which the Settlements 
could fairly be required to pay for their military defence, and then 
for the War Office to .determine what forces could be supplied for that 
sum.
1 This was obviously a flexible way by which the question could 
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be settled; it was also a safeguard, as far as the transfer was concen1ed, 
by which additional charges on the Imperial Exchequer could be prevented. 
The Colonial Office accepted this new formula and stated tl~t 
the Straits Settlements could contribute an annual sum of £ 50,000. 
Such sum was to be taken as covering all military expenditures with 
the exception of the maintenance and repair of barracks and fortifications, 
with the understanding that the colony would not be charged with more 
than the actual cost of the military expenditure if the sum was less 
than l. 50 1000 per armum. The Colonial Secretary at the same time requested 
the War Office for an assurance that the garrison would not entail any 
charge on the Imperial Governn;ent, so as to obtain the consent of the 
2 Treasury to the transfer. 
In the meantime, British military strategy in the East had 
come under review, the result of whlch was to give the Straits Settlements 
a greater role. The question of the future garrison to be maintained in 
the East had become of "pressing illl!lortance" due to the withdrawal 
of the Indian troops from the China command and 
1gdward Lu~ard (under-~ecretary for War) to Rooers, 30 January 
1866, P.P. 1866, LII, 732. 
~ooers to Luoard, 9 FebruarY 1866, P.P. 1866, LII, 733· 
the withdra\>al of· one battery of infantry from Hong Kong because of 
the high mortality of the troops there. The redistribution of troops 
in the East also involved the Straits Settlements. Ed,.,.ard Lugard, 
Under-Secretary of State for 1/ar; pointed out to the Foreign Office in 
Harch, 1866 that, in the event of the transfer, a number of Imperial 
troops '''oul d have to be maintained in Singapore as a reserve unit for the 
China command. He ,.,ent on to state: 
These troops would not, under ordinary circumstances, 
be available for service in China, but in an emergency, 
reinforcements '"01.1lcl no doubt be sent from thence in less 
time than from any other military station, and to this 
extent the proposed transier may influence the decision 
as to the China garrison. 
The subsequent consultations bet\.Jcen the l·lar Office and the 
Foreign Office resulted in a nmr military scheme in \vhich the Straits 
Settlements had a urcnter role than ever before in eastern defence. 
The redistribution of the fo1·ces in the East \'las as follm-rs: 
(1) Japan----- one battery of infantry; 
(2) China----- {llong Kong) one wing of a bnttnlion of British 
infantry, a sm<-~11 battalion (6 companies) of 
native troops, and tho existing force of Royal 
artillery; 
(J) Strnits··~- a '"ing of British troops to b~ detnched from 
llong Kong 1 six comp<mics of th0. C()yl.on Rifles 1 
and t\oto battnlions of the Royal art:i lJ. ()ryft 
The estimat8 d cost of the uan·ison to be stntion~d in the Stra:its 
Settlements \·Jas .f:.GG,ooo, j:1.6,ooo more th<m the cnrlicr propos0 cl 
contrihutiono But the ,.;ing of the~ battalion to be stntioncd in the 
--·-----···-··-----·-------· 
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Straits .uould be 11 to a certain extent, avail&ble, if l"equired, :for 
service in Chinn and Japan", and lThcn the proposed reduction of the 
European force in Hong Kong was decided upon, the S~ttlements '"~re the 
most convenient .::ltation for the remainina l'ling. For these reasons 
the liar Secretary, Lord Hartington, \·those predecessor Lord de Grey had 
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been trnnsferred to the India Office in February 1866, suggested that the 
cost (£20,000) o:f the Imperial troops to be stationed in the Straits 
should be defrayed :from the It:1perial treasury, and considered that the colo-
ni~l contribution of £50,000 \o:ould probably cover the total cost of the 
garrison to be stationed there exclusively for the military protection 
o:f the Straits.1 
The belated recognition of the advantages of Singapore as a 
military station, \·!as an apparc>'lt indication that the Straits Settlements 
were indeed lin!·;ed \"ri th general Imperial interests. The nel'l military 
arre.ngeJ!lent \'laS some\>'hat sirn.i.lnr to that eloquently ndvocated by 
John Cameron '"hen he urged that Singnpore be made a rniJ.i tary station 
for Dri tish troops in the Ear.~t for Imperial purposes. Cameron 'ms of 
course no rrd.litury strategist; nevertheless, bin viev..•s could be taken 
as reflecting those of the local mili tnry authori tie::;. Here is hmt he 
sm·I the usefulness of Singapore for the Imperia l purpose: 
••• there 
to l'ccp a 
purpOS(:!f:l,. 
the Ch:i.r.n 
could be no b etter point ( thnn Sing~lpore) at '"hich 
rcs-::rve of Em:opean infantry for gcn0re,l Imperial 
Dy recent rncdicuJ.. 1·cturns of the nrrny and nnvy, 
.::;tation has proved by a long uay the most tmhca l thy 
for European troops; and it is almost certain that for 
a considerable time to come, Great Britain lllust continue 
to bacl< her influence there by the occasional display of 
military strength. Singapore is but six or seven steaming 
days from Hong Kong, and ten from Shanghai, even in an 
unfavourable monsoon; its climate has been establishe d 
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beyond all doubt to be kinder and more genial to the Europea.n 
constitution than any other in the East. It has no 
pestilence, no epidemics or endemics that e:ctend themselves 
to Europeans. Invalids, brol<en and exhausted, from China 
and Bengal alil~:.e seek its shores, and after a sojourn of 
six or seven l-teeks leave it in health and vigour. 
Cameron then asked: 
\vhy, then, not station in the Strni ts one moiety at lea:::t 
of the troops intended to br~ avail<!blc for Chi na and 
Japan?eoo it is apparent that any body of troops St<!tioncd 
at Singapore would be available not for China only, but for 
India, and that ' ·ti thin a period so £:hart as to meet e ny 
emergency '~hich is ::.lmos~, po::;::lible. to arise, nine days 
\'/ould serve to convey both men and bagg>:~ ge to Cnlcut·tn, 
l·b.dre,s, or nny point on the east coast, or in Dt!:rtilah. 
lndeed •• o irre.cpective of the China force and in regard 
to India only, Singapore might \d th ure~t ad·..rnntage be used 
as n heal thy rccrui ting or reserve stntion for Em:opc an 
infnntry .. 1 
The sir.d.laA"i ty of thinki.ng on the strategic impc•r'tnnce of Sinar:lpore 
\ms proba bly a coincide nce ; in c.ny cane, S:i.ngapor0 1 s ::;tra·~egic sionific,mca 
had bee n more realistically evaluated. 
The Coloni~,l Office conside red the lh.tr Offj_co 1 ;:; n c1.'! milita ry 
s chc i.!-3 sntisfnctory and Gub;;Ji tt.etl it on 21 April 1866 to the 'l're~::mry 
2 
for a pp roval, r e q-.w :::tino that the Tr e asury cons ent to int roduce the bi!. l .. 
amount did not includQ the expenditures for stores, pensions, transport, 
conveyance of stores, and the cost of raising six companies of the 
Ceylon Rifles. An increase in the sum to 59,300 was demanded, coupled with 
the repeated statement that the Lords "must adhere to the determination 
not to impose on the Imperial Exchequer any charge on account of the 
Settlements, the transfer of which is not desired by this country, but 
the inhabitants of the Settlements themselves." 1 The Colonial Office, 
anxious to carry out the transfer, accepted the demand without hesitation.2 
After its basic condition that the Straits Settlements should be 
self-supporting had been satisfied, the Secretary to the Treasury 
consented on 2 June 1866 to the introduction of the bill to provide 
for a new government for the Straits Settlements.3 The persistent 
Singapore merchants, after almost ten years of agitation, finally 
succeeded in overcoming the insistent objections of the Treasury. 
The Treasury approved at the same time a new constitution based 
on the recommendations of the Robinson Report, a constitution that was 
designed to provide a better gov~rnment for the Straits Settlements. 
The inadequacy of the existing administration had long been a complaint 
o.f the Straits Settlements. The mercantile community had demanded 
the transfer i .n order to bring about a new government in ,.,hich they 
1 H.C.E.Childers (Secretary to the Treasury) to Rogers, 12 Hay 1866, 
in P.P.1866,LII, 736-7. 
2 lo/ .E .Forster (Under-Secretary for the Colonies) to Hamil ton, 
25 J.fay 1866, in P. P. 1866 , LII , 738. 
3 Childers to Forster, 2 June 1866, in P.P.1866, LII, 739-7~0. 
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·, .· .. 
could be represented and ,.;hose status \·:auld be enhanced by giving 
the Governor greater po,.;er. The Indian Government, \-:hich had. in the 
past ignored the complaint, finally ac1mittcd, in 1859, that the Straits 
administration, as it then stood, 1·ras a "positive evil". 'fo remedy this 
defect, Lord Canning, then Governor-General of India, suggested that 
the Straits Settlements could be connected ,.,ri th the British establishments 
on th~ coast of China, presumably, Hong Konn. Canning thought that 
there ,.,ere strong reasons for this proposal. First, the Imperial 
Government \Wuld fin~i a good field of selection among the consular 
officers in China for service in the Straits Settlements, and improve 
the prospects and elevate the position of the Chinese consular service. 
Secondly, there were intimate social and economic connections between 
the Straits Settlements and China, there being a large Chin~se population 
in the Straits.1 But Canning's proposal appeared to have overestimated 
the connection bebtccn the Straits Settlements ancl China ·,.;hile it 
neglected the distinct needs and \'lishcs of the local community. This 
proposal made no reference to the form of government, \•thich \•las the 
question at issueo During the subscqnent prolonged negotiations behreen 
the Colonial Office and the India Office, Cannino's proposal never became 
a subject for discussion, P.or tlid the ~encral question of the type of 
goverm:1ent to he:; provided for the Strai t .n Sci:tlem0nt.s after the transfer. 
The only rcfcnmcn to this qucst:i on on the part of the Colonial 
Office ,.,.as contnin0.d in Ho~Jt:'l-s '5 letter of 31. Hay :1861 to the Inclia 
Off . 1 · ' ' t l tl,,..t N-:1\C cn~~tle ,.;ould propose to the Snttlel'lents n • J.ce, '"1l.C•l s.:n ·cc .. -. .... 
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form of constitution similar to one that was in existence then in 
the Crown colonies.1 The India Office thought that the question properly 
rested with the Colonial Office, and abstained from making any proposal.2 
There was no further official reference to the question until after 
the Robinson Report was completed in 1864. 
Great concern and interest, however, was expressed by the 
Straits community and their supporters in London over the future 
government which would be established after the transfer. John Crawfurd, 
the most eloquent spokesman of the Transfer Group, had in 1858 pointed 
out that the Straits Governor's authority was restricted, for the 
governor had "no diplomatic or legislative authority", and was "entirely 
dependent" on the Governor-General of India. He requested that the 
Governor should be appoir1ted, after the transfer, by the Crown and provided 
with a Legislative Council, which to be "popular and effectivert, should, 
as in Ceylon, have "an admixture of British and native resident inhabitants") 
In a later memorandum Crawfurd further demanded that an Executive 
Council should be provided for the Governor, which was to include the 
following principal functionaries: 
1. Colonial secretary; 
2. Treasurer; (these two positions to be held by the same 
person) 
1 Rogers to Merivale, 31 May 1861, P.P. 1862, XL, 652. 
2 Baring to Rogers, 28 July 186), P.P. t866, LII, 695-6. 
3 Crawfurd's Note, P.P. 1862, XL, 590. 
. . - :• , :· . 
) • Accountant-General; 
4. Auditor-General (to be held by the same person); 
S· Attorney-General. 
The composition of the Legislative Council vas also elaborated 
in the same memorandum. The official members should be the Governor 
and his principal functionaries, plus a judge and the commander of 
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the troops. The unofficial members, whose nUIIIber would be tvo or three, 
should be merchants only, for he thought there vas no distinct planting 
interest requiring a separate representation. At least one unofficial 
member should be recommended by the Singapore Chamber of Commerce. 
The unofficial Qembers would be appointed for a period of two years, 
the qualifications being that the candidates should be British subjects 
possessing "adequate acquaintance vi th the English language a. Crav:f'urd 
also suggested that Singapore (vi th }lalacca attached to it) and Penang 
should be given separate administrations.1 
A similar demand also came from the other old Singaporeans, 
led by A. Guthrie, vho requested that the official and unofficial 
members of the Legislative Council should be equal in number, and that 
the unofficial members should be elected. The right of election, they 
proposed, should be vested in the ratepayers vho paid an annual 25 rupee 
municipal tax. Like Crawfurd, they proposed that Penang and Singapore 
should possess separate Legislative Councils, an arrangement which they 
1 Crawfurd's Suggestion, P.P. 1862, XL, 632. 
.·· .·· 
.· . "'. 
believed would "conduce to convenience, without increasing the 
expenses". 1 
The various proposals of the Transfer Group, if carried out, 
would no doubt have resulted in a better form of government, for 
the local community would have been represented in the government. 
But the question of the future government of the Straits Settlements 
had been slighted by the various departments concerned because of a 
more i111111ediate problem: overcoming the objections of the Treasury to 
the proposed trans.fer. 
The principal recommendations made by the Transfer Group were 
embodied in the Robinson Report, although there were some variations 
and one major difference. The new constitution recommended by th: 
commission included an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. 
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The Executive Council, besides the Governor, was to include the following 
off~cials: 
1. Colonial Secretary; 
2. Attorney-General; 
). Officer in command of the troops (when the post was not 
held by the governor); 
4. the government agents o·f Penang and 1-talacca (lieutenant-
governors). 
The Legislative Council, as in Ceylon and Hong Kong, should be 
composed of official and unofficial members. The official members, 
1 Guthrie and Others to the Colonial Office, 20 April 1861, ~· 
1862, XL, 643, 647. 
i 
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besides the Gov~rnor, should include: 
1. (;hief Justice of Singnpore; 
2. Colonial Secretary; 
). Attorney-General; 
4. Treasurer·; 
5· Auditor-General; 
6. Chief Engineer. 
The unofficial members would he four in number, to be nominated by 
the Crm·m, not elected by the ratepayers as proposed, but should 
fairly represent the opinions of the communities. 
The Report proposed that the three settlements of Singapore, 
Penang and Nalacca should be incorporated into one colony, under one 
Governor, and with one Lcgislntive Council. '!'his was a realistic 
arrangement, because, as the Heport pointed out, the conditions and 
interests of the three settlements were identical. Noreovcr, from 
the financial point of view, Nalacca ann Perwng \vere not self-supporting. 1 
It is obvious thnt the recommendations of the Il'3port \·rere in 
substance those favoured by the Transfer Group, with the exception 
of the question as to \'lhethel· the three settlement::; should be brought 
under one ·single government and \·Thethcr the unofficinl Members should 
be elected or not. Thus the H.obinson commission helped to nive the 
propos als of the "local pa"!"'ties11 an official statu:::. 
_ ..... -.... -------~-------
1 The Rohin~on Rc p22:,"!:_, in P.P.t866,LII,698-699· 
·- . . ·.: ~.: . 
: . . ; 
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A bill to provide for the new government of the Straits 
Settlements was introduced into the House of Comaons on 6 June 1866 
and passed on 10 August 1866 without debate. By this act the Straits 
Settlements ceased to be part of the Indian territories and were 
placed under the British Government as part of the colonial possessions 
of the Crown. The new government was officially inaugurated on 1 April 
· 1867.1 The fight for the transfer had been won at last. 
1 Hansard, Jrd. ser., vol. CLXXXIII (1866), 1920; also Buckley, 
Anecdotal History, 780. 
.. .. .. .. '• · ·~ . ·.·,: .. ::.:~ 
Chapter V: The Temporary Success of the Imperial Policy 
of Non-intervention in the Nalay States, 
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The transfer of 1867 thus placed the Straits Settlements under 
the direct administration and vigilant protection of the Imperial 
Government which, unlike the Indian Government, had evinced a more attentive 
and responsive attitude to their needs and wishes. What the supporters 
of the transfer actually wanted to bring about was a reformed government, 
to be introduced as soon as the administrative change was effected. 
The new government that was expected to be formed involved'two major 
changes. Internally, tho new government would be enlarged and streamlined 
by providing it with an Executive Council as well as a Legislative 
Council, and the local community should have representation in the latter 
body. Externally, it was frequently requested that the status of 
the Straits Goverrmtent should be enhanced by giving the governor greater 
powers to carry out an .active policy towards the native st~tes, particularly 
the Malay states, and to improve British trade and increase British 
influence in the area. In other words, more of the initiative in 
handling the Colony's external relations should rest on the local 
authority rather than with the distant authorities in London. 
The Straits community was delighted to know that the Imperial 
Government had agreed to the transfer, even though rather belatedly. 
And internal constitutional changes were duly effected when the Straits 
Settlements became a Crown colony. The newly fornted Executive C..>uncil 
included the new governor, Sir Harry St. George Ord, the two lieutenant-
. governors, Archibald E. H. Anson (at Penang) and William Cairns 
(at Malacca), the Chief Justice (Sir Peter Benson •~ell), the Coloni~l 
Secretary (Ronald Macpherson), the Attorney-General (Thomas Bradell), 
,, 
the Treasurer (W. w. Willans), the Auditor (John Irving) and the 
Colonial Engineer (J. A. F. McNair). 1 
The proposed Legislative Council was also brought into being. 
On 3 April 1867, two days after Governor Ord was sworn in, the 
unofficial members were nominated by the Governor. They were: 
w. H. M. Read, partner in A. L. Johnston & Co., and Chairman of the 
Singapore Chamber of Commerce; F. T. Brown, "head of one of the oldest 
and weal thieat firms at Penang" and perhaps "the largest landholder in 
the Straits"; Thomas Scott, senior resident partner in Guthrie & co.; 
Dr. R.Little,as a "representative of the agricultural interest"; and 
c. H. H. Wilsone, captain of the Singapore Volunteers. 2 The selection 
of the unofficial members appeared to be representative of the various 
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~ercantile interests in the Colony. Later, the following were Appointed: 
W. R. Scott (1869), w. Adamson (1869), Hoo Ah Kay (1870), J. J. Greenshields 
(1871) and Thomas Shelford (1872).3 
1 c. N. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-77 
(Singapore: University of J.lalaya Press, 1960), 18; li. 1-takepeace, 
G. E. Brooke and R. Bradell, One Hundred Years of Singaoore (London: 
John Murray, 1921), 149. R. J.facpherson died in 1869 and was succeeded 
by James Wheeler Woodford Birch, who was then government agent of 
the Eastern Province of Ceylon. 
2 Parkinson, British Intervention, 19-20. The Colonial Office 
wanted 10 names from which to choose five; the other five names 
submitted bY Ord were: 
J. Weis (partner in w. Spottiswoode & co.), L. Nairne (a Penang planter), 
G. Lipscombe (senior resident partner in Boustead & Co.), J. F. Crockett 
(Singapore representative of Jardine, J.tatheson & Co.) and Charles 
Dunlop (senior resident partner in •~elaine, Fraser & Co.). 
3 Makepeace, et. al., One Hundred Years of Singapore, 149-151· 
~ ~~  
·--·:. 
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The composition of the Executive and Legislative Councils was 
in accordance with the recommendations of the Robinson Report. The 
presence of representatives of the local community as unofficial 
members undoubtedly gave greater weight to their opinions. Although 
they were in a minority, their opinions were not to be taken lightly. 
As the new Colonial Secretary Lord Carnarvon stressed emphatically in 
his instructions to Ord in 1867, "the fullest possible latitude" must 
be allowed to the unofficial members "in discussing and voting upon 
all questions brought before the Council, and when they are absolutely 
unanimous, great deference should be paid to their opinions, especially 
in regard to all new ideas of expenditure and ·taxation".1 That deference 
wculd be pnid t!l~!!! ~n qu~stion~ t>f expenditure and taxation was quite 
natural. As we have pointed out, one of the reasons that inspired the 
movement for the transfer was the various attempts of the Indian Government 
to tox the trade and shipping of the Colony without consulting local 
opinion. 
·However, the Straits community suffered at least one disappointment: 
its demand that the new governor possess greater pow~r in conducting 
external affairs was not conceded. 
One of the grievances complained of in the petition of 1858 was 
that no effort had ever been made by the Straits Government to cultivate 
~riendly relations with the )lalay states, which could be attained by a 
1 Carnarvon to Ord, 2 February t867, quoted in Parkinson, British 
Intervent~, 17. 
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slight exertion of influence on the part of the governor. 1 Although 
this subject did not enter the debates on the proposed transfer in the 
House of Commons in 1858, it turned out, however, to be an important 
point in the debates in the House of Lords in the following year. 
Lord Stanley of Alderley, who presented a petition from the Singapore 
merchants to the House of Lords in support of the transfer9 echoed the 
demand of the petition: 
a governor of Singapore and of the Straits Settlements 
might be appointed, with extended powers similar to 
those of the Governor of Hong Kong, and the Superintendent 
of British trade in China ••• (who) should be enabled to 
negotiate treaties with the native PO\iers for the 
extension of our trade and to see that our engagements with 2 the Dutch and other powers in those seas were duly observed. 
He added that this was "imperatively neces~ary for the safe protection 
of British trade in the (Malay) Archipelago". This demand, if accepted, 
would have amounted to turning the Straits Governor into the diplomatic 
representative and trade commissioner oi the British Government in the 
area, a measure the Imperial Government wes not very enthusiastic about. 
Carnarvo~, then ~arliamentary under-s-ecretary ior the Colonies, avoided 
the question in his reply.J However, the position of the Government was 
amply indicated in the former Colo~ial Secretary, Earl Grey's revealing 
observations on the issue. He agreed that Singapore was oi nextreme 
importance" and it was necessary to watch over its interests, but he 
1 See above P•J6. 
2 Hansard, Jrd ser., vol. CLII (1859), 1602. 
J Ibid., 1605-o6. 
' 
. 
-
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counselled caution in extending the governor's power. Speaking from 
his own experience as Colonial Secretary, he held the view that: 
Great caution would be observed in extending the power 
of the Governor of that Settlement (Singapore) to enter 
into treaties with native powers. The \thole of his 
experience led him to the conclusion that nothing was 
more dangerous than to enter into diplomatic relations 
with those barbarous powers, and he thought the Governor 
o~ Singapore ought not to be entrusted with powers of 
that kind, except under very stringent restrictions. 
Grey was of course not speaking in the capacity of Colonial Secretary, 
therefore his opinions could not be taken as representing the official 
stand of the British Government. But, because of his past association 
with the Colonial Office and the weight his opinions might carry with 
the Government, his observations could at least be taken as reflecting 
the thinking of the Colonial Office. 
Here again was an indication that the needs and opinions of the 
colonists did not coincide with those of the Imperial Government. 
While the Straits merchants wished to strengthen the hand of the 
Governor by giving him more leverage in dealing with the native states, 
the Imperial Government frowned upon such a move lest it be involved 
in disputes with the native states, disputes that might well arise 
125 
from concluding treaties with them, for the native states broke treaties 
aa lightly as they entered into them. This conflict between imperial 
and colonial needs was to become more clearly underscored in subsequent 
years when the question of extending the Governor's power was 
continually raised. 
1 Hansard, )rd. ser. vol. CLII ( 1859), 1608. 
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In 1861 the Transfer Group, mistakenly expecting that the 
transfer was within reach, demanded that the power of the new governor 
be substantially extended. Like the earlier demand in the House of 
Lords, the demand was now put forward in specific terms and in relation 
to the political and commercial situation in the Malay Archipelago. 
Crawfurd suggested that the Governor of Singapore and the lieutenant-
governor of Malacca would, after the transfer, "naturally be the agents 
of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs with native princes". These 
would include the chiefs of the Malayan Peninsula, some of those of 
eastern Sumatra, and perhaps the king of Cochin-thina, but excluding 
those states subject to the authority of the Dutch a.tld those where the 
British Government had consuls. 1 The Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
suggested even greater powers for the governor. In addition to his 
ordinary duties, the Governor 
should exercise the function of Her Majesty's commissioner 
and Superintendent of Dritish trade in the Indian (Malay) 
Archipelago and adjacent countries, with power to enter 
engagements with native powers, and having jurisdiction 
over the British consuls in Netherlands, Indio, Borneo, 
Siam, Cochin-China, & c.2 
Furthermore, Read and other Singapore merchan'ts wanted the 
Straits Governor to be appointed Britain's commissioner and superintendent 
of trade in the Malay Archipelago, accredited with "full powers" not 
1
,crawfurd's Suggestions, in P.P. 1862, XL, 6)2•33• 
2 s· 1ngapore 
Expenditure of 
XL, 624. 
Chamber of Commerce: lotemorAndurn on the Revenue and 
the Straits Settlements, April 1861, in P.P. 1862, 
. 
- -·· ~ -- -·-
·- -- ·'-
only to treat with the native chiefs, but also to negotiate ,'lith the 
other Euror)c<~n powers ~o that 11lh·i.tish interests may b<::> maintained in 
their integrity, and that civilization and Christianity may be largely 
1 promoted.u 
The Straits Governor, as the representative· of the Governor ... 
General of India, had already possessed the authority to deal ,'lith 
the native states. The importance and expediency of this practice '"as 
fully realized and appreciated in the Straits, as the memorial of 
Guthrie and others to Nm\"castle shm>'S: 
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It has ahmys devolved upon the Governor of the Straits 
Settlements to give effect to the policy of the Supreme 
Goventment, 'd th regard to the nci ghbourinu native states, 
\>'henevcr occasion aros~ either for remonstrance or more 
active interference, and the LocaJ. Government (in Sinoapore) 
has more th;m once, on its m·m vim•, claimed the right to 
an authoritative voice in the settlement of disputes 
bet1>'een the minor states of the Pcnhtsula. Its arbi tram<mt 
and decisions on such occasions has (have) ah;ays been 
effectual, and there can be no doubt that the English 
nawe ;md government arc treated throughout 2the Peninsula 
,.,i th the utmost deference and respect o.. . 
It '"as thus natural that the mercantile community, fully a\ifare of the 
importance o:f this practice, 'dshed to see it maintained and extended. 
They \>'ere concerncrl that the Foreign Office might, after the transfer, 
take over . full responsibility for the Colony's external affairs. 
They urged therefore that :i. t '"as 
----------------------
1 ~~~~<:.<.:i...~~~ . .<2.:!~E-<E:~.i-.t? Nm·:cn~;tJ.e, JO June 1861, in P.P.t862, XL,658. 
2 A .. Gutl1rie nno Othcr:?__t_o Nc'·0:ast~.' 20 April 1.861, in P.P.1862, 
·xL, G7;i!_o ______ _ 
'-- - --- -- - --------··- -· ·---- ~ < ~>'·"·~.: ... ·:.. ... . .• .: · .?'.'! 
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••• of the greatest importance to the commerce of the 
Straits Settlements, and to the welfare of the native 
states, in no way to abridge the political authority 
which has heretofore been exercised by the Local 
Government in the Straits, or to do anything to diminish 
its credit and influence with the native chiefs of the 
Peninsula, as well as with the Rajah of Acheen (in Sumatra) 
and Cambodia, ••• 1 
However, these repeated demands of the colonists failed at the 
time to draw an immediate response from either the India Office or 
the Colonial Office. The Robinson Report, which first brought the question 
to the fore, recognised the Indian practice by which the governor was 
allowed greater freedom in conducting external relations with the Malay 
states: 
The Governor of the Straits Settlements ••• is at present, 
in his capacity as the representative of the Gover.nor-
~ener~l of !~di~, required to cor.d~ct all p~litical 
relations with the chiefs of the neighbouring states in 
the J.1alayan Peninsula, .and the island of Sumatra, at which 
there may be no British resident agent. With many of these 
states there are British treaties an~ engagements, and with 
all there is comnsercial intercourse • . It is the Governor's 
duty to guard against any infringement of those engagements, 
and to secure facilit~es for commerce as well as protection 
for British subjects. 
The Report tully supported the demand of Guthrie and others that the 
governor's power not be reduced, citing their memorial to this effect.3 
In spite of repeated requests and the full support of the 
Robinson Report, the question of the governor's powers was still not 
brought into the negotiations between the departments. The more immediate 
1 A. Guthrie and Others to ~ewcastle, 20 April 1861, in P.P. 1862, · 
XL, 6 4. 
2 The R~binson Report, i~ P.P. 1866, LII, 699-700. 
J The passage was quoted in the Report, P• 700. 
. ..... ~ - . . . . ·~ : 
question which had to be solved first, such as the financial · 
arrangements, had overshadowed the negotiations from the beginning. 
Even the Transfer Group itself concentrated its efforts in demonstrating 
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to the Treasury that the Straits Settlements were virtually self-supporting 
financially. All the memoranda presented to the home autho •ities after 
1861 were silent about the question of the governor's powers. 
When the Straits Settlements finally became a Crown colony 
in 1867, the nature and extent of the governor's powers were still an 
open question, for the Colonial Office had not come to any definite 
decision yet. Therefore, the movement for the transfer could be seen 
only as a partial success. Nevertheless, the Imperial Government's 
approval of the proposed transfer might have been taken by the Transfer 
Group to mean that their demand that the governor's powers should be 
increased was also approved. This false impression was soon dispelled 
when the ne\'1 governor attempted to deal with the P.talay states entirely on his 
own initiative. We may note here .that the Old Singaporeans in London had 
formed themselves into the Straits Settlements Association in January 1868. 
The President \tas John Cra,Y'furd, who died later that year and was 
succeeded by Edward Horsman. Branches were also organised in the 
. ' • ' -',. · .; .:.· . . 
Straits Settlements; the chairman of the Singapore branch was 
1 w. H. Read. 
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To Governor Ord the Legislative Council was very mucb a sore 
subject becau~e he did not get along well with the unofficial members.2 
He was disliked by the mercantile community from the day he was sworn 
1 The Straits Settlements Association, whose purpose was the promotion 
of tl1e interests of the Straits Settlement~, was formed on 31 January 
1868 in London. Its vice-pre~idents were: Colonel w. Gray, s. Waterhouse, 
Sir James Elphinstone (who once had a plantation in Penang), J. H. Burke, 
Jacob Bright, G. G. Nicol, R. N. Fowler, T. A. ~litchell and E. Haveland. 
All were ).t. P.s except Nicol. 
The executive committee was as follows: 
Chairman: William Napier. 
Deputy Chairman: James Guthrie. 
Hon. Secretary: P. F. Tidman. 
Conunittee: Edward Boustead, John Harvey, James Fraser, H. H. Simons, 
Jonathan Padday, w. ~~ctaggart, E. J. Leveson, 
J. J. Greenshields, W. w. Shaw, w. Paterson. 
See Makepeace, One Hundred Years of Sinna ore, 297-298. 
Singapore branch executive formed on 20 l-larch 1868) 
Chairman: w. H. Read; deputy chairman: W. Adamson. 
Committee: R. Padday, J. Cameron, o. J.looyer, J. D. Vaughan, J. Young, 
J. s. Atchison, G. H. Heme. 
Secretary: J. s. Atchison. 
Penang branch (formed on 28 April 1868): 
Chairman& L. Naine. 
Secretary: Stuart Heriot. 
Committee: J. Allan, A. Gentle, H. J. D. Padday, s. Heriot. 
See J.~epeace, One Hundred Years of Sinaapore, 298. 
2 Sir Harry st. George Ord (1819-1885), graduate of the .Royal military 
Academy at Woolwich; became !olajor-General of the Royal E:'g~neers; served 
in the West Indies (t840-46)t lieutenant-gove1~or of Dom1n1ca (1857-60); 
governor of the nennudas (t86o-66). He served as the Straits Governor 
from 1867 to 1873, then as Governor of South Australia, 1877-79• 
~' XIV, 11.30-)1. 
.· r. ··:· . . - , .· 
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in because of his presumptuous attitude towards them. 1 His decision 
to spend money on a new government house made~ even more unpopular.2 
Whatever his disagreements with the powerful local merchants, Ord did 
not fail to pursue a vigorous policy towards the Malay states. A few 
months after his assumption of office he turned his attention to the 
Peninsula. 
Ord realised that in 1867 the Malayan Peninsula was already 
essentially a British sphere of influence. In the 1820s the Dutch 
were excluded from the Peninsula and Siamese influence halted. The 
Straits Government had secured commercial and alliance treaties with 
Perak and Selangor and freedom of trade with Kedah, Kelantan and 
Trengganu, although 'the last three states remained tributary to Siam. 
Johore, an independent state in theory, was virtually controlled by the 
Straits Government. There was no treaty relationship with Pahang. 
But it was once a dependency of the now defunct Johore sultanate, there-
fore the Straits Government could influence its ruler, styled Bendahara, 
through the Teruenggong of Johore. Trade treaties were also concluded 
with the smaller states in Negri Sembilan (a confederacy o~ nine states 
on the west coast).3 
1 Buckley, Anecdotal History, 781, describes somewhat amusingly 
the unfavourable impression Ord created among the local community 
during the ceremony of inauguration, and the favourable impression 
of the popular Admiral Henry Kepple, a staunch supporter of Singapore. 
2 Parkinson, British Intervention, 2Q-J2; Cowan, Nineteenth CenturY 
Malaya, J1-JJ; Buckley, Anecdotal llistory, 785, Ord was at odd~ with the 
chief justice over the question whether the governor had the r1ght 
to be styled "His Excellency". 
J See above PP• 15•17. 
-·· 
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This was in the barest outline the position in the Malayan 
Peninsula in 1867. That the Colonial Office refused to give the Straits 
Governor full powem in dealing with the Malay states was obvious when 
it rejected Ord's treaty with Kedah signed in 1867. The energetic 
and experienced Governor, acting on his own judgement and the advice 
of the local officials, but without instructions from London, negotiated 
the treaty in order to settle some outstanding disputes. The disputes 
involved the boundary between Province Wellesley (part of Penang territory 
situated on the Peninsula) and Kedah, the duties on provisions imported 
into Province Wellesley from Kedah, and the establishment of gambling 
houses in the Kedah border region. 1 
Ord•s proceedings here involved the important question of whether 
he had the power to negotiate and conclude treaties with the ~~lay 
states on behalf of the British Government, especially in this case 
where Kedah was tributary to Siam. Apparently aware that he might have 
exceeded his authority, Ord wrote to the Colonial Office to enquire 
with what diplomatic power the Straits Governor was entrusted. The 
Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, who had succeeded Carnarvon in ).larch 
1867, rejected Ord's treaty with Kedah on the grounds that the governor 
was not entrusted with any such power and that the treaty was "irregular11 • 2 
1 Cowan, Nineteenth Century ~-lalaya, 56-58. 
2 Grenville, Richard, 3rd Duke of Buckingham and Chandos ( 1823•1889), 
vas Lord President of the Council from July 1866 to J.larch 1867 when he · 
succeeded Carnarvon as the Colonial Secretary until December 1868 
when the Conservative Derby ministry reaigned. ~, VIII, 574-5. 
. . . . . ~ . . . .. '·-: . . : .. 
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The Colonial Secretary then clearly laid dovn the nature and 
extent of the Governor's powers. Although Buckingham was "not fully 
aware to what extent the governor of the Straits Settlements while 
under the government of India was authorized, or had been allowed, 
to contract, cancel, or modify treaties with neighbouring states without 
the express sanction of that Government", he pointed out that in Ord's 
case, "nei~her your commission as Governor of the Straits Settlements 
nor any subsequent instructions from Her Majesty, convey to you any such 
authority". He reminded Ord that "the function of contracting or modifying 
such treaties on behalf of Her •rajesty, whether provisionally or otherwise, 
is one which prima facie belongs to the diplomatic representatives of 
Her Majesty". Therefore Buckingham considered that the proposed treaty 
with Kedah was "in excess of the powers hitherto vested in you". These 
observations were not intended to convey any censure on the Governor 
for the course he had taken, but were intended to ensure regularity in 
the matter in future. 1 
The same despatch added that the Straits Governor's relations 
with the Dutch colonies in the neighbourhood would "differ little" 
from those between the Governors o:f"other British colonies, such as 
British Guiana, Gambia, or the Gold Coast and those of other European 
colonies; in other words, the Foreign Office was the proper channel for 
the Straits Settlements's relations with the Dutch colonies. With 
1 Buckingham and Chandos to Ord, 22 April 1868, Correspondence 
Relatin!l to the Affairs of Certain Native States in the Hnlay l'eninsula, 
P.P. 1874, XLV (in continuation of Command Paper 465 of 1872), 
(hereafter cited as P.P. 1874, XLV), 144-145. 
regard to the native states, Ord possessed a "larger authority" •. 
However, Ord was reminded that the relations with the native states 
"may at any time become of serious importance", and that the Imperial 
Government was "bound to exercise a vigilant and effective control". 
Altltough circumstances might frequently axise in which Ord might have 
1)4 
"to act absolutely" in his own judgement, it was "generally undesirable" 
that he should enter into formal negotiations with native states, still 
less that he should conclude any agreement with them "except in pursuance 
o~ an object, or a policy considered and approved by Her ~~jesty's 
Government". Any such agreement should be "strictly provisional", 
and "liable to be disallowed" by the British Govenunent until embodied 
1 in a formal treaty by the Government. The purpose of refusing the 
Straits governor greater authority was to avoid involvements in Malay 
politics, .which the British Government feared would likely arise. 
But. the merchants disagreed with the policy of the Colonial Office; 
Read wrote to Buckingham, in May 1868, that it was desirable to have 
treaties with the native states and that he did not apprehend any political 
complications in that.2 
Although the nature of the "larger authority11 was not specifically 
defined and the reasons for it not given in Buckingham's important 
despatch, it obviously derived from the practice developed during the 
1 BuckiJigham and Chandos to Ord, 22 April 1868, in P.P. 1874, XLV, · 
145. 
2 Re~d to Buckingham, 4 May 1868, quoted in Parkinson, British 
Intervention, J9• 
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administration of the Government of India, a practice which allowed 
the Governor to conduct external relations in a flexible manner and 
with considerable initiative. Nevertheless, the demand that the Straits 
Governor be appointed commissioner and superintendent of trade in the 
area, possessing wide power to negotiate treaties with the native and 
European powers, was rejected. The Imperial Government wanted to have 
the final say in matters that were of "serious importance". Thus the 
Colonial Office was in fact pursuing a mixed policy: on the one hand, 
it continued the Indian practice under which the Governor enjoyed some 
latitude; on the other hand, it wished to uphold imperial control over 
the Colony's external relations. This policy tended to cause conflicts 
between London and Singapore for it was not easy to draw a clear line of 
division between the two aspects of the policy. It was not clear what 
questions or what measures adopted by the Straits Government were to 
be considered of "serioue importance". Probably, if the dealings of the 
Straits Government with the Malay states involved imperial commitments, 
then they would be considered important issues. 
It may be noted, however, that Ord1 s treaty was not thrown out 
altogether. The Colonial Office rejected the treaty as it stood more 
because of the procedure by which it was made rather than because of 
its contents. It was considered "irregular" because the Colonial Office 
held that it should have been signed by British diplomatic representatives, 
and by Siamese officials, since ~dah was tributary to Siam. The 
substance of the agreement was later incorporated in a treaty wlth 
Siam, properly signed on 6 1-lay 1869 at Bangkok. 1 
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The Imperial Government was also opposed to further acquisition 
of terri tory in the Halayan Peninsula. A treaty signed in 1826 between 
Perak and the Straits Government, by which the former ceded the island 
called "Pulo Dinding Pangkor11 to the latter, had never been carried 
out. Now Governor Ord wished to carry out the cession. Negotiations 
began towards the end of 1867 between Colonel Anson, Lieutenant-governor 
of Penang, and the Perak chiefs. It came to nothing after Ord's 
personal visit to Perak had scared the Sultan who refused to meet the 
Governor. Ord did not report , immediately his proceedings to the Colonial 
Office probably because he believed he had acted within his authority. 
But his actions caused criticism in London, and he was alleged to have 
embarked upon a policy of territorial expansion. The criticism came 
from Henry. Stanley (later Lord Stanley of Alderley) who was a former 
ofticial in the Foreign Office and had previously visited Singapore 
2 
and several Malay states. The Derby ministry had resigned in December 
1868 and Gladstone had formed a new government. Stanley wrote to Lord 
Granville, now Gladstone's Colonial Secretary (1868-70), on 26 April 1869, 
1 See Maxwell, Treaties and Engagements, 82-85 for the treaty and 
the Note explaining the reason for the Colonial Office's rejection. 
2 Stanley, Henry Edward John (1827-1903), 3rd. Baron Stanley of 
Alderley served in the Foreign Office as Palmerston1 s precis writer; 
' . later held a junior consular position in the Near East; was a proaanent . 
member of the Asiatic and Hakluyt Societies. ~' Vol. III (20th Century), 
383-4. He visited Singapore and was said to be a 1-luslim, Buckley, 
Anecdotal History, 72J. 
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to voice his objections to Ord's attempts to claim territory from Perak.1 
He informed Granville that the Straits Government was claiming not 
only the island of Pulo Dinding ceded in 1826 to the Straits Government 
by Perak, but also a hill inland named Pangkor Darat, on the ground 
that "at high tide this hill was surrounded by water which flows into a 
channel or rivulet". He alleged, in addition, that the Straits Government 
was also trying to acquire from Perak "an alluvial plain beyond Pangkor 
Darat, and perhaps some hills beyond which contain tin11 • Stanley 
took strong exception to Ord's scheme for two reasons. First, he thought 
that the acquisition would be costly to the Colony since it might lead 
to "petty wars, brigandage, and bloodshed". Secondly, the acquisition 
would have the effect of throwing "the Malay still more into the hands 
of the Siamese", and raising among the Z.lalays "suspicion of the intentions 
and good faith of the British Government"• Even if Pulo Dinding was an 
acquisition worth making, he argued, the right to do so could not be 
made out, for he regarded the treaty of 1826 as a "dead letter" - it had 
been 
2 
upon. 
rejected by the Indian Government, and the cession was never acted 
1 Leveson-Gawer, Granville George, 2nd. Earl Granville, (1815-1891), 
served in the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade before admitted in 
1851 to Russell's cabinet; president of the council (1852-54); 1859-66; 
Colonial Secretary, 1868-70; transferred to the Foreign Office to succeed 
Lord Clarendon and held the position until 1874. ~' XI, 1029-31· 
2 Henry Stanley to Granville,26 April 1869, in ~.P. 1874, X~V, 
136-7. For the cession of 1826, see ~~xwell and G1bson, Trent1es and· 
Engagements, 23; also Cowan, Nineteenth Century ~~laya, 54-55• 
Granville responded swiftly to these charges by requesting 
Ord to report to him on the subject. The Governor denied the 
allegations and stated tl~t he had merely been trying to ascertain 
the actual geographical position of the places referred to in tite 
1 
cession. Granville, in his reply, was "glad to learn that you had 
no intention of acquiring new or occupying disputed territory without 
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specific instructions to that effect from the Secretary of State", and 
stated unequivocally that he "should not be disposed to approve of any 
proceedings which would extend the responsibilities" of the British 
Government in the native states adjacent to the Colony. 2 The matter 
was dropped.J 
Granville's policy here was probably influenced by the ~,ermanent 
Ynder-S.ecretary Sir Frederic Rogers, who held the position :f'rom 1859 
4 
to 1871. Rogers was very influential in the Colonial Office; as an 
Australian politician, George Higinbotham, said in 1869, Rogers had 
1 Granville to Ord, 5 May 1869, in P.P. 1874, XLV, 136; Ord to 
Granville, 14 July 1869, in P.P. 1874, XLV, 137-8. 
2 Granville to Ord, 10 September 1869, P.P. 1874, XLV, 139· 
J Ord to Kimberley, 23 February 1870, P.P. 1874, XLV, 139· 
4 See above P• 6S footnote 2 .for a biographical note on Rogers; 
for his belief that the colonies would separate ultimately from the 
1110ther country, see G. Bennett (ed), The Concept of Empire, 
(London: Adam and Charles Black, 2nd, ed. 1962), 21J-4. After his 
retirement from the Colonial Office he was critical of the new Malayan policy 
adq>ted after 1874, see Hansard, Jrd. ser., CCXXX ( 1876), 845-6. 
.~ 
·' governed the whole of the colonies for the previous ten years. 1 
Rogers was apparently well aware of the wishes or the demands of the 
Straits community with respect to expanding British influence into 
the Malayan Peninsula for he was one of the principal officials 
responsible for the negotiations that led to the transfer in 1867. 
He was well · aware of the forces at work in the colonies, remarking 
in 1868: 
Settlers and merchants are always ready to call for 
operations of which they are to reap the benefits in the 
shape of security of commerce etc., and government to 
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bear the cost in the way of military proceedings, embassies 
etc. And Governors are only too apt to fall in with a 
policy which gives interest and importance to their proceedings.2 
There was a close accord between Gladstone, Granville and Rogers. 
Rogers was a school-fellow of Gladstone at Eton and Oxford, and it was 
the latter who offered the former his first appointment in the Colonial 
Office in· 1846. Granville was "an able parliamentary leader and possessed 
of political acwnen11 , but he was "a very easy-going departmental minister" 
who "made very few corrections of the despatchel!l drafted by Rogers". 
The relations between Granville and Rogers were so close that when the 
latter retired in 1871 from the Colonial Office, Granville offered him 
the position of under-secretary for the Foreign Office.3 
1 DNB XVIII, 120 .... _, 
2 . Quoted in H. L. Hall, The Colonial Office, A History (London, 
19.37), 240 • 
.3 For this close relationship between the three, see E. Drus, 
"The Colonial Office and the Annexation of Fiji", The Royal Historical 
Society, (Transactions), 4th ser. XXXII (1950), 92. 
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The policy pursued by the Colonial Office after 1867 with 
respect to the Malay states resulted from Br1·ta1•n•s general 1 · 1 co on1a and foreign 
policy. Since the death of Palmerston in 1865, Britain's policy 
towards Europe was one of non-intervention and isolation. Even during 
the short ministry of Lord John Russell (1865-66) who succeeded Palmerston 
as Prime Minister, there were signs of a reaction against Palmerston's 
system of intervention, a reaction which became more pronounced during 
the Derby ministry ( 1866-68). 1 This was partly due to a "natural 
reaction against the excessive habits of intervention practised by 
Palmerston . the bully and Russell the busybody", and partly due to the 
fact that the country was very much preoccupied with the question of 
2 parliamentary reform. · 
By the time Gladstone formed his first ministry in December 
1868, non-intervention l~d become more firmly established as a principle 
of Britain's foreign policy. It was during his ministry that the policy 
of withdrawing imperial troops from the coloaies re&ched its climax. 
Although this policy was applied primarily to the self-governing settlement 
colonies, it vas accompanied by resistance by the Imperial Government 
to further increases in colonial territory elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
the forces at work on the frontiers of the Empire, in the remote 
1 H. Temperley and L. M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge University Press, 19J8), J~5-o6; R. w. Seton-
Watson Britain in Europe, 1789•1911•, (Cambr1dge University Press, 1937), 
' - . " chapter XIIa "Non-intervention and Isolat1on • 
2 B • t . . E Seton-Watson, r1 a1n 1n urope, 477· 
tropical regions of the •~layan Peninsula, as elsewhere, continued 
to work against the policy of the Imperial Government.1 
When Lord Kimberley succeeded Granville in July 1870, the 
Straits Government was still restrained from interfering in the 
internal affairs of the •mlay states.2 But demands for an active 
policy continued to reach London, and soon after, in 1871, Kimberley 
was urged for the first time by the Straits Government to adopt a more 
active policy towards the Malay states. The new Colonial Secretary, 
however, refused to consent to the proposals presented to him, upholding 
the principles laid down by his predecessor. 
Governor Ord was absent on leave fro~ -•~rch 1871 to the following 
March, and the lieutenant-governor of Penang, Colonel Anson, was appointed 
Acting Governor ~ith the title "Administrator") He appointed a committee 
1 Paul Knaplund, Gladstone 1 s Foreign Policy (London: Frank Cass, 
1970 reprint), chapter Ill: "The First Hinistry", 1868-1874; 
Temperley and Penson, British Foreign Policy, 317; Schuyler, 263-267. 
2 Wodehouse, John, 1st Earl of Kimberley (1826-1902) was educated 
at Eton and Oxford. He became Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs in the ministry of Lord Aberdeen and in Palmerston~s first 
ministry (1852-56). In 1856 he was. British minister at St. Petersburg, 
later became Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1859--to 1861 in 
Palmerston's second administration; Under-Secretary of State for India 
tor a few months in 1864, then became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland from 
1864-1866. When Gladstone formed his first ministry in December 1868, 
Kimberley became Lord Privy Seal. In July 1870 when Lord Granville 
· became Foreign Secretary,Kimberley succeeded him at the Colonial Office 
until 1874. He was again Gladstone's Colonial Secretary 188o-t882; 
Indian Secretary, 1882-1885, 1886, 1892-1894, and Foreign Secretary 
1894-1895• ~ (Twentieth Century), 695-699• 
3 A. E. H. Anson, lieutenant-governor of Penang since 1867, was 
popular in the Colony for he was more receptive to the demand for 
British intervention in the l-lalayan Peninsula. See Parkinson, 
British Intervention, 18, 46-47. 
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to inquire into and report on the relations of the Colony with the 
native states, because of the "very unsatisfactory state" of the 
relations with all these states, and the injury to trade which was 
"the natural result", as he later explained to the Colonial Secretary. 
The committee, which was composed of A. N. Birch (acting lieutenant-
governor of Penang), Major J. A. F. McNair (the colonial engineer), 
and George Robinson (commander and senior naval officer, Straits 
division of the China station), recommended that nit would be desirable 
that a commission of officers of rank should visit Achin, Perak, and 
the other states", and that "there should be frequent communication 
between this (the Straits ) Government and those native states". 
Colonel Anson aijreed with the committee on this suggestion, but he did 
not consider it feasible to appoint "resident officers" for these states, 
because he did not think that the Straits Legislative Council would be 
prepared to pay their salaries, nor would the native governments. He 
also felt it was not propitious to do so due to "the barbarous state 
of these countries". Inst~ad, Anson presented a 1010dified proposal. 
He considered that it would be "advisable to have a qualified officer 
as a Political Agent, whose duty it would be to visit these states, 
frequently, either in a man-of-war or in the Colonial Govenuuent's 
steamer, and who might also be employed to carry on all correspondence 
with them". He also agreed with the committee that, if possible, it 
would be advisable to make a new treaty with Perak in order to retain 
the Dinding Island (Pulo Dinding Pangkor), hoping that some day it would 
be made "the centre of civilization for Perak, as well as the depot for 
all the produce of the interior of that country, and at the same time it 
would enable us to suppress piracy, and protect the trade at the mouth 
of the Dinding and Perak rivers." 1 
The report of Anson's committee was significant because it 
was the first official report from the Straits Government since 1867 
to present specific measures to the Colonial Office to deal with the 
Malay states, and also because the Colonial Office had earlier specifically 
instructed Colonel Anson not to initiate or suggest such changes. 
But on the spot, Anson's proposals were not novel at all. Since at 
least 1844 it had become a recurring topic in the Singapore newspapers 
to suggest an active policy wi~h respect to the ~~lay states. Many · 
accounts had been published describing the abundant natural resources 
i~ th~ M~lay~n PP.ninsula which still remained undeveloped and their 
potential benefits to. the trade of the Colony and British industry as 
well as to the native people themselves. These accounts expressed 
disappointment with the indifferent attitude of the Indian Government in 
this respect, and complained of the unstable, disorderly and insecure 
conditions in the Malayan Peninsula, proposing to control them either 
by direct annexation or indirect rule. 2 But these proposals did not 
lead to action. And now Anson's recommendations also came to nothing 
because the Imperial Government resisted this forward policy. 
1 Anson to Kimberley, 3 June 1871, in P.P. t874,XLV, 139-140. 
2 Quoted in Buckley, Anecdotal History, 421-422, 503, 575, 584-585, 
722-723. The Sin~apore Free Press, started in 1835, was the most 
influential of ·nhe Straits papers. It was praised as being 11 among 
the ables.t and most influential jour nals in the East." Ibid., 437-4)8. 
To the disappointment of Anson, Kimberley rejected his proposals. 
The Colonial Secretary told him that he did not "perceive that the!"e 
was any urgent necessity for an immediate examination into the points 
submitted to the Committee", although he was quite aware that the 
relations with those Malay states were of "commercial and political 
importance". Reminding Anson of Granville's despatch of 10 September 
1869, Kimberley reiterated that "any proceedings which would extend 
the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government in the neighbourhood 
o~ the Straits Settlements would not be approved"• In fact, as Anson 
was further reminded, Kimberley had informed him in a previous despatch 
that he was not to "initiate any proposal as to changes in our relations 
with native states without instructions from home". Kimberley added 
that "large and delicate questions of policy should not be entered upon 
I • 1 in the Governor's absence' , except 1n case of emergency. 
Anson responded by further explaining the reasons that induced 
him to take such steps. He said that in Perak, where the sultan had 
recently died, the country was reported to be in "a state of anarchy"; 
and the British territories were likely to be affected because of persons 
from Perak entering Province Wellesley, and creating disturbances there. 
In addition, there were "the outstanding complaints of the traders of 
Penang against some of the Raj~1s in Achin (in Sumatra) and in Perak. 
They were constantly urging the Straits Government to assist them in 
2 
settling their complaints. Kimberley received the explanations without 
1 Kimberlez to Anson, 26 August 1871, in P.P. 1874, XLV, 140-141. 
2 Anson to Kimberley, 19 October 1871, in P.P. 1874, XLV, 141. 
·' making any further comments. 1 While the imperial policy was upheld, 
conditions in the Colony, or rather in the ~~layan Peninsula, were making 
for a change. 
The political imbroglios in the }~lay states that prompted 
Colonel Anson to initiate specific measures to cope with them, were 
apparently the result of a continuous disintegration of the Malay 
sultanates, a process that may be traced back to the 1840s. The Straits 
officials had reported frequently on this situation and its impact on the 
stability and trade of the .area. 2 On the west coast of the Peninsula the 
disturbances had existed for almost a decade when the Anson committee was 
appointed in 1871. Perak and Selangor, two n1ajor states, were the scenes 
of rampant conflicts. In Selangor, rival rajas were fighting among 
themselves for political control and the right ta collect duties on tin 
because the reigning su~tan Abdul Samad was losing control over them. The 
pri~cipal rivals in the struggle were Tenku Kudin and Raja Hahdi. Tenku Kudin, 
who was brother of the Sultan of Kedah, married a daughter of Sultan 
Samad and was appointed Viceroy of Selangor by the Sultan in 1868. 
Raja Madhi was the ruler of the district of Klang, then one of the 
centres of tin mining. From 1866 on frequent conflicts broke out between 
1 Kb1berley to Anson, 4 December 1871, 
see also Parkinson, British Intervention, 
CE!ntury Halaya 1 82-85. 
in P.P. 1874, XLV, 142; 
46-4 7; Cowan, !!,!. . .,n,.e ... t.,.e ... e-n.-t.-h_ 
2 For Malay politics in the 1840s, see Mills, British Malava, 
175-176; particularly P• 176 for Blundell's (then resident councillor 
at ~lacca) report of 1847 on the political disorders. 
the !'actions led by Kudin and Hadht over the right to collect duties 
on tin. With the continuation of the quarrel the neighbouring states 
of Pahang and Sungei Ujong were also drawn into the imbroglios. In 
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1872 the ruler of Pahang, the Bendahara Wan Ahmad, was sending Pahang 
men to assist his friend Tenku Kudin, while some of the chiefs in Sungei 
Ujong were supporting 1-ladhi. The Straits Settlements had commercial 
connections with Selangor: the produce of its tin mines, mostly operated 
by the Chinese and J.talays jointly, was exported to J.lalacca and Singapore. 
Therefore the political chaos in Selangor was likely to involve the British 
in the Straits.1 
But the situation appeared to be more serious in Perak, where 
the dispute~ among the Malay rajas over the succession to Sultan Ali, 
who died in May 1871, were further complicated by the turbulent Chinese 
tin miners. The disputed succession arose when Ismail was elected 
Sultan over Abdullah. According to Malay law, Abdullah, who held the 
position of Raja J.luda (Viceroy), should have succeeded the late Sultan 
Ali; also according to the Malaylaw, when the sultan died the new sultan 
should have been installed at his funeral. But Abdullah was absent at 
the late Sultan's funeral; consequently, Ismail, who was supported by 
1 For contemporary accounte of Malay poli tice, see -Governor Ord's 
political reports, 6 November 1872, 10 July 1873, in P.P. 1874, 
XLV, 1-4 and 28-30; c. J. Irving (auditor-general): Memorandum Relative 
to the Disturbances on the Territorr of Selanooz:, July 1871; c. J. Irving 
to Anson, Julv 1~71; J. w. JHrch (colonial. :;;ecreta~) to Anson, 26 July 
1871, in Papers Helating to Recent Proceed~nqs at olClangore, P.P. 1872, 
LXX (C-475) (hereafter cited as P.P. 1872, LXX), 11-1J, 24-28; and 20-23 
respectively. See Cowan, Nineteenth Century Halaya, 66-77. 
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the powerful and wealthy Orang Kaya Hantri of Larot, was elected 
Sultan of Perak. After 1860, thousands of Chinese flocked into Perak, 
particularly to Larot district, from Penang and Province Wellesley, 
to work in the tin mines. Rival groups of Chinese miners, bringing 
with them from China their secret societies, fought for mining rights. 
The most pol·:erful of them were the Ghee Hin and the Hai San with their 
headquarters in Penang and connections in Singapore. Between t86o and 
1872, four serious outbreaks were reported, involving hundreds and 
even thousands of men on both sides. The :t-fantri, who was the ruler of 
the Larot district and also a high Nalay ·official, sided with one or 
the other depending on which one was victorious. The most serious and ' 
latest outbreak had occurred in February and Narch 1872. Penang, being 
t!!~ !!~edquart.Pr!'l of' hot.h sides~ was affected in these factional quarrels, 
sending arms and ammunition as well as fighting men into Larot and Perak. 
The conbined result of this fectional fighting and rivalry was that 
1 trade with these states was halted. 
1 See C.J.Irving, Memorandum Relative to the Affairs of Perak,- in 
P.P. 18741 XLV, 126-1)7; G.W.R.Campbell( Acting Lieutenant-Governor 
of Penang), Memorandum, 24 October 1872, in P.P.t874,XLV, 16. The 
best study, so far, of the Halay political system on the eve of British 
intervention in 1874 is G.M.Gullick, The Indi{lenous Political Svstem 
of Western Malaya(London: London University, 1958; 1965 reprint)( in the 
series of the L~don School of Economics: monographs on social anthropology), 
11-15 for the roots and nature of the conflicts in Selangor and Perak. 
For the Chinese secret societies, see V.Purcell, '?he Chinese in l\lalaya 
(London: Oxford UnivP.rsity Press, 1948), 106-108; W.Blythe, The Imnact 
of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
172-184. For a concise account, see Parkinson, British Interv~ntion, 
P•372, Appendix; see chapters five and six for the details of Chinese 
involvement in :t-falay politics in Selangor and Perak; see also Cowan, 
Nineteenth Century Nalaya, 77-79• 
. . . ~ ..::.. ~· .... 
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British involvement was inevitable, especially after the c~pture 
of a Chinese junk by pirates. In 1871 Tenku Kudia had driven the Madhi 
party from Klang and himself become its ruler. I~ July 1871 the followers 
of the defeated f.iadhi were found to be implicated iin piracy. A Chinese 
junk leaving Penang, with 4o passengers and several thousands dollars worth 
ot cargo, was captured on its way to Larot, its crew and passengers 
killed and cargo taken. Colonel Anson immediately despatched · the colonial 
steamer Pluto to search for the captured junk. Tbe search party was 
resisted by 1-fadhi followers· in Selangor district where the junk was found. 
The assistance of HJ.IS Rinalclo and the imperial troops at Penang was called 
for subsequently. The fort at Selangor and the war boats of the )~dhi 
1 faction were destroyed. 
Anson apparently believed that occasional suppression of piracy 
was not vufficient to prevent its recrudescence, and wished to have 
stability restored in Selangor. He further persuaded the weak Sultan 
Samad to give full power to Tenku Kudin to govern the whole territory 
of Selangor. J. w. w. Birch, the colonial secretary, and John Irving, 
the auditor, were sent by Anson to conduct the negotiations, on board the 
Pluto, which was reinforced by ~IS Teazer under commander R. w. Blomfield. 
The mission was succeseful: Tenku Kudin's position in Selangor was 
reaffirmed and the Sultan proclaimed Raja Madhi and his two lieutenants 
1 For the reports on the episode of the junk, see Penang Argus, 1 July 
1871, and Penang Gazette, 1 July 1871, in P.P. 18?2, LXX, 14-15 and 15~16; 
also Anson to Kimberley, 14 July 1871, P.P. 1872, LXX, 1-2. 
"pirates and outlaws11 , calling upon his people to assist Kudin and 
the Straits Government in their capture. 1 
To Kimberley, Anson's proceedings against piracy and his 
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diplomacy in the J.talay court of Selangor were satisfactory. It has to 
be noted that the Straits Government's involvements in the Malay states 
here stopped short of treaty obligations, and perhaps this was the 
reason why the Colonial Secretary did not object to them. 2 The Navy 
had played a considerable role in this episode, but later that year 
the Admiralty, with Kimberley's concurrence, ordered the Navy not to 
perform such political duties.J 
Tl~t Kimberley would not go further than occasional intervention 
vas clear, as his response to a fresh demand for British protection in 
Selangor indicated. There vas some vestige of political stability 
after Tenku Kudin had established his administration in 1871, and the 
Malacca merchants and traders, Chinese as well as European, increased 
their investments in Selangor. It was reported that "large sums of 
money" had been invested in the trade of Selangor, more particularly in 
tin mines. On ~ne Klang river alone, about 12,000 Chinese miners were 
1 For the mission of the Teazer, see R. W. Rlomfield to Vice-Admiral 
Sir Henry Kellett, 20 September 1871, in P.P. 1872, LXX, 44-46; 
Blomfield to Robinson, 6 August 1871, in P.P. 1872, LXX, 4o-44; and 
also the report:!! of Irving and Birch to Anl!lon; also Parkinson, British 
Intervention, 55-56 and 62. 
2 Kimberley to Anl!lon, 6 September 1871, P.P. 1872, LXX, 17-18. 
J Admiralty to 
to the Admiraltv, 
28 December 1371, 
the Colonial Office, 16 December 1871; H. Kellett 
JO October 1871 1 and Colonial Office to Admiralty, 
in P.P. 1872, LXX, 44, 46 • 
employed at the mines; and the yield, which was about 3,000 piculs 
( 1 ) 1 picul • 133j lbs per month, was exported to Malacca, Penang and 
Singapore. It was reported that during the short administration of 
Kudin the yield of tin had doubled. 1 But the stability in Selangor was 
more apparent than real. Opposition to Tenku Kudin still existed, and 
without a helping hand he could not maintain his position for long, a 
situation which the commander of the Teazer had pointed out earlier.2 
The Madhi faction, although defeated and driven out of Klang in 1871 
was not destroyed, and attempted a comeback. In 1872 fighting broke 
out again in Selangor, with the Madhi group using Sungei Ujong as some 
sort of a operational base, and Tenku Kudin seeking help from Pahang.3 
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This caused great concern in the Straits Settlements, and British 
intervention was again demanded. A petition from the ~~lacca traders 
and merchants was forwarded by the Singapore Chamber of Coounerce to the 
Straits Government. The petition, signed by 34 Chinese merchants, 
complained of the insecurity and loss they had suffered as a result 
of the renewed fighting in Selangor, and urged the Singapore Chamber 
of Coamterce to "press on the (Straits) Govenunent the necessity of 
giving Tunku Dia Oodin (Tenku Kudin) an unqualified and hearty support11 • 4 
1 See Petition of the !-talacca Traders to the Singapore Chamber 
of Commerce, 27 July 1872, P.P. 1874, XLV, 5-6. 
2 Blomfield to Kellett, 20 September 1871, in P.P. 1872, LXX, 46. 
3 Parkinson, British Intervention, 62-65, 66-71. 
4 Petition of the l-talacca Traders to the Singapore Chamber of Commerce, 
P.P. 1874, XLV, 5-6. 
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The Chamber of Commerce urged the Straits Government "to give its · 
early .and earnest attention" to the demand. 1 
But the petition received a very disappointing and discouraging 
reply from Governor Ord who had resumed office in lolarch 1872. Apparently 
bound by Kimberley's orders to refuse the demand for British intervention, 
Ord reiterated to the Singapore Chamber of Commerce the principles of 
"non-intervention". 11If traders", Ord warned, "prompted by the prospect 
of large gain, choose to run the risk of placing their persons and 
property in the jeopardy which they are aware attends them in these 
countries under present circumstances, it is impossible for government 
to be anl!Werable for tbeir protection or that of their propertT!. 2 
Kimber!~y w~~ satisfied with Ord's handling of the matter. and 
approved the answer given to the Singapore Chamber of Commerce.3 On 
the other hand, the mercantile community of the Colony expressed great 
regret. Read, chairman of the Chamber of Con~erce, wrote to the Straits 
Government to express his strong disagreement with Ord 1 s reply and urged 
that it was absolutely necessary to adopt "some straight-forward and 
well-defined policy in dealing with the rulers of various states of the 
. 4 
Malay Peninsula". 
1 J. G. Davidson (secretary of the Chamber of Conwerce) to Birch 
(colonial secretary), JO July 1872, in P.P. 1874, XLV, 4-5. 
Parkinson, British Intervention, 65. 
2 See Birch to Davidson, 21 August 1872, P.P. 1874, XLV, 6. 
3 Ord to Kimberley, 6 November 1872, Kimberley to Ord, 28 December 
1872, in P.P. 187~, XLV, 1-~ and 7• 
4 Head to Birch, 17 (September?) 1872, in P.P. 187~, XLV, 6-7; 
Parkinson, British Intervention, 66. 
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Since the transfer in 1867, then, the British Government laad 
been repeatedly urged to extend its political influence in the Malayan 
Peninsula, but the Government had so far been abl~ to restrain the 
Straits Government from taking initiatives that would probably involve 
Imperial commitments in the factional conflicts or the Peninsula. 
It was not the intention of the Imperial Government to increase its 
responsibility or to give the Straits Governor wide powers to intervene 
in the Malay states. But clearly also, as can be seen from the foregoing 
discussion, an alternative policy was being formulated and strongly 
advocated in the Straits. This appeared most clearly in the recommend~tions 
of the Anson conwittee that a political officer should be appointed to 
the Malay states, a proposal rejected at the time by Kimberley. 
' .• ~ • · - . ~: .<'.: 
Chapter VI: The Decisive Years, 1873-1871.1: The 
Adoption of A New Policy 
, • -- · .... .; ... :.::. ........ . ··--·· . ·· · .. ·· 
The Colonial Office under Kimberley had so far managed to .ire strain 
the Straits Government from getting involyed· in. t~~ ·~lay states! ~~t the 
enterprising individuals at the frontier of the Colony incessantly worked . 
to change this policy. The pressure for British intervention continued 
to grow, pressure that came primarily from entreprenuers whose activities 
produced repercussions even in London, as the story of James Guthrie 
Davidson illustrates. 1 
Davidson was a nephew of James Guthrie who was one of the pioneer 
merchants in Singapore and .who had played a considerable part in the 
agitation for the transfer. 2 Several years after his arrival in Singapore 
in 1861, Davidson became the legal adviser, and financial supporter, of 
Tenku Kudin of Selangor. It was not infrequent then for the J.lalny rajas 
to find a friend among the leading merchants in the Colony, and A. L. 
Johnston, ·w. H. Read, Tan Kim Ching and Hoo Ah Kay (better known as 
Mr. Whampoa) were the more prominent examples of them.3 These wealthy 
1 J. G. Davidson (18)8-91) was appointed British Resident to Selangor 
in 1875, but resigned in 1877 and returned to his law practice in Singapore. 
See Buckley, Anecdotal History, 731 and 773; J.lakepeace, et. al., .2!2!, 
Hundred Years of Singapore, vol. 1, 28. 
2 See above p.4) , note 1. 
3 Alexander Laurie Johnston, came to Singapore in 1819 and formed 
A. L. Johnston & Co., one of the earliest firms; first chairman of the 
Singapore Chamber of Commerce when it was formed in 1837; commanded great 
respect among the Malays and Chinese. Buckley, Anecdotal History, 
62-6) and passim. 
Tan Kim Ching (1829-1892), a leading Singap~re Chinese merchant 
w'ith wide commercial interests, including Siam; consul and special 
commissioner for Siam; adviser of Sultan Abdullah of Perak in the 1870s. 
See Ibid., 530 and passim; Song Ong Siong 1 One Hundred Years' History 
of the CllinP-se in Singauore ( 192J}, 92-93· 
Boo Ah Ka y ( 1816-CO), provisioner and shipchandler to Hl-1 Navy; 
consul in Singapore for Russia, China and Japan; one of the first 
unofficial members of the Legislative Council; created c.r-t.G. in 1878. 
Buckley, Ane cdotal Hisotry, 658-659; Song, Chinese in Singapore , 51-56. 
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and powerful merchants in tum became very influestial with the 1-falay 
chiefs. For instance, in 1867, it was through the good offices~! Tan Kim 
Ching that the Sultan of Kedah was invited to Singapore to negotiate a 
treaty with Governor Ord. 1 
Davidson and Tenku Kudin decided to launch a joint enterprise 
in tin-mining. In ~~rch 1873 a tin conces$ion was granted by Tenku Kudin 
to Davidson, probably as security for money advanced to the Tenku. 
By the terms of the concession, Davidson agreed to organize a company to 
work the tin mines in Selangor for ten years with a capital of J: 100,000. 
In ~etur.n Tenku Kudin would receive 5% of the gross produce.2 Subsequently, 
the Selangor Tin Mining Company was formed. For the smooth operation 
of the tin mines security and stability were necessary. These conditions 
did not exist in Selangor because of the resumption of fighting in 1872. 
The Straits Government was not inclined, or rather was bound to refuse, 
to extend British protection to Selangor. Davidson was obviously aware 
of this because he had, as the secretary of the Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce, forwarded in 1872 the unsuccessful Malacca petition to the 
Straits Government.) Probably because of this, Davidson turned to London. 
The London solicitors Lambert, Burgin and Petch approached the 
Colonial Office in June 1873, on behalf of Davidson, about the subject 
1 Cowan, Nineteenth Century Halaya, 56-57. 
2 The concession, dated 8 March 1873, was printed in P.P. 1874, XLV, 
52-55; see also Parkinson, British Intervention, 71•72 and Cowan, 
Nineteenth Century ~mlaya, 142, 166-168 • 
.) See above PP• 150-151• 
of British protection in Selanoor. ·' The Colonial Office was informed 
that their client was endeavouring to form a company in London to work 
the mines, but met in financial circles with the objection that the 
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territory was not within the immediate protection of the British Government, 
and that there was no assurance of safety for life and property. The 
Colonial Office was then asked: (1) whether there was any possibility 
of British protection in Selangor; or (2) whether the British Government 
would interfere and prevent the company from keeping armed men in 
1 Selangor. 
The Colonial Office brushed aside the requests. Robert Herbert, 
who had succeeded flogers as permanent under-secretary in 1871, stated 
unequivocal!~·, in his reply, that the British Government did not 
"interfere in the government of Salangore (Selangor) 11 , and could not 
"in any way sanction the employment of an armed force by an English 
company within the .Salangore territory". In addition, Herbert gave the 
usual warning of "do-at-your-own-risk", the same one that the Singapore 
Chamber of Commerce received from Ord in the previous year.2 
1 Lambert, Burgin and Petch to the Colonial Office, 25 June 1873, 
in P.P. 1074, XLV, 20-21; Cowan, Nineteenth Century Halaya,166-167. 
2 Robert Herbert to Lambert, Burgin and Petch, 5 July 1873, in f.:.!!• 
1874, XLV, 27. 
----Sir Robert Herbert (1831-1905), educated at Eton and Oxford; once 
private secretary to Gladstone for a short time; t86o-65 member of the 
Queensland Legislative Council and its first premier; 1868, as~istant 
secretary at the Board of Trade; in February 1870 entered the Colonial 
Office as assistant under-secretary; succeeded Rogers in 1871 and held 
the position until 1892; in retirement, agent-general for Tasmania 
(189)-96); for a short time adviser of the Sultan of Johore. ~' 
(20th Century) , II , 253-254. 
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The tone in Herbert's reply was very much the same as that in 
Governor Ord's categorical rejection of the ~~lacca petition in 1872.1 
The Colonial Office's refusal was unmistakeable. But Kimberley, 
paradoxically, seems to have been convinced of the necessity of British 
intervention in Selangor, as he revealed three years later. Speaking 
in the House of Lords on his Malayan policy, Kimberley declared that 
"no one who studied the actual circumstances of the case could fail 
to convince himself that a policy of non-intervention was impossible". 
"Wheii European settlements", he added, "of such importance as those of 
Penang and Singapore were planted side by side with Malay states, it 
was impossible for them to avoid exercising great influence either for 
good or evil on the surrounding population, and with that influence came 
responsibility". · Kimberley referred specifically to the "occurrence of 
the Chinese riots at Perak", and "the danger to the Native States arising 
from Europeans obtaining large concessions and employing them to acquiFe 
political influence". He considered that these circumstances "rendered 
our intervention absolutely necessary", and also "rendered it necessary 
to take the state of the Peninsula into consideration with a ·View to 
some change of policy11 • 2 
"Europeans obtaining large concessioD~ and employing them to 
acquire political influence" was a statement that referred apparently 
to Davidson's activities. Kimberley was convihced that the policy of 
1 See above P• 151. 
2 Hansard, Jrd. ser., CCXXX (1876), 3 July 1876, 84). 
-.. · .: . . 
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non-intcrve.ntion \'las impossible, yet the Colonial Office's refusal to 
intervene in Sclangor \ms uneq·ui vocal, as HcJ·bert' s reply to Davidson v s 
solicitors indicated. The explanation of tl1iA apparent contradiction 
was that \>'hilc Kimbcrl8y held the vie'·' that political influence begot 
responsibility, and beli«"!vcrl that it \'IMO: necessary to consider a change 
in policy, he was not sure that Gladstone held the same vie"'• In fact, 
Kimberley \;'as constrained to a great extent by the requirements of 
Gladstone in this regard: no Imp0.rial e":pansion unless there '"as a 
dP.sire to be annexed on the part of the native people concerned. This 
is a point that \·~e shall elaborate on later. 
But before long an important message reached the Colonial Office, 
a messaac that appcarc:!d to be the l<ey ,.,.hich unravelled the uhole problem 
of British protection in Selanaor and othcl· Halay states. One of the 
London promoters of the Sele~.ngor Tin Nin:i.ng Company \'Ins Seymour Clarke, 
brothcr-in-1.:1\·l of H .H .. Rearl. Clarl\:1?.!, '"ho \·ms at one time manager of 
the Great \fcstcrn flaih1ay and later that of the Great 1\:orthcrn flail\"ay, 
wns said to have a nood reputation in the City. 1 He wrote to the Colonial 
Office on 18 July 1873 nhout the projected mining enterprise in Sclangor 
and the political situation there. lie informed th~ ~oloninl Office 
that he l d. 1 t 1 · _, a letter from "one of the old rc::ddcnts in _ 1a a e . y rcce1vcu 
S . (•,r ''I n 1?)" J , .. •:-s " .intimately acquaintt.::·d vi·Lh the nittive .1ngapore 1"1·~ • C<H. , \vlO n 
------- -----
lil<cd 
' 
I 
· ::: .•. ::.·. 
.. :: . .:.: .-. ~:::::-;: : -:. : -~ .. .:.:..,. 
159 
chieftains". It had expressed the opinion that: 
the independent sovereigns of the smaller states in the 
Malay Peninsula would put themselves under the Protectorate 
of some European Power, and Germany vas mentioned as most 
likely to be approached, failing England.1 
In addition, Clarke included an extract of a letter, dated 3 June 1873, 
which the promoters had received from Tenku Kudin 1 Viceroy of Selangor. 
It read: 
I would like to ascertain if the English, or ~ny other 
Government, would interfere in any disturbance that 
might arise in the territory of Selangor from wicked persons, 
so that merchants, and etc., desirous of opening up trade 
here, may have a security for their capital and property 
invested, and see that there. was some safety for life and 
property.2 
What impression the mention of other European powers, particularly 
Gerwany, a~epping into a traditional British sphere of influence, had 
on the Colonial Office, it is difficult to say. What was clear ~as that 
the Colonial Office was r.ot alarmed, as Herbert's reply to Clarke indicated. 
It calmly acknowledged the receipt of the letter, but did not express 
any opinion on the question of foreign intervention in Selangor. As 
to the question of British protection, Herbert stated that the British 
Government had "hitherto made it their practice to abstain, as far as 
possible, from interference in the internal affairs" of' the Malay 
states, although the Government had "always main·.b.ined intimate relations 
with the native states which are bound by treaty obligations to this 
1 Seymour Clarke to Herbert, 18 July 1873, in P.P. 1874, XLV, 27-28~ 
2 Clarke to Herbert, op. cit.,28. 
' . ~ .. ; . 
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country," and were "most anxious that peace should be maintained 
throughout the Peninsula, arid that trade and commerce should be promoted." 1 
This exchange of letters between Seymour Clarke and Robert Herbert 
offers us, perhaps, the key to the question as to why Kimberley changed 
his policy in later 1873. That there wan no indication of a possible 
change in policy in Herbert's reply is beyond doubt. But the tone of the 
letter was very different, indeed, from that of Herbert's answer to 
Davidson's solicitors one month earlier. The previous warning of 
"do-at-your-o\m-risk" had disappeared. 
It has been rightly pointed out by C.D.Cowan that Clarke's 
letter was the factor that "prompted Kimberley's change of front in 187J•" 2 
But it seems that Cowan, by dwelling upon that portion of Clarke's 
communication that alluded to a possible German intervention, has overstated 
the case.3 It is clear that the communication indicated unmistakably that 
some Malay chiefs, Terutu Kudin in particular, would invite other European 
powers to assist them in their internal troubles, if Britain refused to 
accept the request. But at the same time, the communication also indicated 
one important fact: the ruler of Selangor wished to receive British 
protection, a statement that has not received sufficient attention. It was 
probably at this time that Kimberley tho.ught he could change his policy 
for he could nm-t satisfy Gladstone's requirements. It must be 
1 Herbert to Clarke, 5 August 1873, in P.P.1874, XLV, 28. 
2 " co,<~ an, Nineteenth Century Malaya, 167-168 and 261*- · 
3 Cowan • s theory is supported and further developed by \v .D.t-Icintyre in 
The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, t865-75 (London: HacMillan, 1967), 
pp.199-210 and 378-379· 
. 
. 
.. .. :. 
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pointed out immediately that Tenku Kudin's letter did not fully meet 
the requirements of Gladstone if '"e take the Prime Hinister' s words 
literally. The "'dsh of the people to be annexed, 11 "',rell understood", 
"freely and generously expressed", and "authenticated by the best means" 
together would seem to imply a step tf\ntamount to a plebiscite. 1 
But such a move \'IC\S inconceivable in the tropical countries in 1873. 
The fact remains that Tenlm Kudin had expressed his desire fcn· 
British intervention, which \•tas the thing that mattered. 
In the meantime, fresh demands for British protection continued 
to reach London. The Colonial Office received on 21 August 1873 a 
petition signed by 2l~o8 11Ch:i.nese mcrchant.s and traders, Bri t:i.sh subjects 
2 
and inhabitants of Singapore, Penang and Nalacca," including, according 
to Governor Ord, "every leading Chinese mcrch;mt and trader in the 
Settlement." The pcti tion pra ised British rule in the Colony \'lhere the 
merchants enjoyed the benefits of trade; it cornplain::!d of the anarchy 
in those Halay states b e yond British sovereignty and not tributary to 
Siam, anarchy that was the res ult of res ume d fighting. It e xpressed 
the \>'ish that the Dri tish Govornment Hould ext~nd her protection to their 
trade ,>"i th those Na lay sta tes. This petition rcs ul t e d from nn intervi e~,r 
s evera l Cliine::-e merchants in Sinuapore h a d '"ith Oro on the eve of hi s 
ret.urn to Englund nnd vrns fully s upported by th~ Gov<:rnor . J It is 
1 Sec below p.171. 
2 Chinosc P~tition to Orrl\ 2A Mn rcl1 1A7J~ trAn~rni ttod on 10 July 
187J ,--;-;;.c .i. ~-;;]·~;~·-i{~;-~~-t 1fJ7J, in P. P .1874. ,XLV, JO·-J 2 . 
J .9.~?-l~~1~b_(!~::~.£:;' J_ t O .July t87J , in P.P.187L1, XLV, 211~29 . 
difficult to tell exactly how it wa~ organised, though Parkinson says 
"the conception and wording of the petition was both European and 
astute", and suggests that perhaps Davidson was partly involved.1 
The Chinese petition, because it was mentioned in Kimberley's 
instructions of 20 September 1873 to Sir Andrew Clarke, the newly-
appointed succe~sor to Ord, and because of its timing (received at the 
Colonial Office one month before Kimberley's in~tructions), .has been 
de~cribed by historians as the mo~t important factor that persuaded 
2 Kimberley to mare. But more than two weeks before the arrival of 
the petition at London, as we have seen, the Colonial Office had 
already changed its tone about British protection in Selangor. It may 
1 Parkinson, British Intervention, 110; Cowan, Nineteenth Century 
Malaya, 169. 
2 D. G. E. Hall, History of South East Asia, 474; R. 0. Winstedt, 
Malay~ and Its History (London: 1951}, 6~65; in his 1962 edition of 
A Historv of :-~l~ya (Singapore: Harican, 1962), Winstedt modified hi~ 
view and adopted Cowan's, 222; Parldnson, British Intervention, 109; 
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F. Svetterunam, British Nalava 1 suggests that Kimberley changed his policy 
because of humanitarian motives as well a~ because of British strategic 
interests and trade, 174. 
Sir Andrew Clarke (1824-1902) 1 entered the Royal Military Academy 
at Woolwich; 1853, Surveyor-general 'of Victoria; member of the Victorian 
Legislative Council and Cabinet; 1864, director of public works at 
the Admiralty; 1873-5 governor of the Straits Settlements; 1875-80, 
member for public works in the council of the Viceroy of India; 
1882-94, 1897, agent-general for Victoria and Tasmania. ~' (20th 
Century), 362-5. He vas one of the founding members of the Colonial 
Society in 1868; see Proceedin"9 of Roval c,lonial Institute, vol. 1 & 2 
(1869-70), 17; R. H. Veitch (ed.), Life of Sir Andrew Clarke (London: 
John J.furray, 1905); also Cowan, Nineteenth C~mtury Halaya, 177-8, 
Parkin~on, British Intervention, 107-8. 
be more appropriate to say that the petition gave additional support to 
the case for British intervention. 1 
Thus, British intervention was not only desired by British 
Merchants, English as well as Chinese, but was also requested by the 
J.lalay ruler himself. Whether by concerted moves or by coincidence, 
the demands :from the Straits Settlements for British intervention were 
organised and presented in a way suitable for Kimberley to take action. 
When the Colonial Office began seriously considering a change 
in its Malayan policy is not certain. It is obvious, however, that by 
early September 1873, the Colonial Office had completed its review of 
Britain's relations with the Malay states, for a memorandum on Britain's 
existing treaties with them was drawn up by then. The memorandum 
discovered that Britain had already concluded treaties, either commercial 
or of friendship, with all the Malay states on the Peninsula, with the 
exception of Pahang and the two northern states of Kelantan and 
Trengganu. 2 The draft instructions to be given to the new Straits 
Governor, probably prepared at the same time as the memorandum, was 
passed to Gladstone on 10 September 1873. We do not know what·the 
. Pr;.me Minister actually thought of the despatch because he did not make 
t •t J any corumen on 1 • Presumably, Gladstone did not think that the step 
to be taken by his Colonial Secretary was objectionable. 
1 Kimberley to Ord, 2J September 187J, P.P. 1874, XLV, 42. 
2 Memorandum respecting the relations of the British Government_ '_"ith 
the independent states of the Nalayan Peninsula, 8 September 187J, 1n 
P.P. 18?4, XLV, J9-41; Haxwell and Gibson, Treaties <iOd Engagemen~s; Nills, 
British Nalava, 174 gives a concluding passage on the 1-Ialayan poll.cy of the 
East India Company until 1867. 
J Cowan, Nineteenth Century Halaya, 174. 
Kimberley's new Nalayan policy \vas embodied in his instructions of 
20 September 1873 to Sir Andrmv Clarlw. Kimberley pointed out that it 
was "an important part of the duties of the Governor of the Straits 
Settlements to concluct the relations betl-recn the Dri tish Government nnd 
the stntes of the Nalay Peninsula ,.,rhich are not tributary to Siam." 
The Colonial Secretary considered that the political anarchy \1hich prevailed 
and appeared to be increasing in parts of the Peninsula~ and the consequent 
injury to trade and British interests generally, rendered it "necessary 
to consider ,.,hcther any steps cnn be taken to improve their coroditions." 
Kimberley referred to Tenl<tt I<uclin, ,,•ho wns "sensible of the evils ,.,hich 
exist in that country(Selangor)," and was "desirous of obtnining assistnnce 
from Her Naj esty t s Government, or from some other European Pm·rer • 11 
Therefore Kimberley thought that it ll"as "incumbent upon them (the Briti~h 
Government) to employ such influence as they possess \vith the native 
Princes to rescue, if possible, these fertile anrl productive countries 
from ~ .he ruin ,,•hich must befall them if the present disorders continue 
unchecked. II nut the Government had~ Kim?el·ley addr.d, "no desire to 
interfere in the internal <lffairs of the l-1<llay states." He requested 
Clarke to "carefully ascertain~ as f~.r as you arc able~ the actual condi tio!l 
of affairs in each stC\te," and to report \·rhether in his op:i.nion there 
\'!ere "any steps ,.-hich can probnbl y be taken by the Colonial Government 
to pl·omotc th~ restorC\tio:-~ of p eace a!1d onl.cr ~ <il1'1 to secure protection 
to trC\de ;md commerce li.ith the native territories." He Hi!"h~d Clarke 
"especially to con~~ider , 1hcthe1· it ,.;nuld be advisable ·to appoint <.>. 
British Officer to res ide in <'!11)' of the .st<\tcs ~ wit.h the full com::cnt of 
the native Government", and added that the expenses so incurred would 
have to be defrayed by the Straits Government. 1 
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The appointment of a British officer to the J.talay states had 
been recommended to the Colonial Office by the Anson committee in 1871, 
but the proposal was then rejected by Ydmberley who thought the move 
vas uncalled for.
2 
But two years later the situation in •~laya had 
changed and now the Colonial Secretary believed that some action must 
be taken. 
The new Straits Governor, Andrew Clarke, was a far more energetic 
man than his immediate predecessor. Soon after he arrived in Singapore, 
in November 1873, he concentrated his attention on Malay affairs. 
Instead of mer~ly mAking enquiries and reporting to the Colonial Office, 
as instruc~ed, Governor Clarke took swift actions. In January 1874 he 
secured an agreement between the rival Chinese miners in Larot by which 
the leaders of both parties agreed to accept British arbitration to 
settle the disputed claims over mining ar6as. A few days later, on 
20 January, Governor Clarke proceeded to conclude an agreement with the 
chiefs on the island of Perak, which came to be known as the Pangkor 
. Treaty.) By this treaty, Sultan Ismail was pensi~ned off and Abdullah 
1 Kimberley to Andrew Clarke, 20 September 1873, P.P. 1874, XLV, 38-39t 
Parkinson, British Intervention, 111-112; Cowan, Nineteenth Century }lalaya, 
174-175· 
2 See above PP• 141-144. 
3 For Clarke's proceedings in Perak, aee Veitch,Life of Sir Andre~ 
Clarke, 147-156; Clarke to Kimberley, 26 January 1874, 24 February 1874; 
T. Braddell (attorney-general): I~eoort on the Proceerlin9s nt Perak and 
Larot on the Occasion of the Visit o f Si r Andrew Cla rke in January 1874, 
in P•P• 1874, XLV, 70-73, 108-114, and 160-176 respectively. 
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installed in his place. The most important stipulation, as far as 
Britain's policy vas concerned, vas Article VI by which the new Sultan 
agreed to accept the appointntent of a British resident: 
That the Sultan receive and provide a suitable residence 
for a British officer to be called Resident, who shall be 
accredited to his court, and whose advice must be asked 
and acted upon on all questions other than those touching 
Malay Religion and Custom. 
By Article VII it vas provided that an assistant resident, with similar 
powers and subordinate only to the Resident, should be attached to 
1 Larot. The same proceedings took place also in Selangor and Sungei 
Ujong in February and April respectively. Tenku Kudin's position was 
strengthened when Governor Clarke appointed him, together with McNair 
and Davidson, to try the Malays who were implicated in a piracy that took 
place in late 1873.2 It is obvious that Clarke had exceeded 
his instructions in these proceedings. 
In explaining the new departure in )~ayan policy in 1873, 
Parkinson emphasizes the point that when Kimberley appointed Andrew 
Clarke as Straits Governor in May 187J, Gladstone 1 s government vas 
1 For the engagements, see Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties and Enaagements, 
28-JO, 35, 37; P.P. 1874, XLV, 81-82, 83-84; Parkinson, British Intervention; 
J2J•325 appendix A. 
2 For Clarke's proceedings in Selangor, see Clarke to Kimberley, 
24 February 18741 T. Braddcll, Report on the Proceedin~s of Government 
Relating to the Native States, 18 l'ebruary 1874, in P.P. 1874, XLY, 181-2, 
184-195· For Clarke's actions in Sungei Ujong, see Clarke to Carnarvon, 
8 May 1874, P.P. t874, XLV, 232-2)4. Also!ve~tch, Life of Sir
1
A. Cl~rke, 
156-164 for Selangor and 165-171 for Sunge1 UJong. For Clarke s ~ct1ons 
generally, see Cowan, Nineteenth Century Halaya, 176-211 and Parkinson, 
British Intervention, 119-142. 
tottering. The Government had lost a vote on 12 March 1873 on the 
Irish University Bill. The fall of the Government was expected, and 
it was as a member of a defeated ministry that Kimberley made the 
appointment. What Parkinson implies here is that the Liberal ministry 
had little to do with the new policy in Malaya. He assigns a larger 
share of responsibility to the new Governor, who was very close to both 
the Liberals and the Conservatives. Clarke was a close friend of H. c. E. 
Childers and Montagu Corry; the former was then Gladstone's First Lord 
of the Admiralty, and the latter Disraeli 1s long-time private secretary.1 
Because of these connections, Parkinson says that Clarke, who was fully 
alive to the political atmosphere, might have had inside infonnation 
about the political prospects when he left for Singapore before the 
1874 general election. We may also add here that both Childers 
and Clarke were among the earliest members of the Colonial Society 
(later Royal Colonial Institute) when it was formed in 1868, which 
was the first appreciable sign of a revived interest in colonial 
affairs. Thus, Parkinson seems to suggest that Clarke acted in 
1 Hugh Culling Eardley Childers (1827-1396), went to Melbourne in 
1850 and remained there until 1857, held various positions: member of 
the executive and legislative councils and member of the first Victorian 
cabinet; elected M.P. for Pontefract in 1860 and represented it until 
1885; financial secre!tary to the Treasury from August 1865 to June 1866; 
first lord of the Admiralty (1868-71) and later Chancellor of the Duchy 
of Lancaster (1872-3) in Gladstone's first ministry. ~. XXII, 423-26. 
~fontagu Corry ( 18JB-190J), 1st baron Rowton, prominent member of 
the Conservative Party; Disraeli's private secretary from 1866 until 
his death in 1881; Disraeli's inseparable companion in public life, 
~' (20th Century) , 422-423. 
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1874 without sanction from the Colonial Office because ha knew that the 
Conservatives, expected to form the next government soon and to adopt a 
forward policy, would sustain him. 1 But Park1"nson has ignored Kimberley's 
role in the making of the new Malayan policy. 
Kimberley \-las praised by John }lor ley for his 11capaci ty, industry, 
probity, independence, entire single-mindness .u2 In the words of 
E.Drus, editor of Kimberley's political journal, Kimberley was "a most 
able and conscientious departmental minister.113 Kimberley had succeeded 
Granville as Colonial Secretary in 1870, at a time when public opinion 
in Britain was showing great interest in colonial affairs. To what 
extent Kimberley played ~ part in the early phase of I~perial resurgence 
is not certain. Of one thing we are sure: when he became Colonial 
3ec.r~ta.~:·y, Lh~ .imp~.~: ·.ial.isi.s{ as exponents oi Imperial uni iy ana opponents 
to separatism) felt relieved. 4 He also received praise from colonial 
governors for his sympathetic support.5 Although he shared the prevailing 
1 Parkinson, British Intervention, 106-111; see Veitch, Life ~f Sir 
A.Clarke, 128-131 for Clarke 1 s correspondence on the ~Uolitical prop~ects 
of the 1874 general election. 
2 CHBE vol.III,J1. __ , 
J -::,Drus, "The Annexation of Fiji", R~H.S.(Transactions), XXXII(1950~,97• 
4 Schuyler, Fall of t .he Old Colo~al Sys tem, 276; C.A.Dodelscn, 
Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism (Copenhagen, 1924), 113. For 
the revival of interest in ;olonial affail·s, see .3chuyler, Fall of the 
Old Colonial System, 272-278; Bodelsen, Imperial~, chapter II; 
Burt, British Empire, 4ltJ-454; ~,vol.III,26-28; J.E.TyJ.er, The Struqgle 
for Imperial Unity,t868-q5( London:Longmans,19J8), 1-6. For the meaning 
of "imperialism" used he re see Bodelsen, pre face P•7• 
5 ~,vol.III,J1. 
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pessimism about maintaining the Empire intact, he was opposed to the 
separatist policy of Gladstone, Granville, Cardwell and Lowe. He wrote 
on 2 March 1872 that he could conceive "no greater fol}y than to dr-ive 
Canada and the Australian colonies into separation". 1 Kimberley urged 
the prime minister to support the annexation of Fiji, although the former 
vas opposed to extensive increases in territory. "At present," he wrote 
to Gladstone on 26 J'uly 1871 "we neither allow the English settlers 
to establish a government for themselves nor provide a government for 
them. This seems to me to be quite unreasonable.w2 
T}:le Ashantee expedition in 1873 1 which was a response to the 
invasion of Gold Coast by the Ashantees, reveals Kimberley a.e an 
energetic Colonial Secretary. Together with the War Secretary, 
Edward Cardwell, Kimberley supported the expeditionary plans o:f Sir 
Garnet Wolseley, who was appointed the Administrator of Gold Coast and 
CoiDIIIander of the expeditionary forces. Two months before it went to the 
Cabinet, the decision to send troops to the Gold Coast was taken by 
3 Kimberley, Cardwell and Wolseley. When cross-examined by some o:f his 
colleagues on the subject of the expedition, as Wolseley records, 
Kimberley was so annoyed that he banged his fist on the table, saying 
1 A Journal of Events Durinn the Gladstone Ministry t868-t874, by 
John first Earl of Kimberley, edited by E. Drus, in Royal Historical Soci~ty, Camden t-tiscellany, XXI ( 1958) (hereafter Kimberley's Journal) t 29. 
2 " t · f F ... 11 98 Quoted in Drus, Annexa 1on o 1~1, • 
3 w. D. J.tclntyre,"British Policy in West Africa", The Historical 
Journal, vol. I (1962), 26-39· 
' . ' ~ ('. ; . ·;: ' .. ·.;..· 
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"either this expedition comes off or I cease to be Colonial Secretary."t 
When Gladstone knew of the plan, he counselled caution, but his 
intervention came too late. As Kimberley notes in his journal, Gladstone 
was "aghast at the expenditure" of the expedition. 2 
Kimberley was thus energetic and forward moving, conducting 
colonial affairs within the general policy of the reluctant Gladstone, 
but displaying considr.rable initiative on his own. Gladstone was opposed 
to annexation of territory. When Germany, after the Franco-German War, 
intended to annex Alsace-Lorraine, Gladstone wanted to prot.est to Germany, 
but failed to do so because of lack of support from his colleagues. He 
wrote to John Bright ~n 16 November 1870 that "England, I think, can 
never contemplate with satisfaction the transference of unwilling 
r--or~J <>t.i nn 'from onr. country of Eurooe to another.113 Kimberley did not 
think that Gladstone 1 s policy was practical. The Colonial Secretary 
noted on JO September 1870 that "Gladstone wants to address a remonstrance 
to Germany against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine contrary to the 
wishes of the population on the ground that it has become the settled 
practice in Europe not to transfer territory from one state to another 
without the consent of the inhabitants," and added that "I am very glad 
4 . 
the project has been abandoned." 
'i Quoted in t-fclntyre, 11Bri tish Policy in West Africa", JJ • 
2 Kimberley's Journal, 42, entry of 22 September 1873• 
J Quoted in Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreinn Polic~, 59; see also 55-56; 
59-61; and Temperley & Penson, .Dri tish Foreign Polley, J24-J27; Seton-
Watson, Britain in Europe, 4:99· 
4: Kimberley's Journa~, 18-19. 
. 171 
Gladstone opposed any increase of Britain's territorial 
responsibilities abroad. As Paul Knaplund's excellent analysis of 
Gladstone's colonial policy reveals, Gladstone was aware of the magnitude 
of the task of Empire, and felt that Britain's primary duty was to 
develop the lands already acquired. Yet Gladstone also understood that 
at the frontier of the Empire there were strong forces at work promoting 
expansion. When it was urged that Britain annex the Fiji islands, 
Gladstone refused to consent. In the debate on the subject in the House 
of Commons, on 25 June 1872, Gladstone declared that although the 
Government had not taken a vow that "nothing shol:lld induce it to add to 
the territory or territorial responsibility of Britain", the general 
policy in this stt>uld be that the British Government "would not annex 
any territory, great or s~all, without the well understood and expressed 
wish of the people to be annexed, freely and generously expressed, and 
1 
authenticated by the best means the case could afford". This principle 
he reiterated in another debate on the SMde subject on 13 June 1873.2 
A further example of Gladstone's reluctance to approve the 
annexation of new territory can be found in the annexation of the South 
African Diamond Fields in 1811. The Diamond Fields were claimed by both . 
the Griqua chief, Waterboer, and the Boer republic, the Orange Free 
State. Thousands of miners, who were British subjects, had flocked into 
1 P. Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's ImperiAl Policy (London: 
Frank Cass, 1966 new impression), 133-139· 
2 Hansard, 3rd. ser. CCXLVI (1873), 13 June 1873, 943-949. 
' •• • --· ··· #. , .... - ·· : · ---.:.:. • • • : •• • :·_,, :-- :~~--~- ·:. : : 
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that district to work in the gold mines. The British Government was 
urged to annex the place. The Colonial Office decided not to annex 
the territory, unless Cape Colony would take full responsibility 
for it and the inhabitants consented to the step. 1 Gladstone was then 
told that Waterboer wanted to cede his country to Britain; that the 
claims of the Orange Free State were11very weak"; and that Cape Colony 
was ready to annex and assume full responsibility for the Diamond Fields. 
It was only then that Gladstone reluctantly approved of the proposal. 
As he wrote to Kimberley on 11 tolay 1871: 11I f, as appears, the parties be 
willing and the resolution of the Legislature of the Cape unequivocal, 
I do not object to the proposed annexation of the Diamond Fields, 
while I regret the necessity which brings it about. 112 
Sir Henry Barkly, Governor of Cape Colony, was then authorized 
to annex the Diamond Fields, subject to the conditions imposed by the 
Colonial Office. Before the Cape Parliament passed an annexation bill, 
Governor Darkly hastily prpclaimed the Diamond Fields British territory, 
thereby violating Kimberley's instructions. Nevertheless, Barkly convinced 
Kimberley of the necessity of immediate action, and Kimberley sanctioned 
the annexation without consulting Gladstone. For this Kimberley 
apologised later on 10 December 1871 to Gladstone; he told his chief 
that Barkly was a p1~dent man who could be trusted and asked for 
1 CHBE vol.III, 39· _, 
2 Quoted in Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperi,al Policy, 135 • 
. , . .  ·-.....•. -·. .. -· -.. ---~---~----.:- ·- .......... ; . .,_ ...... :.:. ::..~ 
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Gladstone's confidence in deali~g with the South African situation. 
Gladstone and the Cabinet had no alternative but to sustain Kimberley. 1 
In the case of the annexation of Fiji, we meet the same reluctant 
Prime Minister and vigorous Colonial Secretary. Gladstone wrote to 
Kimberley .that he did not want "to be a party to any arrangement for 
adding Fiji and all that lies beyond it to the cares of this overdone 
and· overb~rdened Government and Empire".2 To this Kimberley replied: 
"I take a more sanguine view I confess of the power and energy of this 
country than you do." Gladstone's reply was disanuing: "It is quite 
right you should be more sanguine than I, for I am old and begin to feel 
it.113 By F'ebn.~ary 1873 Kimberley had been converted to 'the need of 
. . 4 annexing Fiji, while the Prime l-1inister still rema1ned unconv1nced. 
On 1) June 1873 Gladstone said in Parliament that "the chill of age" 
was coming upon him, and that he "confessed lle did not feel that excitement 
for the acquisition of new territory.n5 
Gladstone seems to have kept an eye on his Colonial Secretary. 
·. · lCnaplund tells us that many drafts of Kimberley's despatches bear the 
annotation· ttaeen by Hr. Gladstone", and suggests ·that probably Kimberley 
1 Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy, 1)6. 
2 Quoted in Ibid., 136; also Drus, "Annexation of Fi.ii ~' 102 • 
.) Quoted in Drus, ''Annexation of Fiji~· 102. 
4 CHDE vol. III, J4; see Drus, 97-104 for Kimberley and Gladstone's attit~'to the proposed annexation of Fiji, which eventually came . 
about on 10 September 1874. 
5 Hansard, Jrd. ser. CCXVI (187.3), 1J Ju.ne 1873, 945. 
' · ... -- · • . . · .. _____ :._ .. __ ..:... __ : •. ::. :.: ::..:.:::-:· ·:~· ..... -.:..:..:.::·::. _·.:::=_-.::,. 
enjoyed less freedom f1·om control than Granville did. 1 Another study 
ot the history of the Colonial Office comes to the same conclusion: 
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"Thus Kimberley deferred much to Gladstone and Gladstone to the Cabinet.n2 
Thus while Kimberley may have been convinced of the need for a 
change in policy towards the Malay states, he also had reasons for delay. 
Not the least important of these reasons was that he could not meet the 
requirements of Gladstone. 
We have seen that Parkinson attributes the new policy towards 
the Malay states to Britain's domestic politics. Cowan, unlike Parkinson, 
seeks his answer to the question in international rivalry. Kimberley's 
decision to reverse the policy of non-intervention in Malaya, Cowan 
suggests, was prompted by the fear that some other European power, 
particularly Germany, might be invited to intervene in Malaya. The 
decision, he says, vas taken by Kimberley on his own initiative.3 
There is no doubt that Kimberley took the initiative, as we ha~e 
seen earlier. But Cowan seems to have overstated the possible threat 
posed by other European powers to Britain in the Malay Peninsula. The 
British had long established their supremacy in the area, a supremacy 
never challenged by any other European power since the Anglo-Dutch Treaty 
of 1824. 
1 Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Poli~, ~00. 
2 ~' vol. III, 737• 
'J Cowan, Nineteenth Century l-falaya, t66-t69; 173•175• 
... ... ~- --~ ·-- . ···-·- ·-···- -· ---~ -- ~- ___ . __ _ ..._ ...... _ .::::.:...: 
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The Dutch were perhaps the most powerful in the Malay Archipelago, 
and their energetic expansion in Sumatra in the 1860s had, no doubt, 
roused great concern among the Singapore merchants. 1 But by the time 
the Sumatra Convention of 1871 was signed, whereby Britain removed any 
objections to Dutch expansion in Sumatra in return for equal tariff 
treatment there, disputes between Holland and Britain arising from 
2 colonial rivalry had largely been removed. Furthermore the Dutch had 
declared war in April 1873 on Acheh, in Sumatra, beginning what came to 
be the longest war in Dutch colonial history, endi~g in 1908.3 As 
R. Emerson clearly points out, "there 8eems no reason to suspect that 
the slightly later date of the British advance (in Malaya) can be 
att.r·iuuteu to auy £ear of an expan&ion ot Dutch ambitions to include the 
4 Peninsula as well as Sumatra". One wonders, in .fact, whether the 
Dutch oauld afford io entertain any pretensions on the other side of 
the Straits of Malacca. 
1 D. G. E. Hall, Historv of South East Asia, 494-495; Buckley, 
Anecdotal History, 66)-664; Cameron, Z.lalayan India, 175-176, 195-196; 
Tarling, British Policv, 159-16J. . 
2 For the Sumatra convention, see Haxwell & Gibson, Treaties and 
Engapemente, 17•19, and Convention for Sumatra, P.P. 1872, LXX (C-475), 
1-2; D. G. E. Hall, History of South East Asia, 474-475, 495· 
3 D~ G. E. f~ll, History of South East Asia, 495-498. 
4 Emerson, P.lalaysia, 112; D. G. E. llall, agrees with.Emereon, 475· 
w. D. Mcintyre, "Disraeli •s Election Blunder: The Stra1ts of' 1-Ialacca 
Issues in the 1874 Election," Renais!lance and Hodern Studies, vol. V 
(1961) 71-105 refutes the suggestions that the Sumatra convention 
and th~ transf;r of Dutch settlements in West Africa to the British 
was a bargain between the two countries. 
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The French, another established colonial power in this part of 
the world, were on the move in the early 1870~, but being recently 
defeated in war with Germany, were not powerful enough to pose a threat 
to the British in the folalay Peninsula. 1 The Spaniards, being busy in 
the Philippines, do not seem to have entered the scene at all. 
In 1870 Germany did not rank as a colonial rival in the 
calculations of the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office • . When the 
Foreign Office received a rumour that Prussia had secured an island off 
the east coast of fo~laya, it merely passed the information to the Colonial 
Office. Rogers minuted that he did not "object to European neighbours 
in the Indian Oceans, and if Prussia likes to have an island there, 
I should let her 2 by all means". In the ewumer of 1870, Robert Herbert, 
then assistant under-secretary, even suggested inviting the North German 
Confederation to annex Fiji, and this idea had general acceptance in 
the Colonial Office.) During the Franco-Prus~ian war Kimberley was 
ready to see a victorious Germany rather than France. He noted on 
7 September 1870: "The North Germansare socially a very disagreeable 
race, but their supremacy would be less dangerous to Europe than that 
4 
of France." In the Malayan Peninsula, the Germans had no footing at 
1 D. G. E. Hall, Historx of South East Asia, 568-577• 
2 Quoted in Cowan, Nineteenth Century folalaya, 170, note 85; Tarling, 
British Policy, 85. 
) E. Drus, "Annexation of Fiji", 9.3-4. 
4 Kimberleys Journal, 18. 
-· ~ . . -.. · ... ··-.. 
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all, and there was no sign of any serious attempt to establish themselves. 
After the Franco-Gennan war Britain's attitude towards Genuany in 
Europe changed markedly, as Cowan emphasizes. 1 Disraeli's Crystal 
Palace speech on 24 June 1872, which was an indication that imperialism 
had won the day and that separatism had lost, was followed by a debate 
in Parliament on the protection of Fiji, but tnis does not seem to have 
2 been directed against Germany. The1·e was competition between Britain 
and Germany, as well &s the United States, in Samoa; but the Germans did 
not obtain a treaty from Samoa until 1879.3 In fact, German overseas 
expansion was to come in the next decade.4 In 1870 there were also 
rumours of Italian and American intervention in Sumatra, but all came 
to nothing.5 Therefore, it is safe to say that foreign intervention 
was not the ~jor factor motivating Kimberley in 1873. 
That Kimberley was convinced of the necessity of changing British 
policy in }lalaya is further illustrated by what he said in public 
after he had left the Colonial Office. Supporting his successor at 
the Colonial Office, Carnarvon, who defended the proceedings of Governor 
1 Cowan, Nineteenth Century J.lalaya, 111-2. 
2 For Disraeli's speech, see Bennett, Concept of Emnire, 257-9; 
for an analysis of the speech, see Bodelsen, Imperialism, 120-24 • 
.J CIIDE, Vol. Iii, 324-5• 
-
4 w. o. Henderson, Studies in German Colonial History (London: 
Frank Cass, 1962), 3-5· 
· 5 D. G. E. Hall, HistorY of South East Asia, 474-5; Cowan, Nineteenth 
Century t-talaya, 170; Mcintyre, ''Disraeli 1 s Blunder", 99-100. 
Clarke, Kimberley declared in the House of Lords in J.fay 1874 that 
Clarke "had exercised a wise discretion in the proceedings he had takenn. 1 
Later, when the death of the first Resident at Perak, J. w. Birch, 
killed in a "mlay reaction to British intervention, was raised in the 
House of Lords, Kimberley said that he had "no desire to disclaim any 
responsibility that probably belonged to him; and was ready to admit 
that although he had not actually sanctioned the act of Sir Andrew Clarke 
in appointing a Resident in the Peninsula, still he was first inclined 
to think that step promised well".2 Kimberley's speech later in the 
same year clearly indicated his strong conviction of the need to change 
the policy bec.:..use of the peculiar situation that then existed in the 
Malayan Peninsula, as has been discussed above.3 
In conclusion, it is reasonable to say that Kimberley initiated 
a new Malayan policy in September 1873 bec~use he thought he could 
fulfill Gladstone's requirements. Although he was urged in 1871 - and. 
1872 by local officials and influential merchants to extend British 
protection to the Malay states, and was himself convinced of the necesoity 
for a change in policy because of the chaotic situation in the "~layan 
Peninsula, he could not take immediate action because he had not found 
a way to satisfy the requirements of Gladstone in regard to further 
territorial expansion. But, when Kimberley received Tenku Kudin's 
1 Hansard, 3rd. ser. CCXIX (1874), 19 May 1874, 477• 
2 Ibid., CCXXVII (1876), 28 February 1876, 1017. 
-
3 See above PP• 157-158• 
~~ ···----·----------·- --· --- -------
. --- - ·--~- · - ·-. 
179 
message asking for British protection, the Colonial Secretary was ready 
to consent now that he had some evidence that could be presented .to 
meet the Prime Minister's conditions. 
That Kimberley's instructions of 20 September 1873 signified a 
change in •~layan policy becomes more obvious if we recall the earlier 
policy of the Colonial Office after the transfer. First, the Colonial 
Office insisted on controlling closely the colony's external relations, 
particularly relations with the ~~lay states. The Governor could not 
initiate any agreement or treaty with tbem unless in pursuance of a 
policy of the Imperial Government, as found in his instructions. 
Secondly, Kimberley had on earlier occasions refused to consider British 
protectorates in the ~~layan Peninsula, and rejected the idea of appointing 
British officers to the l-falay states. But in his instructions of 
20 September 1873, Kimberley not only saw the necessity to take action, 
but also spelt out specific measures that could be taken. 
The Liberal Government had, in the meantime, been defeated in 
the general election of January-February 1874. ~~en the reports of 
Governor Clarke's proceedings in Perak reached London, Kimberley had 
left the Colonial Office. Thus it was Carnarvon, Disraeli's Colonial 
Secretary, who had to face the fait accompli. 
Carnarvon approved the course taken by Clarke in Perak, 
Selangor and Sungei Ujong. The Pangkor Treaty was confirmed and the 
appointment of British Residents to the three states approved towards 
--· - ·· ... -·· ··-······--
., 
/ 
the end of 1874.1 Thus, a new Malayan policy came into being, 
largely because of pressures at the frontier of Empire; a policy which 
inaugurated in Dritish Malaya a system of indirect rule known as the 
residential system. 
1 Carnarvon to Clarke, 6 March 187~, 29 May 187~, in P.P. 1874, 
XLV, 88, 231-2)2. 
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Conclusion 
The t ransfer of the Straits Settlements from the Indian Government 
to the Colonial Office was the result of a persistent demand which 
originated in the Straits mercantile community. The demand stemmed from 
the outmoded and inadequate political arrangen1ent by which the Straits 
Settlements were governed. The increasing in~ortance of Singapore in 
the Empire commercially and strategically required a far more attentive 
government than the Indian Goventment could offer. The strong desire 
on the part of the inhabitants to have a say in their government -added 
support to the campaign for transferring the Stra1ts Settlements to the 
Colonial Office. The expansion of the Dutch, the French and the Spaniards 
emphasized the need for lmperial protection. It was natural that the 
mercantile community should have wished to be placed under the administraton 
of the British Government,by which syl!ltem they would have a better fonn 
of government, more vigilant -rmperial protection, and some representation 
in the local government which would have a freer hand in conducting 
external affairs. 
But the transfer involved increased In~erial responsibility, 
especially in military defence. From the viewpoint of the Imperial 
Government the demand was contrary to the trend of colonial policy of the 
day, which was towards relaxation of imperial control. As Lord Carnarvon 
riohtly stated in 1859 in the House of Lords, the proposed transfer was 
something novel in the history of the Colonial Office. The Imperial 
Government was sympathetic to the idea initially, but the policy of 
economy was paramount. It became more reluctant when doubts arose ~s 
·-·-·· - -· - ---·-·-· . 
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to whether the Straits Settlements were l!!lelf-supporting. The new colonial 
military policy, which required that the coloniel!!l make greater contribution8 
to their own defence, added l!ltrength to the position of the Trea8 u1"Y• 
It was only after the Straits Settlements' ability to finance their own 
defence wal!!l proved and the strategic importance of Singapore more fully 
appreciated that the Imperial Government eventually consented to the 
transfer. 
The transfer not only signified an increase in Imperial control 
but also produced important constitutional changel!l. The outmoded l!lystem 
of "one-man" government ended with the provision of an Executive Council 
and a Legislative Council. With the inc! us ion of unofficial ntembers 
in the latter body, the new government had some element of popular 
representation. Another aspect of the campaign for the transfer was 
the gl'owing del!!lire in the Straits Settlements for British intervention .. 
. . 
in the Malayan Peninl!!lula~ a desire which grew greater .after 1867. 
A strikingly l!!limilar situation to that of the transfer existed 
with regard to the events of 187J-74. The chaotic political situation in 
the •lalayan Peninsula and its impact on British trade, or more properly 
the Straits trade, made British intervention highly desirable in the eyes 
of the local merchantl!!l. However, this was not compatible with Imperial 
policy which resisted further territorial increases or Imperial 
responsibilities. A forward policy gradually took shape in the Straits 
Settlements but was rejected by the British Government under Gladstone. 
Kimberley, although refusing initially to appoint British officers to 
-· _., ....... -.. ·· · ··-. · - ·~·----·-·"-··· · -·-_;.::..: ...:..· :_::.·-~" 
the · J.lalay states, recognized that British protection was unavoidable. 
But he was more or less restrained by the requirement of Gladstone 
that British rule only be extended in response to native demand. When 
Kimberley secured Tenku Kudin's request for British protection, the 
Colonial Secretary then felt free to act and instructed the new Straits 
governor Sir Andrew Clarke to investigate the need for a cl1ange in policy, 
a change which came soon after. 
The interplay between I.mperial nnd colonial needs and interests 
detennined the course of the development of the new Halayan policy as 
well as the ultimate outcome. Especially important were the colonial 
mercantile interests located on the fr~ntier of Empire, but capable of 
exerting powerful influence on the govenlDlent in London. 'the establishment 
of the Straits Settlements as a Crown Colony, coupled with the extension 
of British protection over the ~~lay states, laid the foundation for 
"British ~lalaya". 
.. . . :··, :. ' . ... . ::., 
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